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Preface
The research data analysed in this thesis were collected in 1985-87 by the Sri 
Lankan Demographic Change Project (SLDCP), a joint project of the Demographic 
Training and Research Unit, University of Colombo and the Department of 
Demography, Australian National University (ANU). The project involved a broad 
examination of the long term causes of change in fertility and health behaviour using a 
mixture of anthropological and more orthodox demographic data collecting 
techniques. Sri Lanka is a facinating laboratory for analysing demographic change. It 
has experienced a dramatic mortality decline this century with average life expectancy 
at birth rising from 35 years to over 70 years. The decline was particularly rapid in the 
late 1940s, when during an anti-malarial campaign, in a one year period 1946-1947, life 
expectancy increased from 43 to 52 years, a gain which had taken 50 years in Western 
countries (Petersen 1972: 560-562). In more recent times, and more gradually, fertility 
has also fallen to a total fertility rate of 2.3 in 1990 and a replacement level of two 
children per family can soon be anticipated. For South Asia, Sri Lanka's achievements 
are approached only by the Indian State of Kerala.
A distinguishing characteristic of Sri Lanka’s fertility decline has been the 
contribution of changing marriage patterns. Most of the fertility decline before the late 
1960s, and some of the later decline, can be attributed to a rise in the female age at 
marriage. Female age at marriage has risen elsewhere in South Asia but nowhere, even 
in Kerala, has it risen nearly so far or had a similar impact on fertility.
It was this contrast that most interested me about marriage in Sri Lanka. I had 
previously been involved in fieldwork in the South Indian State of Karnataka. While 
female age at marriage was rising there, pressures for early marriage were still strong 
and age at marriage remained much earlier than in Sri Lanka, even when controlling 
for education and other socio-economic factors. The contrast between Sri Lanka and 
India raised the question as to how to explain the difference in marriage patterns 
between the two, and whether India and other South Asian countries were likely to
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move toward the Sri Lankan pattern of late marriage. To answer these questions 
required knowing a great deal about the circumstances of marriage, and what has 
changed, particularly in Sri Lanka.
The single most obvious difference between the circumstances of marriage in 
Sri Lanka and India is in the selection of the marriage partner. In India, what is 
striking is the extraordinary stability of the marriage system, as of the social system as 
a whole. The choosing of a marriage partner is very much a family matter, the major 
change being that some of the more liberal families consult the individuals concerned 
to a greater degree than formerly. In Sri Lanka, in contrast, marriage is in a state of 
flux; arranged marriage seems to be in the process of being replaced by love marriage. 
The change, however, is somewhat more complex than this, because historical and 
anthropological writings suggest that family involvement in marriage differed 
considerably by region and ethnic group, and according to the circumstances of the 
marriage. This would seem a fundamental change as in South Asia the responsibility 
of parents to arrange a child's, especially a daughter's, marriage is one of the most 
important of all duties. It is part of the fundamental series of obligations between 
parents and children, and others at the heart of South Asian society. If the parents do 
not undertake their duties to their children, why should the children undertake their 
duties in return, such as looking after their parents in the parents' old age? The 
breakdown of arranged marriage implies a major reorganization of society.
A n  explanation of the changes in Sri Lanka's marriage patterns requires dealing 
with a series of problems. The first is are the changes in female age at marriage 
connected to the changes in the processes of marriage, that is how a marriage partner is 
selected and what is required in a marriage? If they are related, how? Furthermore, 
how can the decline of arranged marriage in Sri Lanka be explained, and what does it 
indicate about larger changes in the society? If it is possible to answer these questions 
then there is the general issue of whether the lessons to be learnt from Sri Lanka have 
more general applicability. Do they explain why female age at marriage throughout 
Asia is rising? Do the changes that are occurring in Asia have similar causes to the late
female marriage age that has long prevailed in the West (where it does seem to be 
associated with independent marriage)? Do they help explain why the changes in 
marriage have, apart from Sri Lanka, been less in South Asia generally, than in the rest 
of Asia?
To examine these questions the thesis starts in Chapter 1 with an analysis of the 
determinants of marriage patterns and particularly age at marriage in the West. The 
West is relevant because female marriage age has long been late there, and the reasons 
for this have been discussed extensively in the demographic literature. It is of interest 
to know what there is in common between the rises in age at marriage in Asia and 
what has long been the situation in the West. It is also of interest to know whether the 
changes in marriage patterns are part of a more generalized change in Asian society 
toward the situation prevailing in the West, either in conscious imitation or because 
underlying conditions are becoming more similar.
Chapter 2 examines the changes in marriage in Asia in general and Sri Lanka, in 
particular. Section 2.1 starts with a general survey of marriage patterns in Asia and the 
explanations given in the literature for those patterns. This provides the context for an 
examination of marriage patterns in Sri Lanka in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 examines the 
writings of demographers on marriage patterns in Sri Lanka. Section 2.4 examines 
factors critical to an understanding of the changes which have taken place in Sri Lanka.
Chapter 3 outlines the methodology used in the Sri Lankan Demographic 
Change Project, while Chapters 4 and 5 present the results of the data analysis of the 
SLDCP's marriage component. Chapter 4 covers marriage patterns concentrating on 
changes in the female marriage age while Chapter 5 examines changes in the marriage 
process, specifically the replacement of family arrangement in marriage by self­
selection. Chapter 6 draws together some of the threads particularly those between age 
at marriage and the nature of the marriage.
The comparison between marriage in Sri Lanka and in South Asia generally is 
cited a number of times partly because my interest in Sri Lankan marriage was sparked
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by my experience in India, but also because it throws light on the changes in marriage 
in both Sri Lanka and South Asia. However, this is not to suggest that what has 
happened in Sri Lanka will necessarily be repeated elsewhere in South Asia. Indeed, it 
is argued in the thesis that the disparity in marriage between Sri Lanka and mainland 
South Asia reflects long-standing differences in the social order. It is not possible, 
therefore, to assume that the rest of South Asia will follow the Sri Lankan model. To 
the degree that the wider social and economic order in South Asia may move toward 
that prevailing in Sri Lanka, marriage may change but it would be unprofitable to 
speculate on the extent and speed of such changes.
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Abstract
The study is concerned with the determinants of marriage patterns in Sri Lanka. 
Female age at marriage has been rising since censuses began recording it in 1901, until 
now Sri Lanka has easily the latest marriage age in South Asia. Sri Lanka's late 
marriage age has been attributed to an economic and social context where incomes are 
low and unemployment is high, and where young couples usually establish an 
independent household sometime after marriage. Reduced access to land, as a result of 
population growth and rising expectations, has meant that it is increasingly difficult for 
the young couple to raise the resources to marry. It has also been noted that a shortage 
of grooms in the marriage market may specifically have encouraged a later female 
marriage age.
While these factors are important they do not adequately explain long-term 
changes in marriage patterns; for this it is necessary to examine these changes within 
the total context of changes in marriage. The most important such change has been a 
decline in arranged marriage and its replacement by self-selection in marriage. 
Arranged marriage has declined because marriage itself has changed in response to the 
increasing individualization of society. Marriage, and the rights and responsibilities 
that go with it, in the past involved not simply two individuals but also their families 
and even the wider community.
Marriage reflected a society in which an individual's status depended upon his 
membership of a wider group, generally based on kinship, the most important of 
which was the family. A marriage concerned all family members for it imposed 
obligations and, in return, gave rights for the families as well as the individuals 
marrying; for example, it might involve dowry, or influence the inheritance of family 
property, or create a useful alliance with another family. It also had implications for 
family status; it was important for instance that the individual came from a suitable 
family or caste. For the young to have disputed the family's right to be involved in the 
marriage would have been to dispute their place in the family.
XThis family-based society no longer holds. A new economic system has 
emerged which places a much greater emphasis on individual attributes, and in which 
achieved status counts for more than ascribed status. The family is much less 
important. Therefore, the members of the family place less pressure on other family 
members to behave according to the interests of the family as a whole. This applies, in 
particular, to the arrangement of marriage; the family members have less interest in 
arranging a marriage as its consequences matter less to them, and the young have less 
interest in having their marriages arranged, because what they gain in return is of less 
value.
The increasing individualization of society has also affected marriage patterns. 
In the past, the ties established by marriage were vital for an individual to be a 
functioning adult in society. The only role outside marriage was that of the monk, 
which was essentially available only for males. Marriage now is less a matter of 
establishing social ties and more restricted to forming a unit for raising children. 
Marriage is, consequently, less essential than before, and hence celibacy is more 
possible. The changes also mean that early marriage is less advantageous than 
previously. Where family considerations dominated over individual considerations 
the advantages of early marriage were greater than the disadvantages. For the family 
early marriage has certain advantages, ties with other families can be established 
earlier, the risk of an elopement is less, a younger bride is often more accepting of 
family authority, while there are few disadvantages; emphasis was placed on family 
attributes including family status, caste and property, all of which were independent of 
the age of the individual. For the individual too, the earlier they married the sooner 
they were accepted into full adult status. Now, however, that the family is less 
important, the advantages of early marriage for it are less relevant, while the 
advantages of later marriage are increasing. Most importantly, more emphasis is being 
placed on individual attributes, many of which, such as education, employment and 
especially experience and maturity, take time to accumulate, and thus encourage a later 
age at marriage.
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In comparison to the rest of South Asia Sri Lanka's age at marriage was always 
somewhat later because pressures for very early marriage were never as strong; 
differences in family and kinship structure, in caste, and in the strength of the local 
community meant that early marriage was always less advantageous in Sri Lanka.
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1C hapter 1
Introduction: the cau ses o f m arriage
change
1.1 Why stu dy m arriage in  Sri Lanka?
This thesis is concerned with m arriage in Sri Lanka. M arriage is a 
topic of great in terest to social scientists for it is fundam ental to the 
formation of the family, arguably the central institution of society. It is 
w ithin the family th a t socialization and, especially before the expansion of 
formal schooling, most education take place. In many societies, moreover, 
the family is not only a consumption unit but also the prim ary production 
unit, responsible, for example, for farm ing the family plot or operating the 
family shop. Ties created by m arriage may also play a critical role in social 
organization.
M arriage has a particu lar in terest for demographers because most 
societies sanction reproduction only w ithin m arriage. Consequently, the 
natu re  of the relationships established by m arriage, particularly th a t 
between husband and wife, but also with other family members, will affect 
any decisions influencing fertility, such as w hether or not to use 
contraception.
More directly, factors such as age a t m arriage, particularly of 
females, proportions m arried and the stability of m arriage influence overall 
fertility, by determ ining the period during which it is socially acceptable for 
a woman to have children: this is of most importance where contraceptive 
usage is low. Significantly, changes in m arriage patterns tend to be the first 
factor to reduce fertility. W estern European fertility levels appear to have 
been constrained by a late  age a t m arriage, especially of women, and high
2proportions rem aining celibate, for centuries before any decline in m arital 
fertility which occurred mostly in the nineteenth century. In Asia there has 
been considerable evidence of rises in the female age a t m arriage 
contributing to declining fertility and to a large extent preceding declines in 
m arital fertility, especially in E ast Asia but also in South E ast Asia and 
South Asia. An outstanding example of such change has been Sri Lanka 
which has moved from being typically South Asian, with early m arriage, 
particularly  for women, and low levels of celibacy, to an age of m arriage 
high even by W estern standards and apparently increasing celibacy. These 
m arriage patterns led Kirk (1969:80-81) to refer to Sri Lanka as the Ireland 
of Asia. W hat is not certain is precisely why m arriage patterns have 
changed, and w hether the causes are related to those underlying the 
declines in m arital fertility.
Demographers have w ritten a great deal about m arriage change but 
principally with reference to developed countries. Most of what has been 
w ritten about m arriage change in societies where fertility is prim arily 
determ ined by the proportion of women m arried, is historical, being 
concerned with the European fertility transition. This is, indeed, the most 
in teresting litera ture  on the topic, though it inevitably suffers from its 
reliance on often scanty historical documentation and its inability to directly 
question the people concerned. The litera tu re  on contemporary change in 
developing countries, though being w ritten a t a time when researchers 
could still question those involved directly, is comparatively limited. The 
problem here seems to be twofold. First, the fertility impact of this 
'm arriage transition' is, in many countries, buried under wider changes in 
fertility resulting from changes in m arital fertility. Secondly, the 
abundance of statistical data in comparison with historical Europe has 
encouraged statistical analyses of considerable sophistication, but
3sometimes without the necessary follow-up consideration of what the results 
really mean.
A fully satisfactory analysis of m arriage patterns should take a 
holistic approach recognizing th a t they are bu t one aspect of m arriage and 
are likely to reflect more fundam ental changes in the nature  of m arriage. 
To understand m arriage patterns and other aspects of m arriage properly 
requires answering such questions as why people m arry, who makes the 
decision or has influence over it, w hat factors influence their decision, and 
w hat is the nature  of the m arriage relationship established. However, 
beyond their importance in helping to explain m arriage patterns, these 
concerns are of great in terest in themselves.
This thesis examines how social change has affected m arriage as a 
whole in Sri Lanka, including the nature of the m arriage union as well as 
m arriage patterns. Particular emphasis is given to the conditions of 
m arriage (what is regarded as necessary for marriage: for example, 
education, employment, housing), the arrangem ent of m arriage (who 
decides on it and on what basis), and the m arriage term s including the 
dowry and wedding arrangem ents.
Sri Lanka provides an excellent study area for such an investigation 
since m arriage there has undergone far-reaching changes in recent years. 
Many aspects of m arriage have changed from being typically South Asian to 
resembling W estern m arriage. Individuals, for example, are increasingly 
selecting their own m ates ra ther than  having them selected by their 
families.
This contrast between Sri Lanka and the rest of South Asia provides 
much of the study's interest. W hereas Sri Lanka has moved towards a 
W estern model, m arriage in the rest of South Asia rem ains in m any ways 
the very antithesis of contemporary W estern m arriage.
4South Asia has been distinguished by extremely early m arriage for 
females, often around or even before puberty, generally a large age gap 
between spouses, near-universal m arriage, great stability of m arriage, very 
low levels of rem arriage (among the H indus even the widows are 
discouraged from marrying), high m arriage payments (especially dowries) 
and arranged m arriage. These characteristics of m arriage are associated 
w ith the expectation th a t the young couple will live with the groom's family 
following m arriage. There is, however, evidence of change especially in the 
cities and in the southern part of the region. Age at m arriage is increasing, 
and in the cities the young are increasingly being consulted over their 
m arriage partners though it is still rare for them  to choose for themselves; 
against these trends m arriage payments are rising in many areas. The 
changes, however, have gone much further in Sri Lanka than  elsewhere. 
Because of this Sri Lanka provides an ideal case study to investigate the 
causes of m arriage change.
Before the analysis of Sri Lankan data  some aspects of the lite ra tu re  
regarding m arriage are discussed. Some is directly concerned w ith Sri 
Lanka but to place the discussion in a wider context and because the 
m aterial on Sri Lankan m arriage is patchy, it is necessary to examine the 
more general literature.
The litera ture  regarding m arriage in South Asia is given the m ain 
em phasis because Sri Lankan m aterial can only be understood fully in the 
South Asian context, and because a major in terest in studying Sri Lankan 
m arriage patterns is the contrast they provide to the m arriage patterns 
prevailing elsewhere in South Asia. The litera tu re  concerning European 
m arriage is discussed, because Europe may provide parallel evidence for 
many of the changes th a t Sri Lanka is currently undergoing, and because 
arguably Europe provides a model towards which other countries including 
Sri Lanka are moving, consciously or not. Goode (1963:1-2), in a very
5influential work on m arriage, argues tha t the only common them e in 
m arriage change is th a t all m arriage systems are moving towards a 
W estern model. His argum ent is based on the premise th a t there is no such 
thing as a traditional m arriage system, m arriage having differed greatly in 
different parts of the world, only modern m arriages having common 
characteristics. European m arriage is also significant because m any of the 
issues concerning m arriage patterns are found in its literature.
1.2 Why m arriage w as d elayed  in  Europe: M althus and the va lue of 
prudence
The litera ture  with which we are most concerned is th a t dealing with 
why European m arriage was late and why celibacy levels were high. This 
lite ra tu re  is in teresting in its own right, but, more im portantly for this 
thesis, it raises a num ber of issues concerning the relationship of m arriage 
patterns with other aspects of m arriage. The first w riter to discuss these 
issues, in particular the factors delaying European m arriage, was Thomas 
M althus in his celebrated Essay on Population , originally published in 1798 
and greatly enlarged subsequently.
M arriage played a critical role in M althus's theory of population. 
M althus (1970) argued th a t one of the keys to hum ankind's wealth and 
prosperity was the principle of population: th a t ultim ately, no m atter how 
industrious hum ans were, unless they restrained population growth, their 
num bers would tend to outrun food supplies. Population grew by 
geometrical progression with hum an populations doubling in less than  25 
years if unchecked, whereas agricultural production a t the most only grows 
arithmetically, once all the good agricultural land is tilled, because of 
diminishing returns. M althus said tha t population growth was restricted in 
two ways: by positive checks and preventive checks. Positive checks were 
essentially increases in death  rates resulting from high population growth, 
such as famine, disease, and warfare. Preventive checks were ways by
6which population growth could be reduced; the only one M althus approved 
of was through marriage. All other positive and preventive checks involved 
either 'vice' or misery. M arriage could affect population growth by either 
being delayed or not occurring a t all because those concerned prudently 
decided to wait until they had the necessary funds. M althus's prim ary 
message was th a t though governments could not force people to delay 
m arriage they could encourage people to be prudent. Private property was 
essential because people needed to be assured th a t the ir prudential 
forethought would accrue to their advantage. Equally the poor should be 
denied any right to support because such rights would discourage any 
prudent behaviour on their part and thereby condemn them  and others to 
misery.
M althus's emphasis on the principal means by which fertility should 
be controlled being m arriage, ra ther than  the use of contraception w ithin 
m arriage, reflects the unrespectability of the few contraceptive methods 
available such as condoms or coitus interruptus. It is also significant, 
however, th a t M althus saw prudence as the cardinal virtue, the abstention 
from m arrying until one had the resources to support a family a t the 
accustomed level of living and which one's peers regarded as respectable. 
M althus made no reference, as would a modern family planning advocate, to 
lim iting children to a num ber which could be properly looked after by the 
parents. Under M althus's scheme, if one were able to support dependants, 
one could m arry early and have many children, and, if one were unable to 
support any dependants properly one should not m arry a t all. There was no 
concept, of the type fam iliar to modern demographers, of an ideal num ber of 
children. Although this point may seem minor, it is pertinen t to a major 
source of disagreem ent among demographers: this is the degree to which 
changes in m arriage can be in terpreted as part of the demographic 
transition.
71.3 Was the E uropean m arriage pattern  part o f a m ultiph asic  
resp on se  to p op u lation  growth?
As noted above, changes in female age at m arriage and the 
proportions m arrying have often preceded changes in m arital fertility. This 
has been the case in Sri Lanka as well as a num ber of other Asian countries, 
and was the case - although often with a major gap in tim ing - in W estern 
Europe. It is not clear, however, why this should be so.
Hajnal (1965) pointed out th a t a t the time of the great decline in 
m arital fertility, W estern Europe was already m arked by a pa ttern  of late 
m arriage and high proportions who never married. This pa ttern  he called 
the European m arriage pattern, which he contrasted with the E ast 
European and non-European patterns of early and universal marriage. 
Hajnal was uncertain as to why the European m arriage pattern  had 
developed though he offered a num ber of suggestions which are examined 
below. W hat was certainly absent was a clear link between falls in 
m arriage rates and changes in m arital fertility.
Davis argued th a t such a link exists, referring to both sets of changes 
as being p art of a m ultiphasic response to population growth. Faced with 
rapid na tu ra l increase, 'fam ilies tended to use every demographic means 
possible to maximize their new opportunities and to avoid relative loss of 
s ta tu s’ (Davis, 1963:362).
In some ways Davis's concept is an extension of M althus's preventive 
checks. W hereas M althus argued th a t m arriage could be used to avoid 
impoverishm ent and to keep people living at the standards they felt proper 
to their station in life, Davis noted th a t there were a num ber of ways people 
could avoid poverty such as migration, contraception and abortion in 
addition or as alternatives to changing their m arriage behaviour. Which 
way they chose depended largely on their circumstances. He noted, for 
example, th a t one solution for agricultural populations was to m igrate to
8where work was available in the cities. Where such a solution was not 
possible, in more remote areas where people had few contacts with the cities 
or when there was little demand for their labour, people would have to use 
other solutions. Davis noted th a t the rural population's historical 
mechanism  for responding to population pressure was the postponement of 
m arriage. He noted (1963: 355-6):
They did this, of course, not as a deliberate effort to reduce fertility or to 
solve the population problem, but as a response to the complexity and 
insecurity of the new requirements for respectable adult status.
Davis seems to equivocate over whether delaying m arriage or 
practising contraception were conscious alternatives. The general 
implication of his argum ent is tha t delaying m arriage is simply an 
alternative to contraception (or migration) : Davis noted th a t town people 
who had access to contraception used it in preference to delaying m arriage. 
Similarly he commented (1963 : 361) tha t one reason for delaying m arriage 
was 'because it  was likely to lead to several children'. Yet elsewhere he 
seemingly dismissed the idea th a t delaying m arriage was merely equivalent 
to practising contraception as in the rem ark quoted above, as well as in a 
comment th a t
It is commonly claimed that the Irish postponed marriage or migrated as an 
alternative to practicing birth control within marriage. However, as Glass 
has noted data from the 1946 census show class differences in marital 
fertility. Furthermore, a decline of 25 per cent occurred in overall marital 
fertility between 1911 and 1946. Couples in Ireland, as elsewhere in 
Europe, were apparently taking to birth control...
Although Davis apparently  did not regard it as im portant w hether or 
not couples were consciously delaying m arriage to reduce their overall 
fertility, other dem ographers have treated this distinction as being critical.
The Princeton study of the European fertility transition trea ts 
changes in m arriage pa tterns as having essentially different origins from 
changes in m arital fertility. The study's leader, Ansley J. Coale, argued
9th a t the downturn in m arital fertility was marked by a conscious desire to 
control fertility, whereas before, although m arriage itself m ight be delayed, 
there was no conscious a ttem pt within m arriage to restrict the num ber of 
children, a situation th a t Louis Henry referred to as na tu ra l fertility. 
According to Henry (cited in Coale, 1969: 7),
control can be said to exist when the behaviour of the couple is bound to the 
number of children already born and is modified when this number reaches 
the maximum which the couple does not want to exceed; it is not the case 
for a taboo concerning lactation, which is independent of the number of 
children already born.
Coale remarks:
When birth control first appears among the married, fertility is usually 
reduced initially among women of high parity, and among women over 35 or 
40. This tendency clearly shows that voluntary birth control is usually 
employed at first to avoid children in excess of the number the couple 
wishes. A deliberate restrictive motive is implied by the age pattern of the 
change in fertility. On the other hand, it is highly dubious that if a couple 
gets married when the bride is 26 instead of 25, the purpose is to reduce the 
number of children they will have by one. It seems more plausible that 
couples postpone marriage because they do not command the resources 
conventionally needed for marital union in the Western European stem 
family tradition (Coale, 1969 : 7).
Im is a standardized index representing the proportion m arried in  the 
childbearing ages and indicating the extent to which m arriage is 
contributing to the achievement of the highest possible fertility. Coale 
(1969:9) notes th a t differences in Im
may be the result of major underlying differences in social structure, such 
as systems of inheritance, that may have influenced family relationships 
without any direct association with the number of children people want, or 
any change in their attitude toward the range of permissible behaviour. We 
know that the control of marital behaviour has developed both in 
populations characterized by late marriage and a substantial proportion of 
spinsterhood on the one hand and in populations in which marriage is 
virtually universal and at an early average age on the other. The 
development of low values of Im in Western Europe apparently preceded the 
reduction of marital fertility by a century or two, and has not occurred yet 
in some countries of eastern Europe. Consequently England had a birth 
rate that was lower after 1910. However, marital fertility in the two 
populations began to decline at about the same time, and at about the same 
pace, and the higher birth rate in Hungary was caused by the consistently 
higher proportion marrying.
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M arriage patterns, thus, were the result of factors quite extraneous to 
any desire to control fertility, and often were very local in origin. When, 
however, the fertility transition occurred, it happened right across Europe, 
suggesting a change of a totally different order, perhaps a change in ideas 
and a new way of looking at families and children.
A num ber of writers have disputed this conclusion. For example, 
Andorka (1986: 332) comments on Coale and W atkins (1986) th a t the 
Princeton authors
... seem to accept the existence of non-parity specific and socially controlled 
birth control in predecline societies. In my opinion this implies that couples 
in such societies were able and, if necessary, willing to practice birth 
control. The methods available may have been less efficient; therefore 
couples were less assured of being able to stop fertility definitively and more 
willing to use birth control at the beginning of a marriage. Moreover, the 
motivation to practice birth control may have been less strong or the 
exigencies arising from the economic and social conditions may have been 
less severe than in the late nineteenth century.
Thus I would adhere to the minority view among demographers that the 
spread of birth control and the decline in fertility beginning at the close of 
the nineteenth century in most of Europe were not an innovation but an 
adjustment to the changing economic and social conditions, in the sense of 
Gosta Carlsson (1966). Acceptance of this viewpoint means that earlier 
fluctuations in fertility, such as those demonstrated by E.A. Wrigley and 
R.S. Schofield (1981) for England from 1541 to 1871, ought to be 
investigated using the same approach as for the more recent large-scale 
decline in fertility.
Andorka notes th a t Coale does not totally reject the possibility of 
parity-related lim itation in earlier times, but only suggests th a t where most 
people did not do so, subpopulations that did so would have been 
overwhelmed.
The evidence, however, seems to be against Andorka. It is perhaps 
significant th a t J.A. Goldstone (1986), in a reanalysis of Wrigley and 
Schofield (1981) referred to by Andorka above, convincingly argues th a t 
before 1750 almost all changes in m arriage rates reflected changes in  the 
proportions ever m arrying ra ther than  in the average age a t first m arriage,
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which was almost unchanged throughout the period (1541 - 1750) a t the 
very high age for women of 25 to 27.
Goldstone (1986:15) argues th a t during periods of low wages m any of 
the poorer people were unable to accumulate, or even to anticipate 
accumulating, sufficient resources to m arry. He also notes an alternative 
argum ent: th a t m arriage was restricted to those with access to a lim ited 
num ber of ecological niches - generally landholdings.
Irrespective of which is the correct explanation for people not 
m arrying, m arriage patterns were determined by couples not m arrying 
ra ther than  delaying their m arriages. This counts against the argum ent 
th a t falls in m arriage rates were contraception by another name. If people 
wished to control their num ber of children but did not have an efficient 
m eans of contraception to do so, it might make some sense to delay 
m arriage. However, the same argum ent can hardly be made for not 
m arrying a t all. Only in recent times has there been evidence of a sizable 
proportion of the population who did not wish to m arry, and this is hardly 
likely to be the case in rural societies which provide few alternative 
lifestyles and where there has historically been very little evidence of 
anyone desiring to rem ain single for a lifetime. It was not to avoid having 
children th a t people did not m arry, it was because they could not afford to 
m arry.
This is not, however, to say th a t population growth does not affect 
m arriage patterns. Even in Goldstone's example, although proportions 
m arrying may not have reflected a desire to control family size, the wage 
levels which apparently determ ined nuptiality rates did reflect the 
pressures of population growth. Wrigley and Schofield (1981:439) suggested 
th a t the pre-industrial English economy could sustain a population growth 
rate  of roughly 0.5 per cent per annum  without adverse effects on real
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wages. When population growth was above this figure, wages fell, and, as a 
consequence, rates of m arriage fell. If the density-dependent nuptiality 
control (ecological niche mechanism) holds true the explanation is tha t 
population growth was in excess of the num ber of niches available and 
m arriage was autom atically delayed or prevented and fertility fell.
In some senses changes in m arriage patterns and m arital fertility are 
alternatives. If m arital fertility falls sufficiently to reduce population 
growth, some of the conditions th a t prevented or delayed m arriage may no 
longer apply. Similarly, if falls in m arital fertility are a response to 
population pressures, they may be forestalled by changes in m arriage 
patterns. It has been noted by Paul Demeny (1972:165) th a t in the Austro- 
H ungarian empire in the nineteenth century, in provinces where values of 
Im were lowest, Ig values (m arital fertility) tended to be higher. However, 
Chojmacka (1976) found this not be true in the same period of Russia, where 
m arital fertility tended to be marginally higher in areas where Im values 
were higher. Nevertheless the argum ent has been pursued further by 
Botev.
Botev (1990) notes th a t E astern  Europe, in particular the Balkans, 
was characterized by w hat Hajnal termed the E ast European m arriage 
pattern , with early and universal m arriage, and yet underw ent not long 
after the W est an even more rapid transition in m arital fertility. Botev 
argues th a t E astern  Europe's rapid population growth created strong 
pressures on available resources 'calling for a rapid response from the 
population' (1990: 121): they could not wait until changes in m arriage 
patterns affected the b irth  rate, but had to reduce m arital fertility 
immediately; changes in m arriage patterns have a delayed effect on fertility 
whereas changes in m arital fertility have an immediate effect. W estern 
Europeans, in contrast, were under less immediate pressure and were able 
to reduce fertility by delaying m arriage, a course of action which was
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preferred to reducing m arital fertility, because contraception posed greater 
challenges to the traditional value system.
W hat is not clear from the argum ent, as Botev notes, is why m arital 
fertility should fall in response to population pressures. Pressures on 
resources m eant th a t parents could not support so many children and had 
less to pass on to them , but Botev does not clarify the decision-making 
process th a t then led the parents to have fewer children.
It is also not clear why the age a t m arriage was so high for so long in 
the West. Botev suggests th a t there had been population pressures in the 
W est for a long time, whereas in E astern  Europe such pressures only 
occurred a t the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the tw entieth  
centuries. However, even if population pressure influences age a t m arriage, 
it cannot be the only factor; it seems likely, as M althus noted, that, in pre­
industrial economies, except where m arriage rates responded to population 
pressures, population growth would quickly outrun the growth in 
productivity of which the economy was capable. It would be surprising if 
this had not been the case in Botev's area of study, the Balkans. It certainly 
appears to be the case in other parts of the contemporary world, as in 
Bangladesh which has long been very densely populated but which has had 
a very low female age a t m arriage. Furtherm ore, as noted above, the 
evidence does not fit W estern Europe very well either, for, if Goldstone is 
correct, the proportion m arried, but not the age a t m arriage, seems to have 
been affected by population pressure. In the United States where land was 
freely available, age a t m arriage was lower than  in Europe though still late 
by the standards of South Asia, a phenomenon less conspicuous, however, in 
nineteenth-century frontier Australia. An explanation for the higher age at 
m arriage in W estern Europe m ust take into account the underlying social 
and economic structure.
1.4 Was la te  m arriage in  Europe sim ply a reflection  of the  
dom inance o f the n u clear fam ily?
The most commonly advanced reason for W estern Europe's late age of 
m arriage, apart from population pressure, is the expectation th a t a new 
couple will establish an independent household. As Macfarlane (1986) 
notes, M althus's concept of the preventive check depended upon his 
assum ption th a t new couples would require the resources necessary to 
establish and support an independent household. Hajnal is representative 
of more recent demographers:
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In Europe it has been necessary for a man to defer marriage until he could 
establish an independent livelihood adequate to support a family; in other 
societies the young couple could be incorporated in a large economic unit, 
such as a joint family. This, presumably is more easily achieved and does 
not require such a long postponement of marriage. This line of argument 
seems especially convincing if the larger economic unit is such that the 
extra labour is often felt to be an economic asset. A system of large estates 
with large households as in Eastern Europe might thus be conducive to a 
non-European marriage pattern, while small holdings occupied by a single 
family and passed on to a single heir would result in a European pattern. If 
this reasoning has substance, the uniqueness of the European marriage 
pattern must be ascribed to the European stem-family. (The term stem- 
family was coined by Le Play in describing the type of family organization 
in which land descends to a single heir, the other sons going elsewhere) 
(Hajnal, 1965 : 133).
Thus, under the stem family system, the oldest son would be able to 
m arry early, though, normally, he waited until he inherited or was given 
control of the land. The other sons would have to wait until they had found 
their own livelihood and could establish a new household. Under a joint 
household the sons could m arry much earlier because the family would 
provide them  with a livelihood and they would continue to share their 
family’s household. W hereas the stem-family is based on the concept of 
primogeniture, where the oldest son inherits most or all of the family 
property, the joint family provides each son (rarely the daughters too) w ith 
a share of the family inheritance.
In general it is true th a t in those areas where new couples are 
expected to be independent m arriage is late, while areas where joint
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families are common often have early marriage. Nevertheless, there are 
problems with simply correlating age a t m arriage with family structure. 
Hajnal him self notes (1965 : 133) the difficulty of generalization about 
family systems in Europe and elsewhere at different times. He notes th a t 
'th ere  have been large estates and joint families in some regions of W estern 
Europe in the Middle Ages and beyond'. While these areas may have had 
lower ages of m arriage, a straightforward connection between the two is 
probably too simple. As Hajnal rem arks (1965:133),
Presumably it would be possible to have a system in which each couple is in 
principle an independent economic unit, but in which early marriage is 
made possible by arrangements to provide for the couple until they achieve 
complete independence. Katy mentions such arrangements among Jews in 
Eastern Europe. [Homan describesl arrangements of a related kind in 
medieval England.
The im pact of family structure will depend, in part, upon the wider 
social and economic context. In some economic circumstances, for example, 
it may be in the in terest of both stem and joint families to provide early 
m arriage. Botev (1990), for example, notes, of Sklar's attribution of early 
and universal m arriage in the Balkans to the joint family, th a t early 
m arriage was practised equally in Yugoslavia where the joint family was 
common and in Bulgaria where it was not; though Hajnal (1965:101) 
indicates th a t age a t m arriage was indeed slightly earlier a t least in Serbia 
than  in Bulgaria, a suggestive situation in view of the fact th a t joint 
families formed a g reater proportion of all families in Serbia th an  in 
Bulgaria. Dixon (1978:465) notes th a t both Ireland and Jap an  had a form of 
stem family with primogeniture, yet Ireland had a very high proportion of 
its population never m arrying whereas Japan  had a very low proportion of 
celibacy. Clearly, other factors are involved in each of these situations. 
Dixon argues with regard to Japan 's and Ireland's level of celibacy th a t the 
availability of industrial work and the comparative wage levels between the 
sexes as well as community attitudes were im portant factors.
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There is, however, a more fundam ental difficulty in seeking a simple 
correlation between family structure and the m arriage pattern . The formal 
structure of the family does not adequately describe the nature of the 
relationships within the family and how the structures of authority  and 
decision-making within the family work in practice: for example, who really 
makes decisions, and who, and to what degree, has influence or veto rights 
over decisions such as m arriage. In part, this is a m atter of economic 
circumstances but the problem goes deeper than  this.
This point may be illustrated by reference to the different conclusions 
drawn by a num ber of historical demographers, mostly connected with the 
Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social S tructure, and 
some social historians, with regard to the history of the W estern family 
(Anderson, 1980). It had generally been assumed th a t the modern stem 
family was a comparatively recent artefact. Maine (1863), for example, 
argued,in the nineteenth  century, th a t the progress of modern history was 
one from sta tus to contract. By this he m eant that in earlier times the 
individual was subordinate to the family and community, and th a t his 
position and relationship with others was ascribed by birth  according to the 
family he was born into. In modern society a person's position was achieved 
and relationships of any kind were governed by contract.
Historical demographers have cast doubt on this view by revealing 
the extraordinary stability of W estern family structure over several 
centuries. Social historians, including Aries (1962), Shorter (1976), Stone 
(1977), and F landrin (1979) however, argued that, while formal structures 
may have rem ained largely unchanged, family and other relationships have 
altered radically from being patriarchal and community-oriented to being 
individualistic. Thus, if these writers are correct, W estern Europe has 
changed from the type of social relations th a t w riters since Maine have 
regarded as typical of the joint family to the relations typical of the stem
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and nuclear families w ithout the formal family structure significantly 
changing.
The joint family does not seem to have been universal in so-called 
traditional societies. As Dixon (1971 : 228) points out, in m any societies in 
South E ast Asia ' the simple conjugal family has been traditional'. Yet 
these societies have had m any tra its  held to be characteristics of joint 
families, such as strong family ties as well as universal and relatively early 
m arriage.
The explanation is probably that, ju st as m arriage patterns are the 
outcome of a num ber of diverse elements, so too is family structure. Among 
the elements affecting family structure are the prevailing sentim ents or 
values, forms of inheritance, the social and economic context, and prevailing 
social models of ideal behaviour. Various values seem to exist 
independently of family type. Values which emphasize kin and family links 
and parental authority  undoubtedly encourage the development of joint 
families, but the actual formation of such families largely depends on the 
existence of suitable m aterial conditions. This is particularly clear in India 
where the joint family is strongly favoured as representing ideal values such 
as respect for one's elders and, in particular, parents, fraternal solidarity 
and placing family ahead of all other considerations including one's own 
private selfish in terests. Only a minority of Indian families, though, are 
actually joint families. This is partly because conflicts between brothers 
and their wives often outweigh any perceived benefits from living jointly: 
this is especially so after the older generation, particularly the patriarch, 
has died. However, even where the patriarch is still alive and where 
brothers and wives are compatible, the m aterial conditions may not allow 
for a joint family or it may not be advantageous. Jo in t families are 
generally found among land-owners and to a lesser extent among 
m erchants; such groups have the means to support and provide
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accommodation for a large family. Furtherm ore, living together in an 
organized household has advantages in managing the farm or business. 
Many families, for instance, prefer to have a family member perform or 
supervise certain tasks. Since the family members are part of a common 
family with a common budget it is unlikely tha t they will shirk their duties 
or cheat since not only would it be contrary to their family duty but it would 
be of little  benefit to them.
M aterial conditions are also im portant in giving the older generation 
some control over the younger generation: this is closely related to the 
nature of inheritance. As noted above, stem families are closely connected to 
inheritance by a single heir, usually the first son, in which case it is term ed 
primogeniture. In such a case, the other brothers are unable to m arry 
unless they can find an alternative livelihood, a t which time they move out. 
It would be difficult for them  to bring a wife to live on the family property as 
she would be intruding in w hat was not hers; it would belong in future to 
the inheriting brother and his wife. In these circumstances, there is little  
advantage even in the present in creating such a joint family for they would 
be helping to build up property to which they can later have no access. In 
the case of a joint family, not only are all family members provided with a 
livelihood which enables them  to m arry, but they have every right to live on 
w hat will eventually become their property. In the meantime, however, it is 
in the in terests of all, especially the older generation, for the land to be kept 
together, to ensure th a t it is farmed efficiently and th a t the older generation 
is looked after by all. Furtherm ore, the promise of inheritance will concern 
the younger generation more with the future welfare of the whole family.
The type of inheritance system of course is not an im portant 
consideration if there is no or little property to be inherited. In this case the 
various aspects of inheritance which encourage or discourage the formation
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of a jo int or stem household do not count although they may condition the 
outlook of the whole society.
The formation of joint or stem family households can also be affected 
by the existence of a social model favouring one or the other. In India the 
joint family is regarded as the ideal family representing the ideal values 
noted above such as filial and fraternal duty. It also represents the model of 
the landowning family which constitutes the heart of the Indian landowning 
village, and to which the poorer landless villagers, particularly of the lower 
castes, can only aspire. In Europe, in contrast, the model families were the 
stem and nuclear families. Prim ogeniture was practised by landowning 
families of Europe largely to preserve their positions within the class 
system: in India this was not necessary as the caste system preserved the 
social hierarchy, and accordingly social sta tus was less dependent on 
wealth. In Europe the younger sons were encouraged to join the church or 
the m ilitary and a t the very least not to m arry unless they could command a 
position th a t was worthy of their families. The model to be followed was 
th a t of stem  and nuclear families.
Thus, the actual type of family system in existence depends upon a 
num ber of conditions. The difficulty in determ ining w hether family type 
affects age of m arriage and the incidence of m arriage is in p art th a t the 
factors which affect family structure can directly affect m arriage patterns. 
The system of inheritance which strongly affects the establishm ent of stem 
or joint households will also have a direct influence on age of m arriage. If, 
for example, all sons stand to inherit, age at m arriage is likely to be lower 
irrespective of w hether family structure is joint or nuclear. Similarly, 
values which encourage independent households, such as an emphasis on 
husbands and wives as companions, may also encourage a sm aller age gap 
between spouses and consequently a higher female age a t m arriage. Values
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which emphasize the fraternity  of male kin, which is associated with joint 
households, may do the opposite.
Nevertheless, it seems undeniable that there is a direct relationship 
between family structure and m arriage patterns; but this too is complicated 
for it is a two-way relationship. Family structure affects m arriage patterns 
by institutionalizing features which effect m arriage patterns. If, for 
example, the strength  of the conjugal bond is closely related to age at 
m arriage, the influence of family structure on th a t bond will affect m arriage 
age. A characteristic of joint families in India and elsewhere is th a t of 
arranged m arriage. An often expressed preference is a bride who will do as 
she is told and not talk  back to her betters, especially her in-laws, and who 
will not cause division within the family, such as by inciting her husband 
against his brothers. In such situations a younger bride may be regarded as 
more likely to accept family authority. Conversely, m arriage patterns can 
affect family structure. If for other reasons, a wide age gap exists, this itself 
may weaken the conjugal bond and hence the wife's ability to influence her 
husband to establish a new household. Indeed, if the wife is too young she 
may need to be in a joint household to be trained as a wife. Finally as 
L aslett (1977:107) has noted, the size of the generation gap between when 
parents and children m arry will, depending on mortality, affect the 
possibility of having several generations in one household. If children 
m arry late, the older generation may already be dead by the time their 
grandchildren are growing up.
There is perhaps a more im portant point emerging from the 
discussion of the circumstances in which different family structures arise. If 
the type of family is a consequence of a num ber of factors, including both 
sentim ents or values and also other more practical and m aterial 
circumstances, it follows th a t some joint families may have more in 
common, a t least in term s of values, with some stem families than  with
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other joint households. This is also true for stem families. Joint families in 
Sri Lanka seem to have more in common with nuclear families there, than 
with joint families in India. Social historians like Stone, Aries, F landrin 
and Shorter assert th a t families of whatever type may have shared more in 
common at any one time than  each type m aintained over time. This view is 
probably exaggerated in th a t it underestim ates the continuities in the value 
system of the European family. Sm ith (1981) dem onstrates th a t many 
aspects of the English family were sim ilar in the sixteenth century and the 
n ineteenth  century and even today. Nevertheless, even this indicates th a t 
European joint, stem and nuclear families may not have been representative 
of such families elsewhere. In particular, joint families in W estern Europe 
may have had more in common with stem families there than  with joint 
families in Asia.
For this reason, and also because the circumstances in Europe before 
the Industrial Revolution were very different, the European experience is 
not a perfect parallel to w hat is happening to m arriage patterns in the 
contemporary Third World.
1.5 T he u n d erly in g  con d ition s resp onsib le  fo r m arriage delay  and  
celib acy  in  Europe
Although Europe may not provide a satisfactory parallel to 
contemporary change to m arriage patterns in the Third World, discussion of 
the lite ra tu re  concerning it has raised a num ber of significant and relevant 
points. The balance of evidence does not imply th a t delays in m arrying or 
never m arrying were consciously used to control fertility. There was, 
however, probably an indirect tie to population growth. G reater population 
densities can create conditions which make people delay marrying, 
sometimes perm anently. This is not, though, an inevitable consequence of 
population growth: it depends on the right conditions. M acfarlane (1986:
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323) points out th a t M althus's preventive check depended on the existence 
of four preconditions:
an accumulative ethic which justified and glorified the endless pursuit of 
gain; the ranked, but mobile society which meant that people were 
constantly scrambling up and down a ladder of fortune; private property 
which was protected by government and law; and a generally elevated 
standard of living which would give people that taste for bodily comforts 
which would tempt them to forgo immediate sexual gratification and delay 
marriage until they could afford it.
Put in another way, Malthus was saying that the material and family 
system that he advocated was the natural corollary of what today would be 
called market capitalism. Where capitalism flourishes, he argued so will 
the particular set of traits he analysed.
M althus (1970: 268-9) did indeed regard the preventive check as 
being a corollary of capitalism. He argued tha t only where individuals were 
free to benefit from the full implications of their decisions, good or bad, 
would individuals behave prudentially and delay their m arriages until they 
could support a family. This required the existence of private gain secured 
by the existence of a free and im partial legal system. It also required the 
state not to interfere and distort the m arket by providing assistance in the 
form of poor relief, thus enabling the im prudent who had m arried early to 
evade the consequences of their decision.
As M acfarlane notes, this argum ent assum es the capitalist 
preconditions th a t those who make the decisions are the beneficiaries of any 
gains and losses thereby encountered. M althus dealt with this point in 
arguing the need for secure protection of private property and against the 
poor law.
However, it also assum es the existence of nuclear or stem families 
ra ther than  joint families, wherein an individual determ ines when he or she 
m arries, and where the couple pays for and receives the benefits of children 
themselves. The preventive check would work only if those who decided the 
tim ing of m arriage were the same as those who would benefit from or suffer
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the consequences of the marriage. In theory, this could occur in a joint 
family too: arguably, if a wider range of people participate in the m arriage 
decision the impact of the m arriage could affect the same people. It seems 
unlikely, though, th a t the actual balance of gains and losses would be equal 
for all family members.
In a joint household, however, the older individuals who have decisive 
influence in arranging a m arriage are likely to gain more from the benefits 
of the m arriage - the extra labour, services and companionship - than  they 
would suffer from its costs, as in sharing resources including property, and 
income. The most obvious example is the division of inherited property. A 
more prosaic example is the one given by Caldwell (1982: 227) where the 
food for an extra child is taken from the total amount dished out to children 
ra th e r than  from th a t allocated to all family members.
M acfarlane (1986:36) argues th a t the preventive check depends upon 
m arriage being expensive and in particu lar children being a net economic 
loss: th is loss has to be made up by other gains, mainly the advantages of 
companionship of the spouse and children. M acfarlane, like Smith, argues 
th a t in England, and to a lesser degree elsewhere in W estern Europe, there 
is little  evidence of children having contributed to their parents' economic 
well being, even in the parents' old age; indeed, contrary to M althus's fear 
th a t assistance granted to the poor might have encouraged early m arriage, 
it m ight have delayed it since, by providing assistance to the old, it reduced 
their dependence on any support from their children. Children after early 
childhood were economically independent of their parents, m any working as 
live-in apprentices and servants. It seems logical th a t if m arriage and 
children were a net economic benefit, as Caldwell (1982) argues for pre- 
transitional societies, people would m arry as early as possible, all else being 
equal. Only when their value was questionable would there be reasons for 
delaying m arriage.
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1.6 T he econ om ics o f the fam ily and delayed  m arriage
This brings us back to the question of w hether delayed m arriage was 
only b irth  control by another name. Where children are a major economic 
loss, families may tend to restrict their num ber of children and where they 
are a m ajor economic gain, they may tend not to restrict them. Where, 
however, they are only a m arginal cost or benefit, other factors become more 
im portant. W estern m arriage was delayed not because children were a great 
economic loss (they could after infancy be apprenticed or sent as servants to 
live and work with other families) but because the actual cost of 
establishing and supporting a new household was so great. In economic 
term s the fixed cost of establishing and running a household was high but 
the m arginal cost of each extra child was not. It was not until the couple 
had saved enough money to establish, and were earning enough to 
m aintain, a household th a t they could marry. Some of the waiting period 
was used for train ing  as in apprenticeship, but th a t this was probably not 
the major factor in delaying m arriage is indicated by the large num ber who 
failed ever to m arry, presumably because they always lacked the necessary 
resources. T hat there was a high cost in establishing a household but 
thereafter a low m arginal cost for each additional child is supported by the 
pa ttern  of delayed m arriage followed by a total absence of restrictions with 
consequent relatively high m arital fertility, and certainly no concept of an 
ideal num ber of children.
The natu re  of women's work contributed to the high establishm ent 
cost of the household. Before m arriage many women worked outside the 
house bu t after m arriage they would normally stop to look after their new 
family. The reason for this was probably social expectation and pressure 
though it  also reflected the type of work deemed acceptable for women, and 
th a t which was available. Much of the work outside the family was difficult 
for a m arried woman. The biggest source of employment for women was as
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household servants, who were expected to live in the household; and such 
work was prim arily suited to the unattached. Much of what work was 
available could be done w ithin the family, such as cottage industry work 
like spinning and weaving. Women could also grow vegetables and tend 
some domestic anim als such as dairy cows and pigs.
Once she had given up outside work to become a housewife, looking 
after additional children was probably not a great economic cost though it 
undoubtedly increased the work demands on the woman. It m eant that, if 
the family were to have a reasonable income, it was im portant th a t the 
husband earn  enough to support them  both. However, the wife's loss of 
income was partially  compensated by her household production which 
reduced the need to buy outside products, and which could even bring 
outside income. It is probably significant th a t the wife's household 
production provided much of what was needed by infants, thereby reducing 
the m arginal cost of each additional child.
M arital fertility rates only fell when each child became a heavy net 
loss. In such a situation the family began to restrict its total num ber of 
children. This situation occurred in Europe towards the end of the 
nineteenth century, especially after the introduction of compulsory 
education. Mass education made children expensive partly  through its 
direct costs and partly  by m aking children dependants. Children had, after 
early childhood, been expected to largely support themselves, for example, 
as live-in apprentices and servants; now the parents had to support them.
This increase in the m arginal cost of children was the product in the 
long run  of changes in the economy. The demand for labour outside the 
family increased while the possibilities for home production fell. In many 
industries home-based production became less im portant as in weaving and 
spinning, while others, such as minding dairy cows and pigs, became less
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possible as the population urbanized. These economic changes, coupled 
with changes in social attitudes to women working, eventually encouraged 
m arried women to work after bearing children.
1.7 Do d ifferen ces in  the age gap o f m arriage partners in  the West 
and in  A sia reflect u n derly ing  d ifferen ces in the nature o f  
m arriage?
This chapter has concentrated on w hat explains variations in 
W estern m arriage patterns although the thesis's prim ary concern is with 
changing m arriage patterns in contemporary South Asia and in particular 
Sri Lanka. The major differences between South Asian and W estern 
m arriage patterns were South Asia's low levels of celibacy, and its much 
lower female age a t marriage, often around or even before the age of 
puberty. In contrast to the women, men in South Asia, even in rural areas, 
m arried a t ages not very different from those of the West. Consequently, 
the age difference between husband and wife in South Asia was much 
greater th an  those of the West. Though Hajnal (1965: 134) noted th a t a 
small age gap was a feature of the W estern m arriage pattern  comparatively 
little atten tion  in the litera ture  has been given to why this is so. There has 
been perhaps a W estern tendency to regard a minor age gap as natural and 
assume th a t it is unnaturally  large age gaps tha t need to be explained. 
There has also been a concentration on the comparatively minor differences 
w ithin a society, as in the overall age at m arriage, ra ther than  on the cross- 
culturally much more significant age difference between the sexes a t 
m arriage. This is because changes in m arriage age within a society can be 
correlated with other documented changes such as those in real wage rates 
and population growth. Yet changes in wage rates are prim arily significant 
for the male age of m arriage because men are normally expected to be the 
principal wage earners, while in term s of fertility it is female age of 
m arriage th a t is im portant.
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This raises the question why the ages at m arriage of the two sexes 
changed together in Europe. It is true th a t a woman sometimes did raise 
some of the money toward establishing a new household but arguably this 
was mostly the consequence of her having to wait for her m arriage rather 
than  a cause of it.
Another factor th a t could encourage a relationship between male and 
female age a t m arriage is a m arriage squeeze: a shortage of unm arried 
males of the right age forces females to delay their m arriages because of the 
lack of available grooms. T hat this does not seem to be a critical factor here 
is suggested by the high proportion of men and women who have never 
m arried.
The im portant factor appears to be tha t Europeans preferred a small 
age gap a t m arriage. In m any societies especially in Asia and Africa there is 
little obvious connection between the age at which men m arried and the age 
at which women m arried. A man was expected to be old enough to be a 
m ature husband and a father but the same was not expected of a woman. 
Indeed, a young age of m arriage for women might be regarded as an 
advantage for it implied th a t she would accept her husband's and his 
family's authority, and her duties. In such circumstances factors which 
affect the age of m arriage of one sex need have little effect on th a t of the 
other.
In the W est a small age gap at m arriage was preferred because 
m arriage was a partnership  of two fairly equal individuals: an im portant 
aspect of this was th a t they were establishing an independent household. In 
an independent family the husband and wife both had im portant 
responsibilities within the family; each had to be able to make the necessary 
contributions for the family to be successful. In a joint family m arriage was 
not a partnership  in the same sense, for the young bride was entering her
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husband’s household in which she would become a very junior member. She 
had few responsibilities except to obey her mother-in-law and, ra ther than  
contributing her part to her m arriage, was expected to work in the interests 
of the whole family. In such circumstances she did not need the m aturity  to 
make an independent contribution either as a wife or as a mother. Her 
mother-in-law would make the necessary decisions. Rather, youth was felt 
to be an advantage because she would more readily accept instructions.
This, however, is a somewhat circular argum ent. While the nature of 
the independent household may have necessitated a more m ature bride, it is 
equally true th a t an older female age at m arriage may have made an 
independent household more viable. A younger age of m arriage may have 
necessitated the couple staying with the family while the bride learn t how 
to cope with the duties expected of her.
1.8 Are la te  m arriage and h igh  celib acy  rates a reflection  o f how  
m arriage d ec ision s are m ade and by whom ?
This brings us to how the decision to m arry is made. The distinctive 
aspect about the decision to m arry in the W est was th a t it was up to the 
individuals concerned to decide who they would m arry and, perhaps more 
im portantly, when they would m arry. In South Asian societies individuals 
have generally had little control over whom they m arry and when they 
m arry. In W estern societies, in contrast, individuals usually had virtually 
total control over whom they m arried, though parents might occasionally 
show their disapproval if the proposed spouse was deemed to be of bad 
character or came from the wrong class or religion. M acfarlane (1986: 330) 
claims th a t a t least as early as the twelfth century in England individuals 
in most classes decided for themselves whom they would m arry. It has been 
pointed out th a t some of the richer landowning families especially in France 
did arrange m arriages but this seems to have been an exception; 
significantly their children m arried very early (Hajnal, 1965: 115). More
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commonly, parents exercised control over those whom their children courted 
and vetoed unsuitable matches, though after the age of majority, when most 
m arriages occurred, even such restrictions weakened. This presumably was 
especially so where the children supported themselves or lived away from 
home, for example as live-in servants or apprentices.
Even where restrictions on m arriage and courtship did exist, 
m arriage, in theory a t least and normally in practice, was perceived as two 
m utually consenting parties agreeing to a m arriage partnership. Equally 
im portantly, the time when sons or daughters m arried was their own 
decision, and the family could not decide th a t it was time for them  to marry. 
Although there m ight be some stigma on celibacy, for instance being an 
elderly spinster, concerns about age a t m arriage were rarely th a t someone 
was leaving it too long but much more commonly th a t they were too young 
to have a proper understanding of w hat they were doing and too im prudent, 
the very fears expressed by M althus. It was this lack of pressure th a t 
allowed the female m arriage age to be so late in Europe and also made 
possible its high rates of celibacy. Furtherm ore the lack of arranged 
m arriage m eant th a t there was no way of ensuring th a t everybody m arried.
The in teresting question is why there was no pressure on females in  
Europe to m arry young and why there was in South Asia. It seems to be 
th a t in  Europe m arriage prim arily was not a family responsibility. It was 
an individual's responsibility to decide whether or not to m arry, to find a 
mate, and to establish a new household, though the family m ight provide 
guidance. In Asia these were family decisions.
1.9 W hen do fam ilies favour early  m arriage?
As to why these responsibilities were individual in the W est and 
family in South Asia, one explanation is th a t in South Asia it was generally 
a family responsibility to m arry their daughters off before doubt could be
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cast on their morality; in W estern societies morality was prim arily an 
individual concern. Yet this is not truly an explanation, for it does not 
explain why in South Asia a family is held responsible for its members, but 
in the W est is not. The family structure seems to have been w hat it was 
simply because it was. A deeper explanation requires acceptance of a 
determ inistic framework yet such a framework is likely to be affected by the 
prevailing family structure. The most obvious determ inistic framework is an 
economic one. It is possible th a t Europeans were willing to accept 
daughters or sons m aking their own decisions over whom to m arry because 
it had little  effect on their family. By the time they m arried most 
individuals were largely self-supporting, taking little economically and 
contributing little to their families of origin. To m arry they needed and 
expected little  from their families.
In South Asia the families were intim ately involved because decision 
to m arry would directly affect them. They would have to pay many of the 
costs but also receive many of the benefits of the marriage. The question, 
then, is if the families do have a decision over the m arriage date, w hat 
economic factors affect whether they favour an early or late m arriage. If 
children are of little  or no net value, there will be little reason for families to 
press males to m arry or to have more children. R ather it would be more 
sensible to encourage them  to become independent financially and leave the 
decisions concerning m arriage to them, as is the case in the West. Where 
children are more valuable the family has an economic in terest in children 
and in the tim ing of the m arriage. In such situations it does seem th a t 
families have very great control over the arrangem ent of m arriage including 
the tim ing of m arriage. W hat is of in terest in such situations is th a t a very 
early age of m arriage is commonly encouraged for females but not for males. 
If children are valuable, both young men and women may be encouraged to 
have them  as early as possible. One possible reason is th a t a woman's
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fertile period is restricted to the years between fifteen and forty, whereas a 
m an's is not. It is therefore im portant, especially for her husband and her 
new family, for her to m arry early if her potential fertility is to be realized.
However, though the view is commonly expressed th a t a woman's 
prim ary duty is to bear children, this does not seem to be the reason given 
for early m arriage, a t least in South Asia. Much more common is the belief 
th a t a wife who is relatively m ature m ight challenge the authority  structure 
of the family. According to Caldwell's (1982) wealth flow theory, these 
authority  structures are essential if the older generation, tha t is those who 
in such societies control the m arriage decision, are to benefit from the 
labour of the children. In the most extreme cases, the family might break 
up.
Even if early female age a t m arriage benefits the family into which a 
woman is m arrying it seems likely th a t it is not beneficial to her natal 
family. If the extra labour was useful parents might wish to delay their 
daughter's m arriage to profit from her work; however, a delay might reduce 
her potential value to the family into which she is marrying, and thus she 
m ight not be able to m arry as well as she would have, thus reducing the 
value of m arriage to the family; or her family might have to pay a larger 
dowry or accept a sm aller brideprice. Furtherm ore, it is proverbial wisdom 
th a t a daughter-in-law can be made to work much harder than  an indulged 
daughter, so a girl whose labour may be valuable to her husband's family 
may be economically m arginal in her own family.
1.10 Why is m ale m arriage gen era lly  la ter  than fem ale m arriage in  
fam ily-oriented  societies?
Nevertheless, if it is worthwhile for females to m arry early, why is 
this not also true of males? After all the earlier the son m arried the sooner 
there would be grandchildren. Only when their value was questionable
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would there be reasons for delaying a boy's m arriage. A possible reason 
may be a belief th a t a m an needs to be m ature enough to be a husband. 
M aturity  in this sense included being old enough to place the wider 
in terests of the family before the couple's own selfish desires or interests.
An im portant factor is undoubtedly tha t a woman is seen as achieving 
her full potential earlier than  a man. Her duties, childbearing, household 
work and often the more menial farm labour, though laborious, are 
generally less dependent upon physical strength than the m an’s, and 
therefore she is seen as ready for m arriage at an earlier age. It is only when 
ideas or practices about what is required for their particular duties change, 
th a t the relative ages of m arriage are likely to alter.
Also, if a boy is contributing to his family's welfare, his family may 
not w ant him  to m arry too early. Even in a society where additional 
children contribute to family well-being, it may not be advantageous for the 
parents for their son to m arry too soon. If he does so, his prim ary 
responsibility may eventually be to his wife and children and their 
responsibility to him, even if immediately following m arriage they live 
jointly w ith his parents. Besides, if the generations were too short, the 
younger generation might challenge the authority of the older generation 
more th an  otherwise. Thus while it m ight benefit the older couple to keep 
the female generations short, it is to their benefit to keep the male 
generations long.
1.11 Sum m ary: Is A sia m oving tow ard the E uropean m arriage  
pattern?
In summary, the m arriage patterns of Asia, particularly South Asia, 
and W estern Europe reflect two very different societies. One is based on the 
family, the other on the individual. Where the family is the central social 
fact, decisions regarding m arriage will reflect the in terests of all the family
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members and not simply those of the individuals directly concerned. Where 
the individual is central it will be his or her in terest th a t is param ount, 
though they may continue to be influenced by the a ttitudes of the family. 
Although actual m arriage decisions may be affected by practical factors, age 
at m arriage for females has generally been earlier in Asia where the family 
has control because it has been in the in terest of the family members th a t it 
be so. Furtherm ore, age is a less im portant factor for the family than  it is 
for the individual. Finally, the older members of the family do not need an 
extended period to learn  who would make a good m arriage partner and who 
would not. A family-oriented society is associated with universal m arriage 
in p art because the family's resources can be used to ensure th a t everybody 
m arries, but, more im portantly, in such a society social existence depends 
upon family roles. Individuals, for example, are not properly adults until 
they have m arried and become parents and eventually grandparents. In an 
individual-based society where sta tus is largely achieved, such 
considerations are m uch less im portant. Economic factors are clearly 
im portant. Where family property is central to its members' well-being and 
status, m arriage is likely to be used strategically to preserve and, it is 
hoped, augm ent such property. Where wage employment predominates, 
individuals can become more independent of their families. Similarly, 
where security of property and life, and personal well-being, especially in 
old age, are less dependent upon other individuals within the family, those 
having influence within the family can afford to take a more relaxed 
attitude to the activities of its members.
While economic changes may make it possible for a greater degree of 
individualism  to develop, they do not by themselves ensure it. Some of the 
South Asian communities which have become most dependent on earnings 
from wage labour have experienced less change in age a t m arriage than  
other South Asian communities which depend little on such earnings. The
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communities dependent on wages tend to be poorer and less well educated. 
The essential requirem ent for an increased acceptance of individuals and 
their right to determ ine their own future, is, perhaps, an ideological one.
The critical questions for this thesis now are w hether Asian m arriage 
is moving toward the European model and more specifically whether Sri 
Lankan m arriage is moving from the South Asian model of very early 
m arriage toward a more W estern model; and if this is so, w hat are the 
factors behind this change?
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CHAPTER 2.
Marriage in an Asian society
2.1 A Su rvey o f M arriage in  Asia
2.1.1 The tran sform ation  o f A sian m arriage pattern s
Asia, once stereotyped as consisting of unchanging peasant societies, 
is increasingly characterized in term s of rapid economic growth and social 
change. Its m arriage patterns, which were once seen to be typical of 
peasant societies with early (particularly for females) and universal 
m arriage, are now changing rapidly with age a t m arriage apparently rising 
alm ost everywhere. Smith, Shahidullah and A lcantara (1983: 11) note that, 
in all ten  countries covered by the World Fertility Survey in the Asia and 
the Pacific region, female age a t m arriage is increasing. However, they also 
note, th a t with well over 90 per cent of older women marrying, there are few 
signs yet th a t Asia is moving towards the W estern pa ttern  of less than  
universal m arriage. While female age a t m arriage is generally rising, 
actual m arriage ages differ greatly, with South Asia, excluding Sri Lanka, 
being characterized by much earlier m arriage than  Southeast Asia and 
particularly  E ast Asia (Smith et al., 1983: 7).
The lim ited evidence th a t the proportion never m arrying is changing 
has led most studies of Asian m arriage patterns to concentrate on age a t 
m arriage. This focus has generally been on female age a t m arriage since 
this is w hat is changing most radically, and is im portant in term s of 
fertility, and of gender relations and family structure. The studies tend to 
fall into two principal categories: studies of changes in m arriage ages, which 
look a t region wide factors such as economic change and rising education 
levels; and studies examining the diversity in m arriage ages between
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countries, which generally focus on underlying sociocultural differences. In 
this section both types of study will be discussed commencing with one of 
the former.
2.1.2 The correla tes o f A sian m arriage p attern s
Rindfuss, Parnell and H irschm an (1983) have examined age a t first 
b irth  (in Asia normally closely related to age a t first m arriage), using a 
m ultiple regression analysis for Asian countries with separate variables for 
b irth  cohort, country-ethnicity, ru ral-urban b irth  and education. The 
authors (1983 : 263,268) rem ark that, even controlling for the other 
variables, there are sizable differences by country-ethnicity. Muslim and 
Hindu women in their sample tend to m arry  2.5 to 3 years earlier than  
women from Confucian societies. Sim ilar cultural groups (which they term  
ethnicity) as m easured by religion in different countries often, but not 
always, have more in common with each other than  with different cultural 
groups in  their own countries: Muslim women, for example, in Sri Lanka, 
M alaysia and Indonesia had identical m ean age a t first b irth  (Rindfuss et 
al., 1983: 268).
The other variable they tested th a t was significant was education. 
This not only explained some of the differences between countries, but, more 
im portantly, explained, except for Hong Kong, all the difference by b irth  
cohort in age a t first birth. The effect of education was alm ost identical for 
most countries and ethnic groups; except for M alaysians and Sinhalese, age 
at first birth  was 2.64 years higher for women with more than  prim ary 
education, th an  for women with no education. For the Sinhalese, however, 
the effect was twice as large a t 5.41 years (Rindfuss et al., 1983: 264).
Although Rindfuss and colleagues identify the importance of 
education on age a t first b irth  they do not explain why it has had this 
impact, simply noting th a t education has been identified in  the general
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education litera ture  as having 'sim ilar modernizing effects on individual 
behaviour in diverse settings' (Rindfuss et al., 1983: 268). They do try  to be 
more explicit with regard to the concept of a shared cultural heritage, bu t 
their data  are inadequate for this purpose. They restric t them selves to 
suggesting th a t an im portant factor in earlier m arriage among Hindus and 
Muslims is the em phasis th a t those communities pu t on female virginity at 
m arriage (Rindfuss et al., 1983: 270).
A major lim itation of the Rindfuss, Parnell and H irschm an study is 
th a t Sri Lanka was the only South Asian country covered. There is thus no 
comparison with the very early m arriage pa ttern  of most of the 
subcontinent: the Hindus, for example, who are included in the sample, the 
Tamils of Sri Lanka and Malaysia, are probably not representative of the 
early-m arrying northern  parts of South Asia where the majority live. A 
more fundam ental weakness of their approach, however, is the lack of an 
overall theory of the determ inants of m arriage change: we may know which 
variables affect m arriage but we still do not know why and how certain 
variables affect m arriage patterns.
2.1.3 The im portance o f soc iocu ltu ra l factors in  exp la in in g  A sian  
m arriage pattern s
This criticism also applies, as the author acknowledges, to Peter 
Sm ith's ^  survey of Asian m arriage (P.Smith, 1980), which places more 
emphasis than  Rindfuss et al. on the underlying sociocultural differences 
explaining pre-existing differences in m arriage patterns. Sm ith notes th a t 
even in the early tw entieth  century there were already major differences in 
proportions of females m arried as m easured by Coale's index of first 
m arriage ranging from above .900 in South Asia to below .800 in the 
Philippines (P.Smith, 1980: 65-66).
1 Now known as Peter Xenos
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As P.Sm ith rem arks, the lack of earlier data precludes a certain 
answ er as to w hether these patterns are the resu lt of earlier change or 
underlying sociocultural differences; bu t other evidence suggests the latter. 
P.Sm ith (1980: 71) notes th a t the major regional difference in m arriage 
patterns concerns the age a t which the population begins to m arry. Among 
females this age is around 10 years in South Asia, 13 years in Southeast 
Asia, and 18 years in E ast Asia. A sim ilar age range and pa ttern  is true of 
males. He suggests th a t these differences reflect the broad sociocultural 
differences influencing nuptiality. Sm ith does not identify the relevent 
sociocultural differences, noting th a t it rem ains to be determ ined why the 
spatial pa ttern  prevails.
P .Sm ith (1980: 80) also finds th a t most of the small differences in 
proportions never m arrying have traditional roots. He notes (1980 : 77) th a t 
Sri Lanka, Burm a and the Philippines have slightly higher celibacy rates 
than  other countries, particularly  those in South Asia such as Bangladesh: 
he suggests th a t religious and secular ideology combine to provide a role for 
the celibate in these societies. Significantly, the priests of the prevailing 
religions in the three countries, Buddhist and Catholic, are celibate. It 
could equally be argued, though, th a t it  was because roles outside the family 
were permissible, th a t a celibate priesthood was acceptable. In India, for 
instance, such a concept was alm ost inconceivable, though priests are very 
careful to control the ir sexuality w ithin m arriage. Significantly, in 
Buddhism (but not Catholicism), unlike Hinduism , m arriage is a civil rite.
Sm ith has little  to say about the causes of changing m arriage 
patterns beyond w hat the w riters already discussed have said. He notes 
th a t rising levels of education seem to be strongly associated with increasing 
age a t m arriage (P.Sm ith, 1980 : 85), and th a t the labour force participation 
of women is im portant with regard to female m arriage rates. But the 
empirical relationship between participation rates and fertility (and by
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implication m arriage rates) 'is  problematic, and even the direction of 
causation is sometimes unclear (P.Smith, 1980: 83). He also tests for the 
effects of urbanization on age a t m arriage. He finds, as did Rindfuss et al., 
th a t the evidence is unclear.
Sm ith does not a ttem pt to explain why or how these variables affect 
m arriage patterns. The data  available for this type of study 'preclude 
anything more than  exploration of specific propositions' (P.Smith, 1980: 60). 
He implies (1980: 60, 91), in any case, th a t a proper explanation of changing 
m arriage patterns would involve a theory of m arriage transition, but notes 
th a t no such adequate theory exists. P .Sm ith (1980: 60) cites Becker's 
(1973; 1974; 1981) theory of m arriage, where within a m arket each 
individual seeks to maximize his or her advantages by m arrying individuals 
with the most desirable characteristics, or if it is in  his or her in terests by 
not m arrying a t all. Sm ith comments that, as a theory, it seems to have 
little apparent grounding in sociological realities (P.Smith, 1980: 91). This 
probably does the study less than  justice as Becker's theory is a t times quite 
stim ulating in its a ttem pt to link the different aspects of marriage. 
Nevertheless, it often does seem to posit the obvious, and, in its 
applications, rarely seems to explain the great complexity of m arriage 
patterns found in different societies.
P.Sm ith (1980: 91) rem arks th a t a proper theory of m arriage 
transition would be very difficult to develop because of the empirical 
complexity of the data. He suggests th a t such a theory would have to take 
the family as the pivotal institution. He notes th a t Caldwell identifies as a 
central aspect of the demographic transition
a reversal of the longstanding traditional pattern of within-family 
intergenerational transfers of wealth and resources toward parents from 
children. This reversal in the system of parental incentives is tied in turn 
to changing affective and economic roles and relationships within the 
family, and thus to changes in the family's composition and structure, 
including fertility (P.Smith, 1980: 91).
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A comparative theory of marriage transition might involve combining 
this with a decision-making model.
The next theoretical step might be to tie together more explicitly the 
affective revolution or surge of sentiment stressed by Shorter, what 
Caldwell calls emotional nucleation, the social-structural revolution 
outlined by Goode, and a more sociological informed and constrained theory 
of household choice. What may emerge is a theory of marriage involving 
outcome-optimizing choices on the part of individuals or their parents, 
conditioned by intra-family emotional dynamics as well as key elements of 
social structure, and particularly by intergenerational relations and 
resource transfers (P.Smith, 1980: 91).
Such an empirically based model would require considerable local-level 
research (P.Smith, 1980: 92). A model of marriage transition of the type 
described by Smith would effectively be a model of marriage as well: to 
understand fully the factors causing marriage change one must understand 
the very nature of marriage, why it exists and all the forces that affect it in 
each particular society. This would avoid the problem inherent in many 
analyses of marriage transition (e.g Rindfuss et al., 1983) of explaining 
changes in marriage patterns in terms that are incompatible with their 
explanations of pre-existing marriage patterns. The earlier marriage 
patterns are generally treated as being the result of traditional social 
structure whereas changes in marriage patterns are attributed to individual 
variables such as education and urbanization with little attempt to relate 
the two or to explain how the social structure and particularly the variables 
explain marriage patterns.
Unfortunately, the empirical complexity of marriage and society 
pointed out by Smith probably does mean that a model of marriage and 
marriage transition is impossible; even the precise definition of marriage 
can differ greatly between societies. In some of the matrilineal groupings of 
Kerala, the conjugal marriage of the West could hardly be said to exist (cf. 
Leach, 1971; Fuller, 1976). Such differences in the definition of marriage 
are particularly relevant to Sri Lanka.
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Nevertheless, even if a general theory of m arriage may be 
unattainable, it would be worthwhile to try  to explain m arriage within a 
single society and, where appropriate, to suggest parallels with w hat is 
happening in other societies.
2.1.4 The feasib ility  and d esirab ility  o f A sian m arriage
A w riter who has examined the determ inants of m arriage patterns, if 
not w ith a comprehensive theory of m arriage, a t least with 'a  framework for 
analysing variations in m arriage patterns', is Dixon (1970, 1971) who found 
th a t three variables accounted for most of the observed variation in the 
tim ing and quantity  of nuptiality. These she term ed the desirability of 
m arriage, the feasibility of m arriage, and the availability of mates. 
According to Dixon, the desirability of m arriage is determ ined by the need 
for children or alternatively the availability of non-familial opportunities 
such as gainful or prestigious employment for women. It can be m easured 
by assessing the costs and rew ards of m arrying early or late or never. The 
feasibility of m arriage is determ ined by expectations regarding economic 
and residential independence and the availability of land or income and 
savings. It can be m easured by the relative ease with which residential 
norms can be met. The availability of m ates is determ ined by the sex ratio 
between age groups from which spouses are drawn, and the method of 
selection: arranged m arriage promotes earlier m arriage than  does free 
choice. It can be m easured by assessing the relative ease of finding a 
partner. Dixon regards availability of m ates as being the least significant of 
the three variables, being im portant mainly a t the margin.
Dixon (1971 : 230) argues in essence th a t m arriage was historically 
earlier in Asia than  in the W est because m arriage was more feasible and 
desirable. M arriage was more feasible in Asia for a couple's given level of 
resources because they were not required to be independent, often living
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with one of the families and almost always receiving considerable 
assistance. The lack of independence also m eant th a t m arriage was more 
desirable because it was expected by family and community and because 
there were few alternatives available. For example, even when economic 
opportunities were available community pressures often prevented women 
from exercising them . Dixon (1971: 226) contrasts Asia with the West 
where a newly m arried couple has to have the skills, resources and m aturity 
to establish an independent household, thus ruling out early m arriage and 
in some cases m arriage altogether. Furtherm ore, the lack in the W est of a 
lineage system and of ancestor worship removed much of the compulsion to 
m arry common in other societies.
Dixon's analysis suffers from being a comparative regression a t a 
single point in time; consequently it  conflates factors in time which should 
be separated out. Dixon's concept of feasibility covers both the available 
resources and household structure. While the extreme lack of resources 
may affect the ability to m arry in any situation nevertheless household 
structure m ust be given primacy. The economics of the situation can only 
be understood w ithin the context of the prevailing family system.
This point comes out in Dixon's prediction of likely developments in 
m arriage patterns. She (1971: 230) argues th a t age a t m arriage is now 
increasing in Asian countries because new constraints, such as land 
shortages, unem ploym ent and urban crowding, are appearing while 
sim ultaneously m arriage is becoming less strongly required as arranged 
m arriage breaks down. While she emphasizes the role of the family in her 
contrast of Asian and W estern m arriage patterns, her analysis of changes in 
Asian m arriage pa ttern s essentially ignores the role of the family. The 
breakdown of arranged m arriage is not simply a m atter of the assistance 
the family gives to the young couple. Arranged m arriage is associated with 
m arriage paym ents, jo in t budgets and households, and economic assistance,
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all of which influence w hether the couple has the resources, skills and 
m aturity  for m arried life. Dixon has consequently failed to address one of 
the critical questions of m arriage change in Asia, why the family's role in 
m arriage has changed.
An additional concern with Dixon's framework is th a t it is more 
obviously applicable to celibacy (never marrying) than  it is to age at 
m arriage. Dixon argues th a t the desirability of m arriage can be m easured 
by assessing the costs and rew ards of m arrying early or late or never. While 
quite clearly desirability in this sense m ight affect w hether people m arry or 
not, it is not clear why it should determine w hether they m arry  early or 
late. The problem comes back to the multiple regression model used by 
Dixon. I t is much sim pler to use proxies th a t m easure w hether it is worth 
m arrying or not th an  to use ones th a t m easure when it is worth marrying.
The tim ing of m arriage may be more closely related to the feasibility 
of m arriage, bu t even th is is not clear-cut, since Goldstone (1986) has shown 
th a t in pre-industrial England factors involved in the feasibility of m arriage 
had more impact on proportions never m arrying than  on the age at 
m arriage of those who did.
The essential problem with Dixon's approach is th a t it is a theoretical 
framework for the analysis of m arriage patterns ra ther than  a proper theory 
of m arriage. As such, it does not deal with the root causes of what 
determ ines m arriage patterns, th a t is how the m arriage pa ttern  reflects the 
nature, role and process of m arriage w ithin a particu lar society. In 
particular, descriptions of m arriage such as Dixon's generally trea t 
m arriage simply as a straightforw ard contractual relationship between two 
autonomous individuals. Dixon discusses the role of the family as it affects 
the feasibility and desirability of m arriage, as though the family is an
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external, if  im portant, player, when, in tru th , in family-based societies, it is 
likely to be central to the m arriage relationship.
In societies where one's position is essentially determ ined by the 
family into which one is born, families are not peripheral to marriage, 
simply m aking m arriage more feasible or desirable; they are integral. When 
a bride m arries she is not simply m arrying a husband; she is in effect 
m arrying his family. In many societies, especially those where joint families 
predom inate, it is a common statem ent th a t a woman is concerned not with 
who her husband will be bu t who her mother-in-law will be. In such 
societies women often have very different roles from men and a woman is 
likely to be under the authority  of and owe allegiance to her mother-in-law 
ra ther than  to her husband and children while the husband has allegiance 
to his father and brothers. For the groom, too, m arriage m eans entering 
into a relationship not ju st with a wife but her family as well.
An im portant aspect of this is m arriage paym ents such as dowry 
which not only can make m arriages more feasible bu t give the bride's family 
continuing rights and considerations as well as obligations in the m arriage. 
M arriage paym ents can help to create virtually perm anent ties of 
relationship between two families, ties which may continue into the next 
generation. In such circumstances, the tie between the two families is an 
essential p a rt of the m arriage, and it is not suprising th a t families 
commonly arrange the m arriages themselves, determ ining not only who 
would be a suitable m arriage partner for the individual m arrying and for 
the family as a whole, but also which would be a suitable family to m arry 
into.
The close tie between m arriage and family in family-based societies 
means th a t any explanation of m arriage change which trea ts the family as 
essentially extraneous, facilitating or encouraging m arriage, does not
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adequately explain the changes th a t are occurring. The changes which 
affect m arriage patterns are much more fundam ental th an  is implied by 
concepts such as the feasibility and the desirability of m arriage. M arriage 
in Asia has been moving from a position where it deeply involved the 
families to one where it is accepted as prim arily being the responsibility of 
individuals.
Changes in m arriage patterns reflect fundam ental changes in  the 
nature of m arriage, particularly  in the aims of m arriage and in involvement 
of the family in m arriage. These points are explored below w ith reference to 
m arriage in Sri Lanka.
2.1.5 W hat is  the re la tion sh ip  b etw een  age at m arriage and the age  
gap in  m arriage?
Casterline, Williams and McDonald (1986) have pointed to the 
importance of understanding the causes of the age gap between the spouses 
in explaining changes in age a t m arriage. They note, following Hajnal 
(1965), th a t not only is non-W estern m arriage generally earlier than  
W estern m arriage but the difference is much greater for females than  males 
and th a t consequently the age gap between m arriage partners is much 
larger.
Casterline et al. (1986: 354) suggest th a t there are three possible 
explanations for age differences a t marriage:
1. th a t these differences express explicit preferences 
regarding the age gap;
2. th a t they are the coincidental by-products of
independently determ ined ages a t m arriage of men and 
women;
3. th a t they are determ ined by the age structure
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On the basis of World Fertility  Survey (WFS) data  they argue th a t neither 
age structure nor independently determined age gaps can explain the strong 
association between the m arriage ages of the two sexes and hence th a t the 
only possible explanation is th a t there is indeed a strong preference for 
particu lar age gaps (Casterline et al., 1986: 360-363).
The particu lar age gap preferred in a society can be attributed  to the 
kinship structure and the sta tus of women; in patriarchal societies the age 
difference is relatively large, w ith the husband commonly being ten years or 
more older. W here the sta tus of women is higher age differences are 
sm aller (Casterline et al., 1986: 374).
Casterline et al. (1986: 369) emphasize th a t outside forces will affect 
age a t m arriage only to the degree they influence the factors w ithin the 
family, particularly  the position of women, with a direct influence on age at 
m arriage. They note th a t Goode (1963) argued th a t a sm aller age gap is a 
consequence of the W esternization of family formation, though they 
question Goode's claim th a t a desire for a small age gap is universal among 
the young, as some societies set great store by young brides.
The relationship between apparent sta tus of women and age at 
m arriage is not always straightforward; ju s t as the sta tus of women can 
affect the age gap so too it is plausible than  the reverse can hold (Casterline 
et al., 1986: 374). Casterline et al. also note th a t the sta tu s of women in 
sub-Saharan Africa is, on m any criteria including schooling participation, 
economic independence and freedom of movement, higher than  in  N orth 
Africa, W est Asia and South Asia, yet its age differences are large. They 
suggest th a t s ta tu s outside the household is less im portant than  inside, as 
reflected in in ternal household relations, most im portantly w ith the 
husband (Casterline et al., 1986: 371).
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The general argument has some merit but the specific case of Africa 
is suspect. The large age gap in African marriage reflects the general 
weakness of the marriage relationship in Africa rather than specifically the 
low status of women in the household. In many Asian countries a large age 
gap partly reflects a belief that a woman should be subordinate to her 
husband and his family. In Africa the conjugal relationship is often so weak 
that each wife, but not her children, is virtually independent from her 
husband. To the woman it is more important that her husband is 
financially well off and well respected, attributes commonly associated with 
a later age, than that they should have a close conjugal relationship. To the 
husband and his family what matters most is that the wife should be a good 
strong worker and have many fertile years ahead of her.
Casterline et al. (1986: fn.21, 368) point out that variation in age at 
marriage is greater for males than females within countries but greater for 
females between countries. This means that within countries the male age 
at marriage is the critical factor for variations in the age gap at marriage 
but between countries the female marriage age is. This, they say, suggests 
that men's marriages are subjected to a much more diverse set of influences 
than are women's which are more constrained by sociocultural factors. 
Within a particular country sociocultural factors dictate that women should 
marry at a common age; however the preferred age differs greatly between 
societies. Men's age at marriage differs more within societies but not 
between societies because it involves a wider set of factors such as earning 
an income.
In Dixon's terms women are more affected by the desirability of 
marriage, men by the feasibility of marriage. Women are generally much 
more constrained by sociocultural factors than are men. The concept of 
chastity and its relationship to the honour of the family, a very important 
concept in many societies, inevitably applies to women and not to men. It
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may be that it is part of a complex of ideas where women become 
subservient to the interests of men and the families into which they marry. 
It is certainly connected with the fact that women are more closely related 
to the family which is regarded as the central pillar of traditional values, 
values which women are expected to pass on to their children; whereas men 
are much more involved in the outside and more modern world.
2.1.6 South  A sian  m arriage pattern s and th e ir  re la tion sh ip  to the  
k in sh ip  system
Before consideration of the Sri Lankan situation, marriage in India 
should be examined. Any analysis of Sri Lankan marriage must take the 
Indian situation into account because, not only are the two neighbours, but 
they share much in common, much of Sri Lankan culture having ultimately 
derived from India: the two principal ethnic groups, the Sinhalese and the 
Tamils, claim originally to have migrated from India and the two main 
religions, Buddhism and Hinduism, originated in India. However, the 
surveys examined above have, with the exception of P.Smith (1980), 
excluded India: significantly India was not included in the World Fertility 
Survey. In this regard a particularly relevant article covering many of the 
interests of this thesis is one by Dyson and Moore (1983).
Dyson and Moore (1983: 42-43) identify the existence of two separate 
demographic regimes in India: a northern model with high fertility and 
mortality rates and a high sex ratio; and a southern model which is much 
lower in all respects. Most importantly, in terms of the thesis, age at 
marriage is earlier in the North than in the South.
Dyson and Moore (1983: 43-47) explain the two demographic regimes 
in terms of the kinship system and its effect on female autonomy. They 
argue that North Indian and South Indian kinship are fundamentally 
different. North Indian kinship involves three key principles: marriage is
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exogamous with only non-relatives m arrying; males generally co-operate 
with agnates, particularly brothers; and females do not inherit. Society is, 
in effect, divided into rival patrilineages. The consequence is to cut young 
wives off from their na ta l families and to ensure th a t they have very little 
say even over decisions directly concerning them . M arriage, itself, becomes
dominated by the search for intergroup alliances, and women usually have 
no choice in the matter. The wife-givers are socially and ritually inferior to 
the wife-takers, and dowry is the main marriage transaction; at the 
extreme, marriage transactions may resemble trafficking in females. The 
fact that the in-marrying female comes from another group means that in 
some ways she is viewed as a threat: her behavior must be closely watched; 
she must be resocialized so that she comes to identify her own interests 
with those of her husband's kin; senior family wives tend to dominate young 
in-marrying wives (Dyson and Moore, 1983: 44).
The strong emphasis on the patrilineal family and on patriarchy 
requires th a t women and especially their sexuality be carefully controlled to 
uphold the honour of the family. It also requires th a t husbands and wives 
should not be too emotionally attached as th is could th rea ten  the unity  of 
the patriarchal family if the couples were to go against it. The consequence 
is th a t women are alm ost totally segregated from men to the extent of 
forming their own female specific communication network (Dyson and 
Moore, 1983: 44).
The southern kinship system differs in  each of the three principles 
operating in the north: the ideal m arriage involves cross-cousins; males tend 
to co-operate with affines, men to whom they are related by m arriage; and 
women m ay sometimes inherit (Dyson and Moore, 1983: 44). Not only are 
the links between the family into which the bride m arries and her na ta l 
family much stronger, bu t they are based on a  relationship of equality. As a 
consequence she herself achieves much greater autonomy. W hereas 
northern  kinship is built around the patrilineage, in southern kinship 
affinity is as im portant as descent in social organization. Consequently,
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Female chastity is less important, and both the woman's sexuality and her 
personal movements are less rigidly controlled. Women interact with their 
natal kin more regularly than their counterparts in the northern system, 
and there is less need to repress and resocialize females in their affinal 
home. Indeed, nuclear families are often established at marriage. Affective 
ties between husband and wife represent no social threat to the descent 
group. And daughters are much more likely - along with sons - to be on 
hand to render parents help and support in later years. Finally, 
communication networks are less sex specific, and there is less social 
restriction on female occupational choice (Dyson and Moore, 1983: 44-45).
In agrarian societies a person's control over his or her life is largely 
dependent on kinship, family, and marriage relationships:
Thus cultural practices - such as those of the north Indian system - that 
tend to constrain or erode the personal links between a married woman and 
her natal kin directly diminish the woman’s autonomy. If, at the same 
time, norms of avoidance make it difficult for the woman to establish 
affective links within the household into which she marries, she is left 
socially almost powerless (Dyson and Moore, 1983: 45-46).
Dyson and Moore (1983: 47-48) point out that even if they are correct 
with regard to the influence of kinship on female autonomy, the kinship 
system itself may be determined by more fundamental causes such as the 
requirements of an agrarian economy and in particular the value of the 
labour in rice-based farming systems. But it is difficult to show any causal 
connections or clear spatial connections: consequently they suggest that it 
is more realistic to use culture as the primary determining factor for their 
analysis.
This raises the question, however, whether both female autonomy 
and the kinship system are independently linked to the requirement for 
female labour in rice farming, that is, they are both symptoms of the 
economic system rather than one being the cause of the other. It is true 
that there are rice growing areas in South Asia, such as Bangladesh, where 
women play only a small part in cultivation, but these may be exceptions, 
though large ones, due, for example, to overriding religious requirements.
Dyson and Moore (1983: 48) argue that the northern kinship system 
means that early marriage for women is preferred. It helps protect their
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chastity, cuts them  off from their families, and makes them  more likely to 
accept the structure of authority in their new families, and weakens the 
husband-wife bond. It also reduces the burden to the family of supporting 
daughters who after m arriage will not contribute to the family, nor will 
their children. Finally, it will lengthen the child-bearing period for the 
b irth  of sons, a very im portant consideration in a patrilineal society where 
the transm ission of property depends on male heirs. These factors m aking 
for early m arriage were either absent or much weaker under the southern 
system.
Many of the argum ents th a t Dyson and Moore put forward are 
reasonable, but their ethnographic description is often erroneous. While 
their description of North India is reasonably accurate their description of 
South India is not. Even if cross-cousin m arriage is favoured it is a gross 
exaggeration to describe the South Indian descent group as endogamous. 
The most commonly favoured m arriage in South India, depending on caste 
and region, is m atrila teral cross-cousin, th a t is with m other's brother's 
daughter^, the favoured uncle-niece m arriage, th a t is with the sister's 
daughter, is arguably in kinship term s equivalent to th is type of m arriage: 
both involve the uncle using his rights over his niece to m arry her him self or 
into his family while the alternative patrila tera l cross-cousin m arriage to 
father's sister's daughter is often banned. This allows m arriage in one 
direction only: one family gives brides to the other bu t never receives brides; 
consequently the daughters’ descendants and any property accompanying 
them  are dispersed. Dyson and Moore's emphasis on the strength  of 
relations between affines is exaggerated: this certainly applies to their 
statem ent th a t
2 The favoured uncle-niece marriage, that is with the sister's daughter, is arguably in 
kinship terms equivalent to this type of marriage: both involve the uncle using his 
rights over his niece to marry her himself or into his family.
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males are at least as likely to enter into social, economic, and political 
relations with other males with whom they are related by marriage (i.e. 
affines) as they are with males with whom they are related by blood (i.e. 
descent) (Dyson and Moore, 1983: 44).
They go too far in arguing th a t 'female chastity is less im portant, and both 
the woman's sexuality and her personal movements are less rigidly 
controlled' (Dyson and Moore, 1983: 45). It is a very relative argum ent. 
A ttitudes to female freedom are somewhat more relaxed in the South than  
in the North bu t th is does not m ean th a t families do not take female 
chastity very seriously: a girl who is regarded as too free, for example who 
talks to boys, will be subject to village gossip and innuendo and may very 
well become unm arriageable as a result. Nor is it true th a t 'affective ties 
between husband and wife represent no social th rea ts to the descent group' 
(Dyson and Moore, 1983: 45). The patrilineal joint family is favoured in the 
South and although it may be somewhat less common than  in the North the 
possibility of the wife's influence on the husband threatening the unity of 
the family and particularly  his relationship to his parents is regarded very 
seriously. It is certainly not a society m arked by 'some independent control 
by females of their own sexuality - for example, in the form of choice of 
m arriage p artners’ (Dyson and Moore, 1983: 45). Arranged m arriage is 
v irtually  universal even in  Kerala where female autonomy is acknowledged 
to be particularly  high.
However, the authors are not entirely unaw are of the gap between 
their description of the southern system and empirical reality, for they note 
in a footnote th a t in practice the contrast
between certain features of northern and southern kinship may not always 
be quite as marked as the ideal-typical descriptions imply. Of course, choice 
of marriage partner for southern females is often nonexistent, and chastity 
is prized in the south as well as the north. Thus ... the difference between 
northern and southern system is often a subtle one of degree (Dyson and 
Moore, 1983: 57,fn31).
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But these minor inconsistencies go to the very heart of their 
description; what is the value of their model if it does not accord with 
reality? The reason why it does not may be that it is not a description of 
South India but of Sri Lanka. Dyson and Moore acknowledge that their 
schema 'derived most directly from the work of Nur Yalman' (Dyson and 
Moore, 1983: 56,fn 23), specifically from his book Under the Bo Tree, Studies in 
Caste, Kinship and Marriage in the Interior of Ceylon (1971). While it is true that they 
do acknowledge a number of other authors, notably Karve (1965) and 
Dumont and Pocock (1957), these works are more concerned with the 
principles of kinship organization than with true ethnographic description. 
The latter, with regard to South India, seems to be entirely derived from 
Yalman.
According to Yalman, in the remote areas of the Kandyan highlands, 
the kinship system is bilateral with both matrilateral and patrilateral cross­
cousin marriage; there is a strong tendency to endogamy; marriage rites are 
very weak: significantly among the Buddhist Sinhalese marriage is a civil 
ceremony, not a religious rite as it is among the Hindus of South India; 
dowry is minimal, affines are strongly linked; and the young have a high 
degree of discretion over marriage. Significantly, whereas arranged 
marriage is still dominant in South India, in Sri Lanka it has largely given 
way to love marriage.
While Yalman relates his findings to South India, his understanding 
of social systems essentially derives from Sri Lanka. Indeed, part of the 
very interest in Yalman's description is that it is not true of India nor, from 
my experience, does it entirely apply to coastal Sri Lanka, but these issues 
are examined below. Furthermore, Yalman does not argue that the 
Dravidian kinship prevailing is necessarily associated with bilateral 
kinship, only that it can be and is so in the Kandyan region that he is 
studying. Indeed, in South India, outside Kerala, it is generally associated
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with a patrilineal system. Dyson and Moore's acceptance of Yalman's 
description may be related to Moore being a specialist on Sri Lanka, while 
Dyson may be more at home with North India than with South India.
While Dyson and Moore are not always accurate about South India 
much of what they say is applicable to Sri Lanka. The kinship system does 
seem to promote affinal interests and thus prevent women from being cut off 
from their natal homes; and it may give them a measure of autonomy. 
Nevertheless, kinship systems by themselves do not explain how family 
relations work. The South Indian society that I have experienced (excluding 
Kerala) is in many ways closer to North Indian society than it is to Sri 
Lankan society. In particular, the organization of the family in Sri Lanka is 
quite distinct from that in South India and has different implications in 
terms of marriage, even though the formal kinship structures are similar. 
Furthermore, one cannot study the precise influence of kinship on family 
relations in South Asia without taking into account such a central social 
institution as caste, or ignoring the impact of the economic system.
Because Dyson and Moore have failed to address the problem of how 
the kinship system interacts with other factors, their model seems very 
static. It is difficult to see how marriage patterns, as well as fertility and 
mortality rates, change.
2.2 M arriage P attern s in  Sri Lanka
2.2.1 Age at m arriage
In this section marriage and marriage patterns in Sri Lanka are 
examined, starting with an examination of trends in Sri Lankan marriage 
patterns, followed by a review of the explanations given by various authors 
for the patterns, and finally a look at the various factors in Sri Lankan 
history that might be involved.
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The prim ary source for information on Sri Lankan m arriage trends is 
the census. Table 1 lists the singulate m ean age a t m arriage as recorded by 
the censuses from 1901 to 1981.
Table 2.1 Singulate mean age at marriage (SMAM) by sex, 1901-1981.
Census year Male Female Difference
1901 24.6 18.5* 6.1*
1911 26.9 19.9 7.0
1921 27.5 20.6 6.9
1946 27.0 20.7 6.3
1953 27.2 20.9 6.3
1963 27.9 22.1 5.8
1971 28.0 23.5 4.5
1981 27.9 24.4 3.5
Notes: * Fernando (1975) records the female SMAM for 1901 as 18.1 with an age difference 
of 6.5.
Sources: 1901-1921 census figures - Dixon, 1970: 205.
1946-1981 census figures - Nadarajah, 1986: 100.
A part from the decade 1901 to 1911, male age a t m arriage appears to 
have risen little, but female age a t m arriage has been rising almost 
continuously, though apparently a t a slower rate  between 1921 and 1946, 
and then  a t a faster pace. As noted by Fernando (1975: 185) and Dixon 
(1970: 202), the early figures, particularly 1911 and 1921, are probably 
somewhat overstated. The report of the 1911 census noted th a t
the mean female age is probably higher than is actually the case as there is 
a tendency to over-state the age of the bride at the registration of a 
marriage, on account of legislation - imperfectly understood, but recognized 
as existing - as to the age at which girls can marry. In many cases the 
parties have contracted marriages according to their own religious rites and 
customs, or lived together as husband and wife for years before registering 
their marriage (Denham, 1912: 350).
The Census Commissioner, Denham (1912: 323), thought, perhaps 
optimistically, that, since the 1901 census had been the first a t which 
information on m arriage had been obtained, enum erators probably entered 
people in customary unions as m arried. He believed th a t by 1911 the
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enumerators had, in his words, become more civilized and thus refused to 
countenance customary unions as marriage. The problem was apparently 
also true of the 1921 census (Ranasinha, 1946 Vol.l: 192). The impression 
is given not only that the 1911 and 1921 censuses grossly overstated the age 
at marriage, at least of females, but that the 1901 census may also have 
overstated it to a lesser extent^.
The censuses since 1946 seem to have been more accurate for they 
have recorded customary marriages and registered marriages separately 
(Nadarajah, 1986: 90). Depending on the degree to which the early census 
figures were distorted upwards, age at marriage of both sexes seems to have 
risen further and for females at a somewhat steadier rate than is recorded 
in the official census figures.
3 Dixon has made a correction for this problem: 'In order to remove at least a minimal 
number of customary marriages from the ranks of the unmarried in the earlier 
censuses, it was assumed that the proportion unmarried at all ages had not changed 
between 1921 and 1946, and that the unmarried population was thus inflated in the 
earlier years by at least the difference between the 1921 and 1946 figures (64.7/61.3 for 
men, and 54.3/51.7 for women). The proportions of men and women never married 
within the different age groups in the earlier years were then reduced by these 
amounts', to obtain the estimates shown in Table 2.2. This correction, as Dixon notes, 
is a highly conservative one and assumes that misreporting of marital status was equal 
across all age groups. The assumption is probably fair, for in 1963 the proportion of 
married persons reporting their unions as customary was 20 per cent at ages 20-24 and 
exactly the same at ages 40-44 (Dixon, 1970: 202-204). This reduces the calculated 
SMAM slightly. Dixon (1970: 204) notes, however, that the revised percentages in 
1901, 1911 and 1921 may still be too high.
Table 2.2 Singulate mean age at marriage by sex, 1901 -1921
Year Census R e v i s e d
Male Female Male Female
1901 24.6 18.5 24.0 18.3
1911 26.9 19.9 26.1 19.7
1921 27.5 20.6 26.9 20.3
Source: Dixon, 1970: 205, Table 8.3.
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Nevertheless, it is fairly clear that, although age a t m arriage was 
much lower than  it is currently, it was already higher than  it is in any other 
country in South Asia today. Hence, in regional term s Sri Lanka was in 
m arriage, as well as geographically, already an outlier. This raises Smith's 
point, mentioned earlier, about w hether such a pa ttern  reflected even 
earlier changes in m arriage patterns or pre-existing socio-cultural 
variations (P.Sm ith 1980: 65-66). The evidence suggests th a t both are, to 
some extent, true.
According to the 1911 census commissioner, Denham, female 
m arriage negotiations among the Sinhalese had been expected to commence 
imm ediately following puberty, while Tamils and Moors (Muslims) were 
often m arried before puberty (Denham, 1912: 347). T hat is, m arriage had 
been expected to take place considerably earlier, depending on how lengthy 
the negotiations were, than  the census indicated was the case in 1911. A 
more recent w riter has commented th a t
most people in Ceylon consider a girl who has attained puberty or the first 
menstruation to be a woman. She is expected to shed her childish ways and 
learn to play the role of an adult woman, for she is now marriageable. The 
majority of the village girls of the last generation were married between the 
ages of 13 and 19, and a similar proportion would be found even today 
(Siriwardena, 1963: 160).
The las t comment is factually incorrect, bu t the point Siriwardena is 
m aking rem ains. The emphasis on puberty stressed by both Denham  and 
Siriw ardena is expressed in Sinhalese culture by elaborate and very 
expensive puberty ceremonies symbolizing th a t a girl has come of age and is 
m arriageable.
D enham ’s comments th a t Sri Lankan m arriage had been early and 
universal is supported by the early writers. John Davy, writing in 1821, 
commented th a t
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Old bachelors and old maids are rarely to be seen amongst the Singalese, 
almost every man marries, and marries young, and the wife not of his own 
but his father's choice ... When a young man has reached the age of eighteen 
or twenty, he is considered marriageable, and it is the duty of his father to 
provide him with a proper wife ... (Davy, 1969: 213).
Davy noted th a t the father was content if among other things the bride was 
younger than  his son. Robert Percival, writing in 1803, rem arked th a t 'they  
are in general even regularly m arried a t twelve' (Percival, 1803: 181-182).
Nevertheless, this earliness by W estern standards should be kept in 
perspective. Percival was probably exaggerating the earliness of Sinhalese 
m arriage w ith most sources supporting Denham (1912:327), th a t the 
Sinhalese preferred m arriage immediately following puberty. This was 
later th an  was true for other groups in South Asia, where the almost 
universal preference was for prepubertal m arriage. The point is brought 
home by Lindenbaum  (1981: 395-396) who discusses a rise in female 
m arriage in Comilla District, Bangladesh, from infancy last century to post­
puberty now.
This raises the question w hether a rise in the age a t m arriage from 
infancy is comparable to rises in m arriage after puberty. T hat is, w hat is 
m eant by m arriage, and are infant m arriages the same phenomenon as la ter 
m arriages? It is unlikely th a t very early m arriages would involve connubial 
relations^. Infant m arriages are essentially a contractual arrangem ent 
between families. Nevertheless, very early m arriage should not be 
dismissed too easily. As noted before, Asian m arriage concerns more than  
conjugal relations; m arriage concerns families as much as individuals, and 
to ignore changes to very early m arriages may be to ignore im portant 
changes in the nature  of the m arriage relationship, as well as the factors 
determ ining m arriage and hence m arriage age. Furtherm ore, any move
4 Singh (1990), however, has found in Himachal Pradesh in Northern India that some 
prepubertal marriages were "proper" marriages including cohabitation and sexual 
relations.
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from very early marriage to later marriage, even if it is still relatively early, 
must affect the role of individuals in determining their marriages. A very 
early marriage is, in effect, a statement that the family comes first, while 
individual concerns are very much secondary.
A second question which needs to be considered concerns the nature 
of changes to very early marriage and to somewhat later marriage; and 
whether the same underlying causes are involved. There are many factors 
involved, some of which are much more important at some ages than they 
are at others.
2.2.2 The age gap b etw een  sp ou ses has b een  greatly  red uced
Several further points need to be made about Sri Lankan marriage 
patterns. The first is that the age gap which was between six and seven 
years has, in recent years, halved, to, in 1981, three and a half years. This 
has major implications for the nature of the conjugal relationship. As 
Selvaratnam notes of societies with large age gaps, 'the woman's already 
subordinate position at the time of her marriage is further compounded by 
the additional advantage her husband has accrued with his age and 
experience' (Selvaratnam, 1988: 17). Such a relationship of subordination is 
unlikely to be conducive to a close conjugal relationship.
2.2.3 V ariance in  fem ale age at m arriage has in creased
The second point is that variance in female age at marriage, the span 
over which women are likely to marry, has greatly widened. In contrast the 
variance of male age at marriage, which was much greater, has reduced 
slightly, and in this respect the two sexes have become much more similar. 
Dixon points out that
Male marriages were more concentrated and female marriages less 
concentrated in the postwar years than at the turn of the century, bringing
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the index of concentration^ for the two sexes closer together. In 1901 
slightly over one-quarter of the men married within the five years 
surrounding the median of 23.3 years, whereas almost three-quarters of the 
women married in the period surrounding the median of 17.2 years. By 
1963 the Ic5 for both men and women was slightly over one-third with, of 
course, marriages occurring on the average much later (Dixon, 1970: 214).
David Sm ith (1980: 6-8) has also commented th a t the distinctive 
female age pa ttern  of m arriage in Sri Lanka and the Philippines is the wide 
age range over which m arriages take place. He notes th a t in most Asian 
countries a la ter age a t m arriage has m eant th a t everyone delays their 
m arriages by a certain num ber of years but th a t a t the ages when m arriages 
are concentrated, there is the same intensity  as before. In Sri Lanka and 
the Philippines, however, m arriage delay has led to a g reater dispersal of 
m arriage as some people have delayed their m arriage much more than 
others.
Sm ith et al. (1982: 27) argue th a t 'a t  the other extreme, Sri Lanka's 
dispersed pa ttern  of m arriage ages probably reflects not only its level of 
economic development bu t also its  considerable cultural diversity'. These 
factors are undoubtedly im portant. Age a t m arriage does vary by ethnic 
group, even controlling for other factors. As already noted, the 1911 Census 
Commissioner Denham  commented th a t Tamil and Muslim women tended 
to m arry  before puberty, and Sinhalese women after. Similarly, economic 
development has resulted in  g reater socio-economic diversity in the 
population and th is is likely to have affected the ages a t which people 
m arry; though Dixon (1970: 275) notes th a t differentials in age a t m arriage 
between groups of different socio-economic sta tus are surprisingly small.
Why should economic development cause the female age a t m arriage 
to become more diverse bu t not the male? It may represent a change in the
5 The index of concentration Ic ^ is derived from period statistics, showing the 
proportion of first marriages before age 45 falling within a five-year age range centred 
on the median.
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factors affecting female m arriage, in particular less community and family 
pressure for early marriage; in the absence of such pressures other factors 
are likely to determ ine the m arriage age.
I t  may also reflect a change in the natu re  of the relationship between 
the two m arriage partners. In the past a woman was regarded as 
m arriageable a t a particular time, irrespective of when a specific man was 
m arriageable. If a potential groom was not ready for m arriage, another 
groom was chosen. M arriage was, after all, arranged, very often between 
people who were not acquaintances. Now, however, m arriages are generally 
self-selected, love matches, between individuals who not only are acquainted 
but may have been engaged for years. This means th a t a woman's m arriage 
age is more likely to be affected by the age a t which a m an m arries; it also 
means th a t she can afford if engaged to delay her m arriage. However, it is 
not simply love m anages which have become more diverse. Formerly, 
arranged m arriages took place when it  was thought th a t the boy and girl 
were old enough to m arry. Now arranged m arriage is likely to occur when 
the parents become worried th a t their offspring will never m arry; by this 
time they may have real difficulties in getting them  m arried a t all. It is not 
surprising, therefore, th a t the diversity of ages has also become much wider. 
Clearly, though, the factors responsible for the increased diversity of female 
m arriage are likely to be related to those responsible for the delay in female 
m arriage.
2.2.4 Is ce lib acy  increasing?
The th ird  point about Sri Lankan m arriage patterns th a t requires 
discussion is the level of celibacy. In the discussions of Asian m arriage 
patterns above, only brief reference was made to celibacy because in almost 
all Asian countries m arriage continues to be virtually universal. Sri Lanka, 
however, is a partial exception to this generalization. The proportion of
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bachelors aged 40-44 has generally been around 10 per cent in recent 
censuses and the proportion of spinsters in the same age range around 3 to 
5 per cent. These rates, though low by Western standards, are high by 
Asian standards, except for the Philippines.
The evidence is that celibacy rates have not varied greatly from their 
present levels for either sex for a considerable time. It is, however, difficult 
to be precise about this. In the earlier censuses many of those customarily 
married were not included as married, which gives the impression that the 
proportion of celibates has fallen substantially. The Census Commissioner 
of 1921 argued that, if the census were corrected for this factor, marriage 
would be nearly universal (cited in Sarkar, 1957: 72-73). Dixon comments 
that 'I f  this is indeed the case, there has been a considerable increase in the 
propensity to forgo marriage altogether as well as to postpone it’ (Dixon, 
1970: 209). She concludes on the basis of the inadequate and contradictory 
evidence that there probably 'has been some rise in celibacy during the 
century along with the delayed marriages' (Dixon, 1970: 209).
Apart from the difficulty of interpreting earlier data on celibacy there 
is also a problem concerning more recent data. During the 1970s there was 
a very rapid increase in female age at marriage. It might be expected that 
this would lead to an increase in female celibacy, but, without knowing the 
precise reasons for the increase in the marriage age, it is very difficult to 
say. The problem is largely that only when a cohort has finished marrying 
(theoretically when they are all dead) can it be said precisely how many will 
eventually marry. In practice, of course, demographers usually choose a 
cut-off date for measuring celibacy, say 40, 45 or 50 on the basis that few 
women marry after this date, and those few who do are largely irrelevant in 
terms of the demographers' prime interest, fertility. In this study the data 
used were mostly collected in 1985 and some in 1987. The relevant cohorts
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are just approaching these cut-off dates. Most of the literature discussed 
refers to much earlier data.
Trussed (1980), in an analysis of age at first marriage for Sri Lanka 
based on the Sri Lanka Fertility Survey of 1975, used a variation of Coale's 
marriage function. This method in theory can predict fairly accurately not 
only age at marriage but the ultimate proportion marrying. The c value, the 
proportion who ever marry, was found among female to be 0.825 for the 20- 
24 cohort, 0.968 for the cohort aged 25-29, 0.932 for the cohort aged 30-34, 
0.968 for the cohort aged 35-39, 0.959 for the cohort aged 40-44, and 0.981 
for the cohort aged 45-49. Trussed remarks: 'In  Sri Lanka there is no 
smooth pattern, but the estimate of c is smallest for the younger cohort. 
The cohort 25-29 is seen to be an anomaly; if it is omitted one obtains a 
smoother trend' (Trussed, 1980: 21).
If the 30-34 cohort is excluded there is little evidence of change, 
before the youngest age group, the 20-24 cohort, which is, as Trussed 
acknowledges, suspiciously low. He remarks: 'one might suspect that the 
estimated value of c for the youngest age group is too low, that, for example, 
more than 82.5 percent of women aged 20-24 in Sri Lanka will eventually 
marry' (Trussed, 1980: 21). Trussed suggests that in the absence of 
adequate data to estimate c as in this case, to estimate the mean age at 
marriage arbitrary levels can be set: for Sri Lanka he suggests the more 
plausible 0.90, or even 0.95. Clearly the evidence for a trend in celibacy is 
not strong. Trussell's calculations of c values using ten-year cohorts show 
few signs of a trend: c for the 20-29 cohort was 0.969, for the 30-39 cohort 
0.955 and for the 40-49 cohort 0.970 (Trussed, 1980: 22).
The very high c value for the 20-24 cohort may, if correct, indicate a 
rapid change in proportions ever marrying or it may represent the impact of 
a period event, such as severe economic problems making it difficult to
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marry or the effects of a marriage squeeze causing a shortage of grooms. It 
has been argued that both these circumstances existed in the early 1970s 
immediately before the Sri Lanka Fertility Survey. To some extent, the 
women involved may have been merely delaying their marriage rather than 
not marrying at all.
More recently Fernando (1985), in a comparison of the 1971 census, 
the 1975 WFS and the 1981 census, has found signs of an imminent rise in 
spinsterhood with the proportion of never married females rising in all age 
groups, with particularly large rises in the 30-34 and 35-39 year age groups. 
He notes, in particular, that the four Southwestern low-country districts of 
Colombo, Kalutara, Galle and Matara all have particularly high never 
married rates, a state of affairs he attributes to their having been subject to 
Western influence since the sixteenth century (Fernando, 1985:289), which if 
correct indicates a remarkable time lag. It is possible that the rates simply 
reflect the economic conditions of the early 1970s which afflicted these 
districts particularly badly. While De Silva's (1990) analysis of the 1982 
CPS suggests that the proportions of females never marrying is by Asian 
standards a comparatively high 10 per cent, it nevertheless shows little 
change by cohort.
The two countries with reasonably high levels of celibacy, Sri Lanka 
and the Philippines, are also the countries with a wide dispersal of marriage 
ages; this may suggest that the two traits have similar causes. Perhaps the 
lack of family and community pressures to marry, or a greater reliance on 
self-selection, is largely responsible.
2.2.5 M arriage stab ility
The fourth point concerning marriage patterns is marital stability 
which has not been discussed until now because with the exception of Malay 
and Indonesian marriage (see Jones, 1980), Asian marriage is generally
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fairly stable. This is particularly true of South Asia. In India marriage is a 
sacrament, which is the central event, at least of a woman's life, and is 
indissoluble. Once she is married the bond cannot be broken, even by death: 
hence the concept of sati in which the widow burnt herself to death on her 
husband's funeral pyre, and the concept of the virgin widow. There is a 
common concept that men and women are married in successive lives, 
through reincarnation, also known as transmigration of souls. It is true 
that the ban on widow remarriage was most strictly adhered to among the 
higher castes, but even where widow remarriage was allowed, generally 
only the first marriage was blessed as a sacrament and it alone was 
regarded as the true marriage.
In Sri Lanka among the Buddhists marriage is not a sacrament, 
though there does seem to be some concept that husband and wife can be 
married in successive lives: this is said to have been true in the case of the 
Buddha. The statistical evidence generally indicates that marriage is fairly 
stable. The census in 1981 listed per 10,000 persons aged 15 years and 
over, only 23.5 males and 37.5 females as divorced, and 18.7 males and 25.6 
females as legally separated (Nadarajah, 1986: 98). The divorced were 
slightly up on the 1971 census but the legally separated were slightly down. 
These figures are so low that they must reflect legal concepts rather than 
true rates of separation. World Fertility Survey figures indicate somewhat 
higher, though still reasonably low, figures for separation and divorce. Of 
all women the Sri Lanka World Fertility Survey (SLWFS) showed 87.7 per 
cent of first marriages undissolved, 6.2 per cent dissolved by the death of 
husband, and 6.1 per cent dissolved by divorce or separation (Dept, of 
Census and Satisfies, 1978: 66). In all, about one marriage in twelve failed. 
The report of the SLWFS (Dept, of Census and Satisfies, 1978: 64) notes 
that there is little sign of an increase in marriage dissolution.
The report comments on remarriage that
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the number of women in later unions is quite low. ... 96.0% of all ever- 
married women have been married only once; 4.0% have been married 
twice; and a negligible percentage (0.1%) have been married three or more 
times. Even for women married 30 or more years age, these percentages 
are respectively 89.4%, 10.1% and 0.5%.
Detailed analysis ... indicates that 33% of those whose first marriage was 
dissolved have remarried. It appears that these re-marriages tend to occur 
within about five years of the dissolution (Dept, of Census and Satisfies,
1978: 67).
The Sri Lanka Demographic and Health Survey (SLDHS) found even 
lower levels of divorced and separated, indeed just over half that found by 
the SLWFS: this difference may be due to the SLWFS covering all ever 
married women whereas the SLDHS was restricted to the 15-49 age range, 
excluding older women who had been subject longer to the risk of divorce 
and separation. SLDHS (Dept, of Census and Satisfies, 1988: 20) recorded 
91.4 per cent of ever married women 15-49 as currently living with their 
husbands, 3.8 per cent as widowed, 6.3 per cent as divorced, and 3.2 per 
cent as separated.
These data sources may underestimate divorce and separation. To be 
divorced or separated is not very respectable in Sri Lanka, and women may 
be reluctant to admit to it. Women who have remarried in particular may 
be reluctant to admit that their current marriage is not their first. Many of 
the respondents in the Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, which this 
thesis analyses, complained about marital problems but few admitted to 
being separated. Because of social pressures women might complain about 
marriages but be reluctant to actually separate or to report if they do.
The writings of anthropologists and of early travellers indicate 
greater instability than shows up in census evidence. The anthropologist, 
Edmund Leach, wrote of the village of Pul Eliya, which he studied in 1954, 
that the common-law marriage, which most villagers practised, was so 
unstable, uncertain even, that it was difficult to distinguish between
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marriage and promiscuous mating, and that, as a result, most people had 
been married more than once.
However, Leach remarks that, in addition to common-law marriage, 
there were two other forms of marriage. One of these was the registered 
marriage, the only legally recognized form of marriage. This form of 
marriage was indulged in only by those individuals who had political 
ambitions. 'The Pul Eliya villagers had a theory that no one could get 
appointed to any kind of government office - such as village headman, Vel 
Vidane, Village Committee Member - unless he had registered his marriage' 
(Leach, 1971: 91).
The third and sociologically more significant form of marriage was a 
type of ceremonial marriage, which differed from the common-law marriage 
in that it was really a kind of formal alliance between families, symbolized 
by the payment of dowry. Significantly it was much more stable, and the 
divorces that did occur were much more bitter:
... instead of simply setting up house with a lover, a man may go through a 
very elaborate marriage ceremonial which includes the use of formal 
matchmakers, expensive feasting for assembled kinsmen, and in some 
cases, the formal bestowal of dowry on the bride by the bride's parents.
Marriages of this type are numerically in a minority, but they include 
most of those which are sociologically important. In general, the 
arrangement and the staging of such formal marriages are matters for the 
parents of the couple concerned, and it is they who bear the expense. Such 
marriages form part of the strategy of village politics, the main issues at 
stake being the transmission of property from one generation to another. 
Expensive formal marriages are confined to the relatively wealthy; they can 
be thought of as political alliances with kinsmen on either side assembling 
en masse to witness the treaty of friendship. But the parties concerned 
are likely to be rivals and potential enemies rather than natural 
companions. It is significant that when such marriages end in divorce, as 
they sometimes do, the quarrel becomes a cause celebre and a source 
of long-standing bitterness between whole groups of kin. In contrast, the 
more casual type of marriage can break up without anyone commenting on 
the matter at all (Leach, 1971: 90-91).
The type of marriage has no implications for inheritance:
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In both types of unions, marriage, if it can be called such, establishes the 
inheritance potential of the children. Every child is an heir to both its 
recognised parents individually, no matter what form of marriage they may 
have been through. But the formal type of marriage does more than that, it 
establishes a relation of affinity between two sets of kinsmen, and it is this 
alliance aspect of the union which receives ritual emphasis (Leach, 1971:
91).
Leach is describing the Sinhalese, but Denham (1912: 335), in his report on 
the 1911 census, found a sim ilar distinction among the Tamils.
Leach's description of customary m arriage and ceremonial m arriage 
emphasizes a point made before, that, where the family is involved in 
m arriage, it is not peripheral, in the sense of simply facilitating m arriage, 
but is central to the very natu re  of the m arriage. The ceremonial m arriage 
more obviously involves the two families because it is essentially an alliance 
between them. The consequence for the family of the break-up of the 
ceremonial m arriage is clearly much greater than  th a t of a customary 
m arriage. Leach does not discuss how the families ensure the longevity of 
these ties but presum ably they pu t more pressure on the m arriage partners 
to stay together and more of their own resources into m aking sure th a t it is 
in their own in terest to do so: significantly dowry was given only in the case 
of ceremonial m arriages.
The distinction between ceremonial and customary m arriages may 
give the im pression tha t, whereas ceremonial m arriage is essentially a 
m atter between families, customary m arriage is solely the concern of 
individuals: th is is a simplification of the true  situation. People may have a 
certain freedom of initiative w ithin their m arriage bu t only if they act 
w ithin the lim its set down by their families. Leach's student, N ur Yalman 
(1971) makes essentially this point. He, like Leach, distinguishes between 
the more formal m arriage arranged by the family and the customary 
m arriage with, apparently, little  formal arrangem ent. W hereas Leach 
distinguishes between the two on the basis th a t the former involves family 
alliances and the la tte r  does not, Yalman emphasizes th a t customary
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m arriage involves two partners who are already related, th a t is, are already 
in close alliance, whereas the more ceremonial m arriage involves m arriage 
to someone outside the kin group, th a t is, who is being brought into close 
alliance. Yalman, in essence, argues th a t the key characteristic of Sinhalese 
m arriage, as distinct from simply sexual relations, is th a t it places the 
individual and his or her family in a relationship of alliance to the family 
into which he or she m arries. If the family does not recognize this 
relationship, then, in effect, no m arriage has taken place. If the m arriage 
partner was already related, the question of recognition did not arise, for he 
or she was already a m ember of the kindred. Yalman concludes:
In kinship terms, therefore, the reason why a marriage ceremony may be 
omitted among close kin is that structurally nothing happens. The 
particular relationship is already in existence since it is implied by the 
kinship of the rest of the relatives and the cross-cousin rights and 
obligations (Yalman, 1971: 172).
It should be noted th a t cross-cousins were the preferred m arriage partners. 
Cross-cousin m arriage m eans m arrying the m other's brother's child or 
father's sister's child; parallel cousin m arriage , which was banned, involves 
the father's brother's child or m other's sister's child. Yalman claims th a t 
sexual relations were perm itted between cross-cousins before m arriage 
(Yalman, 1971: 172) though I know no Sinhalese who believes this.
The m arriage only needed to be formally recognized where no 
relationship of alliance already existed, th a t is where two unrelated people 
were m arrying. According to Yalman (1971:207-208), the m arriage 
ceremony had the effect of putting the m arriage partners into the 
relationship of cross-cousins. Yalman notes th a t while Leach does not 
describe his concept of the kindred, all m arriages in Pul Eliya were 
supposed to occur w ithin the v a r ig a  which acted as a single sta tus group, 
in which all members were regarded as relatives and presum ably in a 
relationship of alliance. Provided the in terests of the family were not
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endangered by a m arriage outside the sta tus group it allowed a degree of 
discretion to the young. In Sri Lanka the demand for more direct family 
involvement in the m arriage is very likely to come from the younger 
generation if they deem it to be in their interest.
Yalman, unlike Leach, does not discuss w hether customary m arriages 
are m arked by a greater degree of instability than  are the more ceremonial 
m arriages. W hat he does say is th a t m atches without children tend to be 
much more unstable th an  those with children. However, w hat surprises 
Yalman, in contrast to Leach, is not the instability of m arriage, but ra ther 
its relative stability, a t least once children are born, despite any apparent 
strong impedim ent to divorce.
It may seem surprising that in a society with such formal ease of marriage 
and divorce, with marriage payments, a system of property rights for 
women, no unilineal descent groups, and with both polyandry and polygyny, 
there should be such stability in the domestic unit. Two important reasons 
explain the seeming inconsistency:
(a) The tasks and domestic roles of men and women are distinct and so 
specifically allocated that each partner is quite clear as to what his rights 
and obligations are. No more can be demanded. In this respect the ge is 
well isolated from purely personal difficulties unless these happen to be 
great enough to upset the basic rights and obligations.
(b) Great sexual freedom is granted to both partners. The criminal nature 
of adultery (when it occurs within the same caste) is minimized (Yalman,
1971: 186- 187).
Nonetheless, even if Leach exaggerated the instability of m arriage 
and Yalman is correct th a t m arriage is more stable than  m ight be expected, 
the impression given is very different from th a t which I gained in my field 
work. The two w riters may have overstressed the instability  of customary 
m arriage to contrast it w ith the more formal type of m arriage. 
Nevertheless, even if this is so, there seem to be significant differences 
between Kandyan Sinhalese society which Leach and Yalman are describing 
and lowland Sinhalese societies where most of my fieldwork was conducted.
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Denham (1912: 335), in his report on the 1911 census, noted tha t 
Kandyan m arriages were much more likely to end in divorce than  those of 
the general community (predominantly low-country Sinhalese and Tamils) a 
difference he attributed  simply to m arriage regulations. I t seems more 
likely th a t the Kandyan M arriage Ordinance reflected practice, than  tha t 
practice reflected the ordinance, for only a minority of m arriages were 
registered a t this time.
E arlier writers, too, have rem arked, sometimes in horrified tones, on 
the instability  of Sri Lankan m arriage. The most in teresting of all the early 
European travellers to Ceylon was Robert Knox who lived for 20 years in 
seventeenth century Ceylon as a prisoner of the King of Kandy. On his 
re tu rn  to England in 1681, he published under the auspices of the Royal 
Society a rem arkable book, a virtually complete ethnography of Kandyan 
Sinhalese society of the time. Knox's account of Kandyan society is 
generally sym pathetic but, as a Puritan , he disapproved of the 
imperm anence of their marriages:
But their Marriages are but of little force or validity. For if they disagree 
and mislike one the other; they part without disgrace. Yet it stands firmer 
for the Man than for the Woman howbeit they do leave one the other at 
their pleasure. They do give according to their Ability a Portion of Cattle, 
Slaves and Money with their Daughters; but if they chance to mislike one 
another and part asunder, this Portion must be returned again, and then 
she is fit for another Man, being as they account never the worse for 
wearing.
Both Women and Men do commonly wed four or five times before they 
can settle themselves to their contentation. And if they have Children when 
they part, the Common Law is, the Males for the Man, and the Females for 
the Woman. But many of the Women are free of this controversie, being 
Childless (Knox, 1981 [1681]: 248).
Somewhat more recent w riters on the Kandyans have made sim ilar 
comments. John Davy (1969: 214), in 1821, noted th a t among the rich there 
were tria l m arriages, while the poor parents were merely asked to part with 
their daughters. Little concern was paid to chastity and infidelity was
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easily forgiven unless it involved a man of low caste, in which case the 
woman would be divorced (Davy, 1969: 215).
However, the dichotomy suggested earlier between unstable Kandyan 
Sinhalese marriage and stable marriage elsewhere may be too simple. 
Denham’s comment that, among lower-caste Tamils, marriage was easily 
dissolved (Denham, 1912: 335), has already been noted. Similarly, Percival 
found that Knox’s description of sexual licence applied equally to the low- 
country Sinhalese (Percival, 1803:176).
More recent accounts of low-country society have also noted the 
existence of an informal customary marriage along with the stricter formal 
marriage system. Leonard Woolfs novel, The Village in the Jungle (1974), 
drew upon his experience at the turn of the century as a British 
Administrator in Ceylon; in it he described life in a remote low-country 
village in Hambantota District.
In towns and large villages there are especially among people of the 
higher castes, many rigid customs and formalities regarding marriages 
always observed. It is true that the exclusion of women no longer exists; 
but young girls after puberty are supposed to be kept within the house, and 
only to meet men of the immediate family. A marriage is arranged 
formally; a formal proposal is made by the man's father or mother to the 
girl's father or the mother. There are usually long negotiations and 
bargainings between the two families over the dowry. When at last the 
preliminaries are settled and the wedding day arrives, it is a very solemn 
and formal affair. All the members of each family are invited; the 
bridegroom goes with his friends and relations to the house of the bride, and 
then conducts her in procession, followed by the guests, to his own house. 
Much money is spent upon entertaining, and new clothes and presents.
But in the villages like Beddagama, these customs and formalities are 
often not observed. The young girls are not kept within the house; they 
have to work. The young men know them, and often choose for themselves. 
There is no family arrangement, no formal proposal of marriage; the 
villagers are too poor for there to be any question of a dowry.
And yet the villager makes a clear distinction between marriage and 
what he calls concubinage. In the former the woman is recognised by his 
and her families as his wife; almost invariably she is openly taken to his 
house, and there is a procession and feasting on the wedding day: in the 
latter the woman is never publicly recognised as a wife. Marriage is 
considered to be more respectable than concubinage, and in a headman's
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immediate family it would be more usual to find the women: recognised 
wives than 'unrecognised' wives. And though in the ordinary village life the 
'unrecognised' wife is as common as or even more common than the 
'recognised' wife, and is treated by all exactly as if she were the man's wife, 
yet the distinction is understood and becomes apparent upon formal 
occasions. For instance, a woman who is living with a man as his 
'unrecognised' wife cannot be present at her sister's wedding. When a man 
takes a woman to live with him in this informal way, the arrangement is, 
however, regarded as in many ways a formal one, a slightly lower form than 
the recognised marriage. The man and the woman are of the same caste 
always: there would even be strong objection on the part of the man or 
woman's relations if either the one or the other did not come from a 
'respectable' family (Woolf, 1974: 36-37).
There would appear to be a dichotomy between a formal style of 
m arriage, often involving an arranged m arriage and dowry, and a much less 
elaborate customary m arriage which tends, because it affects fewer people, 
to be less stable. The formal m arriage prevails among the more powerful 
and richer people of the village and among the towns, especially of the low- 
country. The customary m arriages prevailed, according to Leach and 
Yalman, among the poor, the majority, in the villages, or a t least in the poor 
and remote villages where they worked. I am not attem pting to identify 
how common customary m arriages are a t present, bu t the evidence implies 
th a t they were very common in the past, even in the low country, and th a t 
the tra its  of customary m arriage, including instability, were also found in 
more formal m arriages.
Clearly, this is a m atter which concerns much more than  whether 
statistical sources reflect the true  level of m arital instability in Sri Lanka; it 
also concerns the nature  of m arriage itself. It has im portant implications 
for the processes of m arriage and consequently for all aspects of m arriage 
patterns. The stability of Sri Lankan m arriage appears to be linked to the 
social and economic context within which a m arriage takes place.
M arriages are likely to be more stable if there are major implications 
in term s of family relationships or property rights, and especially if parents 
have a high degree of influence over the lives of the young. Yalman 
(1971:277) suggests th a t one reason why low-country m arriages may have
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been stabler than  Kandyan ones was because the low country was under 
Roman-Dutch law, under which the properties of bride and groom were 
merged into a single estate, while under Kandyan law the property 
rem ained separate. It seems somewhat questionable w hether official 
property laws had much influence over family behaviour in this respect, but 
they may have reflected pre-existing differences in the social systems. 
Another factor th a t may be im portant was the comparatively greater 
availability of land, particularly chena (land used for shifting cultivation), in 
Kandyan areas as well as some of the rem oter parts of the low-country such 
as H am bantota District about which Woolf (1974) wrote. The greater 
availability of land would have reduced the control of the parents over the 
younger family members, while the value of the land th a t the family already 
held would have been diminished, thereby reducing the value of m arriage 
alliances as p a rt of a strategy for protecting or enhancing family property. 
Yalman notes th a t in the village of Terutenne, people argued th a t m arriage 
ceremonies were all newfangled inventions:
In the times of the Kandyan kings there was no arrangement or ceremony 
at all. One merely went to the mother of the girl who took one's fancy and 
asked for her daughter as a companion during the chena season. If one 
found that she did no work, she would be sent promptly back. There being 
no formal marriage there was no divorce (Yalman, 1971: 168).
One of the changes which has occurred is increasing population 
pressure which has reduced the availability of chena and consequently 
increased the value of land, and hence given the family a greater in terest in 
the m arriage and in particular in ensuring its stability.
In my own data  there is little evidence th a t m arriage was particularly 
unstable, even in the lifetime of the oldest respondents. The explanation 
may be th a t the W estern Province, the location of seven of the eight field 
sites, was one of the most densely populated parts of the country where land
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was a t a premium. It is also possible th a t if the survey had included larger 
num bers of Kandyan Sinhalese the results m ight have been different.
If the argum ents above are correct, the increase in love m arriage 
presum ably reflects a diminished in terest of the parents in the m arriage 
(discussed in Chapter 5) and has not been associated with an increase in the 
instability  of m arriage. There may be a time-lag involved, but a more 
convincing explanation is th a t there is more to keep the partners together. 
Yalman's statem ent concerning customary m arriage th a t if the young bride 
did not work she would be sent back, indicates th a t while there were few 
im pedim ents to customary m arriage there was little also to m aintain such 
m arriages. This is probably not true nowadays, for a great deal is now 
required of both the groom and the bride. They should both be educated and 
the groom should preferably hold a job for which education is a prerequisite. 
Increasingly it  is expected the bride should hold such a job and even when 
she does not work, she will be expected to manage the household, a duty 
th a t is considerably more complex than  it was formerly. It is now expected, 
for example, th a t a wife will do m any things once done by the husband, 
especially if the husband has to spend considerable periods away from the 
household, for instance, working according to fixed hours; a surprisingly 
common occurrence in coastal Sri Lanka is th a t the breadw inner boards 
during the week in Colombo and only retu rns home to the family on week­
ends. The wife has also taken over specific responsibilities such as looking 
after the family's health  and helping with the children's education, tasks 
th a t would once have been left to the husband or parents-in-law, or simply 
neglected. The decline in arranged m arriage has not been associated with 
increasing instability  of m arriage because while the choice of the partner 
may m atter less to the family it is increasingly im portant to the groom.
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Since my data  provide little evidence of m arriage instability either at 
the time of the survey or in the past, the causes of m arriage instability and 
of changes in it are not explored in the data  analysis in Chapters 4 and 5.
2.2.6 P olygam y
The final aspect of m arriage patterns which needs to be examined is 
polygamy. Polygamy may seem to be a slightly esoteric topic in a country 
where levels are low but in fact it is quite relevant to the issue of the nature 
of m arriage in Sri Lanka and its relationship with m arriage patterns in 
general.
Currently both forms of polygamy, polygyny (one m an with more than  
one wife) and polyandry (one woman with more than  one husband) are rare 
in Sri Lanka, but neither is unknown. Polyandry is illegal whereas 
polygyny is legal only under the Muslim m arriage code. Previously, 
however, both appear to have been more common. The litera ture  is 
relatively scant concerning polygyny but for many early w riters polyandry 
constituted their principal in terest in Sri Lankan marriage.
Joao Ribeiro, a seventeenth century Portuguese w riter wrote:
Their marriages excite laughter. A girl makes a contract to marry a man of 
her own caste (for they cannot marry outside it), and if the relations are 
agreeable they give a banquet and unite the betrothed couple. The next day 
a brother of the husband takes his place, and if there are seven brothers she 
is the wife of all of them, distributing the nights by turns, without the first 
husband having greater right than any of the others. If during the day any 
of them find the chamber unoccupied, he can have access to the woman if he 
thinks fit, and while he is within no one else can enter. She can refuse 
herself to none of them; whichever brother it may be that contracts the 
marriage, the woman is the wife of all; only if the youngest marry, none of 
the other brothers has any rights over her; but if there are two, up to five, 
they are satisfied with one woman; and the woman who is married to a 
husband with a large number of brothers is considered very fortunate, for 
all toil and cultivate for her and bring whatever they earn to the house, and 
she lives much honoured and well supported, and for this reason the 
children call all of the brothers their fathers (Ribeiro, n.d: 54).
Knox wrote more soberly:
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In this Countrey each Man, even the greatest, hath but one Wife; but a 
Woman often has two Husbands. For it is lawful and common with them 
for two Brothers to keep house together with one Wife, and the Children do 
acknowledge and call both Fathers (Knox, 1981 [1681]: 248-249).
As Ribeiro's account, in particular, shows, the W estern writers were 
much more shocked (and enjoyed being shocked) by a woman having more 
than  one husband than  a m an having more than  one wife.
A more informative account of polyandry is given by Davy:
Though concubinage and polygamy are contrary to their religion, both are 
indulged in by the Sinhalese, particularly the latter: and, it is remarkable, 
that in the Kandyan country, as in Tibet, a plurality of husbands is much 
more common than of wives. One woman has frequently two husbands; and 
I have heard of one having as many as seven. This singular species of 
polygamy is not confined to any caste or rank; it is more or less general 
amongst the high and low, the rich and poor. The joint husbands are 
always brothers. The apology of the poor is, that they cannot afford each to 
have a particular wife; and of the wealthy and men of rank, that such a 
union is politic, as it unites families, concentrates property and influence, 
and conduces to the interests of the children, who, having two fathers, will 
be better taken care of, and will still have a father though they may lose one 
(Davy, 1969: 214-215).
Polyandry, hence, is a form of strategic alliance between two brothers, and 
their wife, with the purpose of preserving or promoting their assets.
More recently Yalman lists the same reasons as given by Davy for 
polyandry bu t observes th a t he did not find a single case of polyandry 
among the wealthy (Yalman, 1971: 112). He rem arks th a t polyandry can be 
a satisfactory arrangem ent:
the main obligations of a wife are in the nature of housekeeping, and these 
are easily shared if the men can get on in the first place. Second, with the 
deep cleavage between the sexes there is no particular emphasis on the 
special and private emotional attachments between individual men and 
women to which Westerners are accustomed. Third, it is of no small 
importance that two men together can better support a wife than one man 
alone, with fewer children into the bargain and rather more prosperity and 
well-being for all. In Terutenne, the poor are sufficiently poor to take this 
economic issue into consideration (Yalman, 1971: 109).
Yalman observes however th a t polyandry has become rare, and he 
suggests two reasons: one moral, th a t it was disapproved of, especially by
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the urban upper classes and officials; and the second, more practical, th a t 
its confinement to the poorest had reduced its prestige (Yalman, 1971: 109- 
110 ).
Yalman also notes th a t polygyny is rare. He argues th a t the reason 
for this is th a t few men can afford two wives and secondly th a t m arriage 
alliance requires such extensive co-operation with one's affines th a t vit 
would be difficult to share one's attention between two sets of in-laws. 
Their demands would soon come to conflict' (Yalman, 1971: 114). Indeed, he 
notes th a t in all the cases of polygyny he knew, the men only took one set of 
obligations seriously and ignored the families of the lower-status wife. 
When a m an had more than  one wife, they were kept entirely separate, 
often in different villages, indicating th a t polygyny is not truly an 
acceptable m arriage.
Polygamy is of in terest because of w hat it reveals about the nature of 
m arriage. The fact th a t polygamy could exist a t all indicates th a t the 
conjugal relationship was not particularly im portant, and th a t concepts of 
rom antic love did not underlie the m arriage relationship, even where the 
family did not take an active role in arranging the m arriage. The writers 
referred to above all discuss the advantages and disadvantages of polygamy 
in term s of its implications for inheritance and relations of alliance. 
Polygyny was rare because it had little practical advantage. It would have 
m eant a m an dividing his resources, including time, in m aintaining 
relations with two competing sets of affines, when it was better to 
concentrate on building up relations with the most powerful set. It would 
have caused complications with regard to the wives and their children over 
access to family resources and inheritance. In Africa where polygyny is 
im portant, property considerations are not a major impediment because 
land is held communally and therefore is not subject to individual
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inheritance. Polyandry where it did exist also had practical causes, the 
desire usually by two brothers to avoid the division of family property.
The decline of polygamy raises the issue of w hether this indicates a 
strengthening of the conjugal relationship. Clearly an im portant factor is 
the simple point th a t polygamy is illegal, except under the Muslim m arriage 
code. However, in the Kandyan areas where it was banned in 1859, it long 
continued to be practised (Jayasuriya, 1976: 327). After all until very 
recently m any m arriages were not officially registered; the law, 
consequently, has probably been less im portant as a legal sanction than  as a 
sta tem ent of official opprobium. This m eans not only th a t polygamy is 
discouraged but th a t even where it exists it may not be adm itted to. In my 
field experience, there were only a few examples of polygamy including a 
very small num ber of polyandrous cases. Particularly in the la tte r situation 
people were reluctant to adm it to it, and we did not press them  on it. Their 
reluctance seemed to be due less to its legal sta tus than  to the fact th a t it 
was no longer socially accepted and polyandry, in particular, was subject to 
some ridicule. The polyandrous cases were only found amongst the oldest 
respondents.
The social a ttitude  to polygamous m arriage partly  reflects W estern 
a ttitudes as exemplified by Rebeiro’s comment th a t 'th e ir  m arriages excite 
laughter' (Ribeiro, n.d: 54), bu t felt more influentially by the British 
adm inistrators and missionaries. But contemporary attitudes to polygamy 
may also reflect changing notions of the natu re  of m arriage; a shift toward a 
stronger conjugal relationship in m arriage. Such a shift should not be 
exaggerated. Even love m arriages often seem to lack a close emotional 
union. Significantly, the decline in polygamy in Sri Lanka seems to have 
preceded the rise in love m arriages. Perhaps a more im portant point is th a t 
m arriage is increasingly becoming a true  partnership  where the wife works 
w ith the husband much more closely and takes a greater responsibility for
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family decisions. This requirem ent would make a polygynous m arriage very 
difficult. Polygamy is not discussed in the analysis of my data  because its 
occurrence is so rare  th a t there is little to analyse.
The discussion of m arriage patterns above covers Sri Lanka's 
population as whole, with little reference to inter-ethnic differences, and 
much of the discussion has been concerned with the Sinhalese, as their 
num erical dominance largely explains the overall patterns. The minority 
groups generally m arry somewhat earlier than  the Sinhalese, have lower 
celibacy, and have stabler m arriage. According to the Sri Lankan World 
Fertility Survey of 1975 the m ean age a t m arriage of those women who had 
m arried by age 25 and were currently aged 25-49, was among the Sinhalese 
18.6, Sri Lanka Tamils 17.5, Indian Tamils 17.2 and Sri Lanka Moors 
(Muslims) 16.5 years. For those aged only 25-29 it was among the Sinhalese 
19.5, the Sri Lanka Tamils 18.0, the Indian Tamils 18.2, and the Sri Lanka 
Moors 16.5 (SLWFS, 1978: 62). Since only those who m arried by age 25 are 
included the actual m ean age a t m arriage for the cohort is considerably 
understated.
2.3 E xp lan ation s o f Sri Lanka's C hanging Mtarriage P attern s  
2.3.1 The m arriage sq u eeze
The discussion of w ritings concerning Sri Lanka's changing m arriage 
patterns concentrates on two authors, Dallas Fernando and R uth Dixon.
Fernando has argued th a t the principal explanation of the rising age 
a t m arriage in Sri Lanka is a m arriage squeeze. M arriage squeezes occur 
when the num bers of m arriageable m ales and females are not equal. The 
classical situation would be where a w ar has decimated the male population 
(who make up the armies), as happened in the Soviet Union after the 
Second World War, or where large-scale emigration or im m igration has
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occurred which is sex-selective, as happened to the Southern European 
population in A ustralia in the 1950s. M arriage squeezes can also happen if 
there are differential m ortality rates by sex, different rates of rem arriage by 
sex (as in India) and most im portantly differentials in the m arriage age for 
the two sexes in a rapidly growing population. In this situation younger 
cohorts will be much larger than  older ones, and, if the age gap is large, 
there will be a surplus of potential female m arriage partners. This situation 
can be aggravated if, added to this, there is a steep m ortality decline in the 
period between when the males were born and when the females were born. 
This is precisely w hat happened in Sri Lanka where a major anti-m alaria 
campaign and other changes in the health  system in the late 1940s brought 
a dram atic fall in m ortality (see Meegama, 1967, 1985; Jones and 
Selvaratnam , 1972: 19-25; Gray, 1974; N adarajah, 1976: 127-9). Fernando 
(1975: 183) notes that, according to apparently reliable registration figures, 
the crude death rate  fell from 20.2 per thousand in 1946 to 14.3 per 
thousand in 1947. As a resu lt of rapid population growth and perhaps too of 
better health, during 1942-46 there were 608,799 male live births whereas 
during 1947-51 there were 721,175 female live births, a discrepancy 
subsequently widened by the higher m ortality rates to which the males 
were subject during their initial years when high m ortality still prevailed.
Even with a growing population, a m arriage squeeze on women would 
not occur if there were higher female mortality, a higher proportion of males 
than  females rem arrying, sex-selective migration, and polygyny. All these 
factors were operative in  varying degrees before the 1950s but they now 
either are insignificant or have actually reversed and become factors 
actively contributing to a m arriage squeeze.
Previously high m ortality m eant th a t there were larger num bers of 
widows and widowers th an  now bu t widows rarely rem arried while 
widowers did. As Dixon (1970:242) notes, lower m ortality rates m ean th a t
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this is much less im portant now. Counteracting this, the num ber of 
divorced and even separated men rem arrying has increased, but, as these 
states are still comparatively rare  in Sri Lanka, the increase has been more 
than  counterbalanced by the fall in the supply of eligible widowers. 
Secondly, female m ortality rates were formerly higher than  male m ortality 
rates but since the 1950s this has been reversed (Langford, 1984). Thirdly, 
until the 1930s there was large-scale immigration, mostly of labourers for 
the plantation sector. Since Independence in 1948 this imm igration has 
been reversed with repatriation: 313,000 Indian Tamils were repatriated  in 
the 1970s under the Sirim a-Shastri Pact of 1964. The original immigration 
and to a lesser extent the repatriation were characterized by a high 
proportion of males; thus m igration changed from contributing to a male 
surplus to accentuating a male shortage. A final factor is the decline of 
polygamy, whereas in Africa polygyny, with men having more than  one wife, 
allows a very large age gap to persist even in a rapidly growing population. 
However polygamy seems never to have been a major factor in Sri Lanka 
and the two forms of it, polygyny and polyandry, may have partly 
counteracted each other.
In the absence of external conditions loosening the m arriage squeeze, 
the squeeze can be overcome either by a large num ber of women not 
m arrying a t all, or by a reduction in  the age gap between the two sexes at 
m arriage, or by a m ixture of the two. A reduction in the age gap would 
reduce the influence of the increase in the size of age cohorts between the 
births of the males and those of females. After all, if females m arried males 
of the same age the problem would not exist.
Fernando's argum ent (1975) is essentially th a t as a resu lt of the post­
war anti-m alaria campaign and the accompanying spectacular decline in 
mortality, the cohorts m arrying in the early 1970s were subject to a very 
severe m arriage squeeze. He appears to take the view th a t the squeeze was
83
mostly subsequently overcome by a narrowing in the age gap a t m arriage 
brought about by a rise in the female age a t m arriage, and to a sm aller, but 
indeterm inate degree, by a rise in perm anent celibacy. It is still very 
difficult to predict w hat the ultim ate level of celibacy will be.
To substantiate  his case Fernando calculated the m arriage squeeze 
by comparing the num ber of males in an age group to the num ber of females 
five years younger, approximately the age gap which prevailed before the 
m arriage squeeze, as reproduced in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2 Males per 100 females in various age groups by census years
C en su s  y e a r s
1901 1911 1921 1946  1953  1963  1971  1981
M ( 2 0 - 2 4 )
-----------------  8 8 . 6  1 1 4 . 8  1 1 1 . 1  1 0 3 . 7  1 1 6 . 4  8 8 . 3  9 5 . 3  9 5 . 1
F ( 1 5 - 1 9 )
M ( 2 5 - 2 9 )
-----------------  1 1 2 . 1  1 0 6 . 2  9 9 . 6  9 7 . 9  9 9 . 7  8 5 . 1  7 5 . 9  8 4 . 3
F ( 2 0 - 2 4 )
M ( 3 0 - 3 4 )
-----------------  7 0 . 7  8 7 . 2  8 6 . 4  9 1 . 2  8 4 . 5  9 5 . 9  7 9 . 5  8 9 . 6
F ( 2 5 - 2 9 )
M ( 3 5 - 3 9 )
-----------------  1 5 3 . 4  1 0 8 . 6  1 1 5 . 7  1 2 8 . 3  1 2 4 . 1  1 0 9 . 2  1 0 4 . 2  7 6 . 4
F ( 3 0 - 3 4 )
M ( 4 0 - 4 4 )
-----------------  6 7 . 3  1 0 1 . 4  9 5 . 2  8 8 . 0  8 6 . 5  8 3 . 4  8 7 . 7  8 6 . 8
F ( 3 5 - 3 9 )
M ( 2 0 - 3 4 )
-----------------  9 0 . 4  1 0 2 . 3  9 9 . 0  9 7 . 9  1 0 0 . 2  8 9 . 3  8 4 . 2  8 9 . 7
F ( 1 5 - 2 9 )
M ( 2 0 - 4 4 )
-----------------  9 4 . 3  1 0 3 . 3  1 0 1 . 3  1 0 1 . 1  1 0 1 . 7  9 1 . 1  8 7 . 5  8 7 . 0
F ( 1 5 - 3 9 )
Sources: 1901-1961 figures Fernando, 1975 : 181.
1971-1981 figures Fernando, 1985 : 286.
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The most useful figures in Table 2.2 are the ratios using the broad 
age groups, M(20-34)/F(15-29) and M(20-44)/F(15-39), as the marriage 
squeeze in a narrow age group can be easily overcome if there are available 
males in neighbouring age groups. The figures have the further advantage 
of being 'quite reliable since broad age groups are involved and age- 
misstatement can be considered to be minimal' (Fernando, 1975: 182). The 
low ratios of 1911 and 1981 and to a lesser extent 1963 correspond to a 
period during which the marriage age gap dramatically narrowed as shown 
in Table 2.2. The 1981 ratio of 87.0 for the broad age group M(20-44)/F(15- 
39) is virtually unchanged from the 1971 ratio of 84.9. For the youngest age 
group M(20-24)/F(15-19), in the 1981 census,however, the squeeze seems to 
have virtually passed. In the next few years the squeeze should largely 
disappear as a steady decline in the birth rate (see Table 2.3) reduces the 
margin of the younger cohorts over the older ones.
Table 2.3 Total fertility rates (TFR) in Sri Lanka for selected years.
Year TFR
1953 5.3
1963 5.0
1971 4.2
1981 3.3
Source: De Silva, 1986: 27.
Fernando does not speculate on the long-term impact of the marriage 
squeeze; but Mühsam (1978) suggested that the marriage squeeze may, by 
changing women's experiences and expectations, have a long-term effect on 
nuptiality, and much else.
Thus, in Sri Lanka, all of a sudden, 5, 6 or 7 percent of the women will not 
be able to find husbands, if both sexes maintain the traditional marriage 
pattern which had proved to ensure practically universal marriage to all 
men and women, even in the presence of a structural disequilibrium of the 
marriage market. It is true that only some 10 cohorts will be affected by
85
this situation to its full extent. But the women of these cohorts will 
certainly create an upheaval in behaviour patterns which cannot remain 
without repercussions at a future time when the cyclical squeeze has long 
disappeared or, at least, been considerably softened. The excess women 
must be expected to remain unmarried and have a strong inclination of 
penetrating into the labour market and many of them will eventually find 
employment. Once women will have conquered some positions on the 
labour market, they - as well as their younger sisters and daughters - will 
not easily relinquish these positions... Thus, the participation of women in 
the labour force is liable to become a permanent feature and the subsequent 
and long-term repercussions of this on nuptiality and fertility cannot even 
be guessed (Mühsam, 1978: 302).
The m arriage squeeze probably played a role, a t least in the short 
term , in  forcing the female age a t m arriage up, in increasing celibacy, and in 
reducing the age gap between m arriage partners, but it seems to have 
merely accentuated trends th a t have been under way since before 1900. 
Fem ale ages a t m arriage were rising long before the m arriage squeeze. It is 
more difficult to be precise concerning celibacy but it is very likely th a t it too 
was increasing slowly before the m arriage squeeze had its effects. While 
most of the reduction in the age gap has occurred since the squeeze began, 
there are other reasons for expecting the age gap to lessen.
Dixon (1970) found little correlation between the m arriage squeeze 
and m arriage patterns. Dixon (1970: 312) employed data  collected before 
the height of the m arriage squeeze, but nevertheless noted th a t there was a 
shortage of males. This, however, had been overcome by a higher 
rem arriage rate  of widowers than  of widows, to the degree th a t there were 
more bachelors than  spinsters.
She notes th a t the supply of males is not a good predictor of celibacy 
or age a t m arriage; ra th e r where celibacy was high and the m arriage age 
late for one sex, this was also true for the other. Thus Colombo which has a 
surplus of males had late m arriage and high celibacy levels for females as 
well as males, and not early rates as the m arriage m arket might have 
implied (Dixon, 1970: 245). As yet, there had been little reduction in the
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average five-year age gap between spouses, bu t Dixon (1970: 243-245) 
suggests th a t it m ight as the m arriage squeeze tightened.
Significantly, Fernando (1985: 285-286), in a more recent article, 
downplays the role of the m arriage squeeze on changes in age a t m arriage, 
and places more emphasis on economic factors stressing, in particular, how 
the economic difficulties and high unemployment of the 1970s delayed 
m arriage. Sim ilar argum ents have been put forward by Abeyesekere 
(1982:196), Hannenberg (1987) and Gombrich and Obeyesekere (1988:196). 
The w riter who has pursued the argum ent most thoroughly, however, was 
Dixon (1970).
2.3.2 D ixon  and the d ec lin in g  feasib ility  o f Sri Lankan m arriage
Dixon (1970: 310-311) argues th a t the prim ary factor explaining the 
late age a t m arriage in Sri Lanka and the increase in age a t m arriage this 
century is th a t m arriage has become less feasible. She attribu tes the 
original relatively high age a t m arriage to an ideal household arrangem ent, 
where the young m arried couple should live separately from the parents. 
This delayed the commencement of the m arriage search until the bride had 
acquired housekeeping skills and the m aturity  to manage a household, and 
the groom was earning his own living; after all sons who are already 
earning can bring larger dowries and daughters with special abilities may 
require sm aller ones. The increase this century, she suggests, is due to 
increasing financial obstacles, due, in particular to the subdivision of 
agricultural land as a consequence of the population increase which has 
made it difficult to accumulate dowries for daughters, as well as to low 
incomes and unemployment.
She has identified m any of the elements involved in the increases in 
age a t m arriage bu t she has placed too much emphasis on problems of 
feasibility in delaying m arriage, and consequently understated the
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importance of other factors. In comparison to other countries in the region 
m arriage in Sri Lanka was less feasible; land is being subdivided and 
unemployment is a major problem. In my experience, however, few people 
give the lack of alternative employment as a reason for delaying m arriage. 
Similarly, Dixon refers to a suggestion by Ryan (1952: 366) th a t the 
difficulties of raising dowry might be delaying m arriage, but Ryan observed 
th a t neither the cost of dowry nor the proportion paying dowry seemed to be 
increasing. Dixon argues th a t it is becoming more difficult to finance dowry 
for such reasons as land fragm entation and the increasing cost of living. My 
own experience is tha t, in contrast to India, dowry is not commonly cited as 
a reason for delaying m arriage. In India where m arriage is much earlier 
respondents often refer to dowry destroying a family’s fortunes but the 
claim is never made in Sri Lanka.
Difficulties in establishing a household have affected m arriage rates, 
particularly  in times of severe economic difficulties as in the early 1970s 
when many m arriages were delayed. But the relationship between the 
feasibility of m arriage and age a t m arriage is not simple: the long-term rise 
in the age at m arriage cannot prim arily be related to problems in the 
feasibility of m arriage. Since the early 1970s employment levels, especially 
in the towns, have increased and there are greater opportunities to work 
overseas, particularly in the oil-exporting countries of the Middle East; 
m any young men and women work overseas to raise the money to buy or 
build a house. Yet there are few signs of a significant fall in age at 
m arriage. This suggests th a t the factors leading to a rise in the age a t 
m arriage are more complex than  simply specific obstacles in the way of 
early m arriage. There are, indeed good reasons for families and individuals 
now to prefer la ter marriage.
A more common reason given for delaying m arriage than  the lack of 
the inheritance or dowry or employment, is a desire for perm anent
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(generally government) employment, preferably clerical bu t also manual. 
This is a new requirem ent and, especially for arranged m arriages, relates as 
much to the desirability of m arriage as to the feasibility of marriage. A 
single m an with a perm anent job is regarded as being a particularly 
desirable groom, and is much more likely to be approached with m arriage 
offers th an  a m an who lacks such a job. A m an who has the prospect of 
getting a perm anent job may well wait until he has one before he or his 
family considers m arriage because he will then be in a much better 
bargaining position. Perm anent employment has prestige and, a t least to a 
lim ited extent, provides access to the privileges of the W esternized elite.
Dixon herself alludes to the advantages of delaying m arriage when 
she points out th a t a bride with housekeeping skills may require a smaller 
dowry and a groom with a job command a larger dowry. However, by tying 
these requirem ents very closely to the difficulties of establishing a nuclear 
household she implies th a t these requirem ents are simply obstacles to early 
m arriage when they are, in fact, essential to w hat is desirable in a bride or 
groom.
It is true th a t the joint family is not the expressed ideal as it is in 
India, and most families wish eventually to establish their own household. 
However, most young couples initially live with the parents of one of the 
partners, until they have the resources to establish their own household and 
often for much longer. The tendency to establish a new household on 
m arriage may reflect Sri Lanka's late age a t m arriage as much as the late 
age reflects the need to establish a new household. The im portant point is 
th a t even if they do not establish a separate household, the young couple, in 
contrast to sim ilar couples in India, for example, are regarded as being a 
separate family unit, even if they are living in the same house, and are 
consequently expected to have the m aturity  and independent resources to 
manage a family. Moreover, because they are regarded as a separate family
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unit there is no pressure for a less m ature bride who would not threaten  
family unity.
The result of Dixon tying the requirem ent of a more accomplished 
couple to the need to establish an independent household is th a t she 
underestim ates the degree to which the requirem ents have changed. W hat 
is needed to manage a family is greater now than  formerly; a m other m ust 
take greater in terest in the family’s welfare than  before. Similarly, w hat is 
required of a groom, such as a good job, is more stringent than  it was. 
Consequently, while Dixon recognizes th a t the m aturity  and ability of the 
bride and groom delayed m arriage before the rise in m arriage ages she 
understates the role th a t it had in those changes.
While Dixon regards problems in the feasibility of m arriage as the 
principal reason why age a t m arriage has risen in Sri Lanka, she also says 
th a t m arriage has become less desirable. She notes th a t in the past 
m arriage was desirable, 'in  a society where social interaction is centred so 
strongly on kinship networks, the unattached person suffers particularly 
from a condition of social isolation’ (Dixon, 1970: 292). An unm arried 
woman may be criticized for being stubborn in rejecting m arriage proposals 
brought by her parents or for being undesirable, and she may be subjected 
to gossip as being a loose woman (Dixon, 1970: 295). It can be difficult for 
an individual to live alone; for a m an to do so is not regarded as proper, and 
a woman may have difficulties in finding employment, particularly a good 
job, especially if she has been w ithdraw n from school to be trained as a 
housewife (Dixon, 1970: 298). Female employment is generally only found 
among the poor, being seen as a painful necessity ra ther than  an alternative 
to m arriage (Dixon, 1970: 299).
The desirability of m arriage is lessening; rising female education 
rates m eans th a t women have access to better paid and more prestigious
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employment, and work may come as an alternative to m arriage. Education 
is also changing aspirations toward a more genteel life style (Dixon, 1970: 
311-312). The reduction in m ortality is reducing the advantage of early 
m arriage as more children are surviving to adulthood (Dixon, 1970: 311). 
Dixon argues (1970: 311) th a t m arriage was always less desirable in Sri 
Lanka than  in other countries in the region since Buddhism placed less 
emphasis on reproduction than  Hinduism  and Islam. She notes in 
particu lar the lim ited sanction in Buddhism against celibacy; spinsterhood 
may be a ttributed  to bad karma  (bad actions in previous lives will be 
punished in this life), but it does not imply eternal dam nation which, she 
says, is the case in Hinduism  and Islam (Dixon, 1970: 296).
Nevertheless, Dixon believes th a t m arriage is still regarded as 
desirable in Sri L ankan society and w hat prevents it from being early or 
universal there is simply, as noted earlier, th a t it is not feasible because of 
the requirem ent for residential and financial independence.
Dixon's division between the desirability and feasibility of m arriage 
seems artificial. Furtherm ore, even if one accepts her division she places 
too much emphasis on the feasibility of m arriage and too little on the 
desirability of m arriage. She trea ts desirability as essentially im portant in 
explaining why m arriage was early in the past and as having comparatively 
little impact on changes in contemporary m arriage patterns. F ar from 
changes in the desirability of m arriage having no role in the changes in 
m arriage patterns, they are central.
W hen people are asked why they or their children m arried a t a 
certain time they rarely answ er th a t they did not have the resources or they 
could not find a m ate. They are much more likely to answer th a t this was 
the proper time to m arry. Such an answer is difficult to in terpret. It could 
simply be a rationalization for changes forced on them , but the evidence
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suggests that it is more than this: desired age at marriage has changed in 
response to very real factors concerning what is regarded as the necessary 
level of maturity of the bride and groom. The bride and groom need to be 
capable of handling and manipulating a much more complex world than was 
the case formerly.
2.4 W hat are the C ritical F actors w h ich  N eed  to be E xam ined for an  
U n derstan d in g  o f Sri Lanka's M arriage P atterns?
2.4.1 E xp la in in g  both pre-transition al and p ost-tran sition al 
m arriage
It is useful now to examine the forces in Sri Lankan history and 
society which may help explain why Sri Lankan marriage was already fairly 
late in the nineteenth century, and why age at marriage has increased 
throughout this century. First an examination of the underlying socio­
cultural conditions may help to explain why age at marriage seems to have 
been comparatively high before modem changes, and whether the socio­
cultural conditions provided a favourable environment for the marriage age 
to rise. Then some of the historical factors that have impinged on marriage, 
as on much else, are examined. Finally, there is an examination of how 
economic factors influence marriage and particularly changes in marriage. 
I am moving from factors that have the greatest impact on pre-transition 
marriage patterns to those more closely involved in changing marriage 
patterns. Each of the factors to be examined is relevant for both the pre­
transition and post-transition marriage processes.
2.4.2 T he k in sh ip  system
The first and most obvious socio-cultural factor influencing marriage 
is the kinship system. Sri Lanka has what is called in the anthropological 
literature (Dumont, 1953: 34; Keesing, 1975: 107-110), a Dravidian
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m arriage system after the Dravidian-speaking populations with which it is 
commonly associated^. This system distinguishes between kin and affines, 
giving a very prom inent role to the latter. By doing so it helps the young 
bride to reta in  links with her family, and indeed the system generally 
involves a continuing relationship with rights and obligations on both sides. 
This relationship is very likely to be continued into the next generation with 
further m arriages.
Dravidian kinship systems also seem to be involved with sm aller 
family units. There is no necessary reason why this should be so. Provided 
property is not diffused but kept in a single line either patrilineal or 
m atrilineal, it would be perfectly possible to have unilineal descent systems 
of the type often identified with large families. This, indeed, seems to be 
implied by Dumont's (1953, 1957) model of the Dravidian kinship system 
where he emphasizes the movement of brides between parallel descent 
groups. Dumont appears to assume th a t brides moved in only one direction 
between these groups, either patrila terally  or m atrilaterally , as is normally 
the case in South India but not in Sri Lanka. His argum ent also 
emphasizes the classificatory nature  of the kinship system. A person is an 
aun t not because she is a particular individual but because structurally  she 
is. She may not be the father's sister bu t the father's brother's daughter. 
She is structurally  the same because she is a woman who has m arried out 
(in a patrilineal system) of the lineage, and is of the same generation. The 
emphasis on the classificatory aspects of the kinship system emphasizes the 
role of lineage; everyone in the same descent line will be kin, everyone in 
descent lines into which someone from ego's line has m arried will be affines.
6 Note, however, that the majority population in Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese, speak a non- 
Dravidian language.
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Yalman argues (1971: 358) th a t Dumont's emphasis on the lineage 
structure is unnecessary and, in fact, fails to explain Kandyan society with 
its b ilateral inheritance a t all. He comments th a t
It is important to understand that the features of South Indian kinship to 
which he draws our attention are not intrinsically associated with any 
lineages at all. On the contrary, the functioning of the system is most clear 
in systems such as the Sinhalese where the categories of kinship are not 
submerged in lineal groupings (Yalman, 1971: 357).
Yalman insists Dravidian kinship terminology contains 'no lineal emphasis 
at all, bu t only rules regarding the interconnections between categories' 
(Yalman, 1971: 357).
Yalman argues tha t, contrary to Dumont's claim th a t the Dravidian 
kinship system contains a continuing alliance between two lineages, it 
actually reflects the claims th a t brothers and sisters have with regard to 
each other:
What Dumont calls affinity I would translate as rights and obligations 
between brothers and sisters. This permits us to see the mechanism of 
transfer more clearly. If we consider the claim of the cross-cousins upon 
each other as marriage partners, we can detect that these claims are part of 
the claims that a man has over his sister's children and the counterclaims of 
the sister upon her brother’s children. It is the previous claims of the 
parents which the offspring reiterated as their rights upon each other. Let 
us further observe that in the South Indian context the claims of the 
brother on the children of his sister are simply a further statement of his 
claims upon her person. The brother has an important voice in the 
marriage of his sister, because her marriage has important side effects upon 
his status; it also brings in as part of the enclosed endogamous circle a 
person (cross-cousin) with whom he will have to cooperate (Yalman, 1971: 
358).
Thus brothers and sisters as children of the same parents retain  
residual rights over each other, partly  because w hat happens to one has 
implications in sta tus for the other. In a sense they reta in  family ties even 
when they have m arried out. To the extent th a t there is an alliance it is 
between brothers and sisters, and between brothers-in-law, not between 
lineages. New cross-cousin m arriages will continue this alliance into the 
next generation but it is an  outcome of the relations between siblings ra ther
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than  a separate entity. Yalman (1971: 358) accuses Dumont of reifying 
affinity, treating  it as equivalent to a lineage which is a corporate group 
(and as such an actual institutionalized structure with property and offices), 
whereas affinity merely consists of relations between persons or groups of 
persons.
A consequence of the rights of brothers and sisters over each other is, 
a centripetal tendency ... Sm aller and sm aller circles of endogamy form 
purer and purer circles of kin who may be perm itted to claim - a t least in 
their own minds - higher ritual status' (Yalman, 1971: 359).
Yalman's argum ents have had some critics. Obeyesekere argues tha t 
Yalman (1962) attribu tes too much to a terminological system which he 
insists cannot regulate hum an behaviour, th a t is he reifies the terminology.
The neatness of the terminological system has attracted many 
anthropologists - Morgan, Rivers, Levi-Strauss, Murdock, Dumont, to 
mention a few. The most recent exposition comes from Yalman. Yalman's 
hypothesis commits the fallacy of deducing behavioural regularities from a 
terminological system. According to him the function of the terminology is 
to 'regulate marriage and sexual relations inside bilateral and largely 
endogamous "kindreds" ’. It is difficult for us to see how a terminology 
regulates marriage in this sense. Regulation of marriage is done by human 
agents in an action context. Yalman goes on to say that the terminology 
implies 'a  prescriptive bilateral cross-cousin marriage rule. In this respect 
the terminology is highly systematic, and all the terms imply bilateral 
cross-cousin marriage, and such marriage is essential if the categories of 
kinship are to be kept in order' ... To assume that such marriages are 
essential if the categories of kinship are to be kept in order, is to imply that 
Sinhalese get married in order to keep their kinship categories in proper 
shape. This is an empirical, not a prima facie theoretical issue. Empirically 
there is no prescriptive rule enforced in action unanimously by the 
Sinhalese. It is true that all marriages are between cross-cousins in the 
terminological sense, even marriages with total strangers, who after 
marriage are designated as consanguines (Obeyesekere, 1967: 248-250).
Obeyesekere's principal criticism is th a t Yalman is suggesting th a t 
kinship categories guide hum an actions when, in fact, it is hum an actions 
th a t are reflected in kinship terminology. Obeyesekere (1967: 251-253) 
argues th a t contrary to Yalman no special emphasis is placed on the 
m arriage of cross-cousins. The only emphasis is th a t sentim ent favours the
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m arriage of close relatives and only cross-cousins are eligible. More d istant 
relatives who are parallel cousins will be re-defined as cross-cousins. While 
the terminological system is undoubtedly flexible, the argum ent seems 
slightly unfair and even disingenuous. Yalman too was stressing the rights 
th a t brothers and sisters have towards each other ra th e r than  simply 
terminological systems, and he recognizes th a t among more d istant 
relations the system has a strong Active element. Furtherm ore, the 
statem ent th a t among close relatives only cross cousins could m arry surely 
reflects the fact th a t w ithin the kinship system cross-cousins are defined as 
potential m ates and parallel cousins are not.
It is more im portant th a t Yalman overemphasizes the bilateral 
na tu re  of the kinship system. It is true th a t in the Kandyan areas m arriage 
may be either with m atrila teral cross-cousins (mother's brother's daughter) 
or patrila tera l cross-cousins (father's sister's son). The bilateral nature of 
the Sri L ankan m arriage tends to underm ine any lineal aspects, and the 
bilateral nature  of Kandyan inheritance helps break up the property of any 
corporate group thus underm ining the lineage system. In South India 
where m arriage tends to be either patrila tera l or m atrila teral, and property 
is inherited either patrilineally or more rarely m atrilineally, a lineal system 
is more possible.
But in reality South India, like Sri Lanka, lacks a genuine lineage 
system, in the sense th a t Africa has one. More relevantly its family system 
is m arked by sm aller families and less of a tendency towards joint families 
than  is the case in North India where the Dravidian kinship system does 
not prevail. The em phasis on affinal links, perhaps deriving from the 
continuing rights of nuclear family members especially brothers and sisters 
over each other, seems to be an im portant factor in this. Strong affinal links 
are in conflict with the very concept of the joint family which depends upon 
emphasizing kin links, the unity of the male members of the lineage in
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Opposition to outsiders including affines. Furtherm ore, the support th a t a 
woman's relatives give to her will reduce her subservience in her new 
household, because a major factor in a woman's subservience to her new 
household is her total dependence physically and emotionally on a 
household in which she is an outsider. Most im portantly the very concept of 
strong relations between brother and sister underm ines much of the 
em phasis on female inequality found in N orthern India.
All these factors are relevant to m arriage patterns. The stronger 
rights of the girl w ithin her natal family as well as the greater status in 
general accorded to females may mean that, potentially a t least, a girl has a 
greater righ t in decisions regarding her future welfare including her 
m arriage. While the female m arriage age is early this is likely to rem ain a 
potential only, but as female age a t m arriage rises this is likely to become a 
factor in its  own right in further forcing up age a t m arriage and even 
allowing celibacy. T hat is her family may allow the girl to veto potential 
m arriages and even leave it to her to make her own decisions on marriage; 
in such cases the family is also likely to reta in  its own veto rights.
2.4.3 The jo in t fam ily
Furtherm ore, the fact th a t a woman m aintains particu lar rights 
w ithin her own family even after m arriage may also m ean th a t she has a 
place w ithin her family if she needs it. This is related to the fact th a t the 
kinship system seems to discourage joint families. In the large patriarchal 
joint family there seems to be no role for the unm arried adolescent 
daughter. The stability of the family is dependent upon the unity of the 
men under the authority  of the patriarch, and on the subservience of the 
women and children to the men, and to the women's mothers-in-law. An 
adolescent daughter would th rea ten  this because she, unlike the other 
women, is not an outsider, she is a member of the family as part of her
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birthright. She could not be treated  as an interloper who needed to earn her 
right to be in the family (mostly through bearing male children), bu t not to 
do so would create anomalies in the trea tm en t of other women, including 
the girl's m other. The emotional m other-daughter link m ight have an 
egalitarian  tinge threatening the authority  structure of the family, and, 
even more dangerously, create a rival network to the dom inant male ties. 
This is a particu lar danger in societies where female and male roles are 
strongly segregated. In such situations women are likely to be restricted to 
the house while men are in control of the relations with the external world. 
This can serve to make the women very isolated but it can also serve to 
make the m en feel outsiders in their own homes. This is prevented in  the 
joint household by ensuring th a t the women are rivals with little  in 
common. A rising age a t m arriage can th rea ten  this situation. In Sri Lanka 
even when men theoretically have authority, the real locus of power, over 
domestic m atters a t any rate, often seems to lie with the women, mothers 
and daughters.
The jo int family has other implications for m arriage patterns. Where 
there are no joint families, m arried couples may be expected to establish 
their own households. This is likely to require a greater degree of m aturity  
and hence an older age of both husband and wife. Secondly, there may be 
less pressure in favour of a large age gap between husband and wife to 
discourage too close an emotional relationship which m ight challenge the 
unity  of the joint family. Conversely, the age gap m ay equally be an 
outcome of a weak emotional relationship as the cause of it; if the joint 
family effectively discourages a strong emotional relationship in the first 
place, there may be no wish among the groom or bride for a partner who is a 
genuine companion, for which a small age gap may be an asset. Thirdly 
where the young couple are likely to be independent, residentially a t least,
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the kin are more likely to leave decisions concerning m arriage until they 
have reached an age when they can give their opinions.
The emphasis placed here on the joint family as an interm ediary 
factor in the influence of kinship structures on m arriage patterns raises the 
point th a t the existence of joint families cannot be attributed  solely to the 
kinship structure. Jo in t families are much more common in South India 
than  in Sri Lanka, even if they are ra re r than  in North India, though both 
South India and Sri Lanka have Dravidian kinship systems. Precisely how 
common the joint family is in each of these cases depends on how the joint 
jam ily is defined. Apart from the quantitative question of precisely how 
many nuclear units of each generation there are residing in the family there 
is a question of how the family functions. So far I have emphasized an 
overriding patriarchal authority  as an essential tra it of the joint family. 
Nuclear units which reside jointly but function as separate units are 
probably not true joint families: those families which appear to be joint 
families in Sri Lanka are not joint families in the same sense as the ones 
existing in North India.
The existence of joint families is also affected by factors which are to 
some extent independent of the kinship system, including notions of the 
ideal family, female chastity, and religion. The joint family is regarded in 
India, bu t not generally in Sri Lanka, as the ideal family. The joint family 
represents the ideals of family unity, particularly fraternal solidarity in the 
face of all possible adversity. It also represents respect for the elders and 
even for the ancestors. The family is a whole which should not be divided. 
The existence of the joint family as an ideal is doubtless partly  due to the 
nature  of the N orth Indian kinship systems, but in South India its existence 
as an ideal,independent of the prevailing kinship system, is an im portant 
factor in promoting its existence. Its existence has been promoted by the 
prestige of North India in the South as the N orth has long been regarded as
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the heartland  of Indian and particularly Hindu Culture. The strongest 
factor promoting the ideal of the joint family is its identification as the ideal 
Hindu family. This is expressed in the Hindu epic the Mahabharata  where 
the five Pandya brothers represent all the noble Hindu values, including 
th a t of placing the in terests of the whole above those of the individual; this 
is linked to the H indu belief th a t desire is the root of all evil and disorder 
derives from self-interested actions. The association of H induism  with the 
joint family is reinforced by the fact th a t the family worships as a unit. In a 
H indu household, there is a shrine to the gods including the family gods 
before whom each day the eldest woman in the household does obeisance .
H induism  as a religion is very closely linked to the prevailing social 
order in  India. Ju s t as it provides the justification for caste (cf. Dumont, 
1980) it also underlies the joint family. Each of the major rites of passage 
such as birth, puberty, death and above all m arriage, are religious rites 
which m ark an individual's passage through life and in particular through 
the life cycle of the family. Indeed Hindus assign various stages to a man's 
life including a stage during which he should be a family man.
In  Sri Lanka, unlike South India, the joint family is not the ideal. 
The reasons for this prim arily relate to Sri Lanka's political and cultural 
separation from India and above all, to its religion. Although the majority 
ethnic group of Sri Lanka's population, the Sinhalese, claim to have 
originated in  North India, believe in a religion which was born there and 
speak a language th a t is closely related to the languages of North India, 
they do not look to it for a model of behaviour. Indeed the Sinhalese, who 
tend to perceive Sri Lanka as a citadel preserving the original purity of 
Buddhism  both from the revival of Hinduism in India, and from the 
corruption which it has suffered elsewhere, are much more likely to regard 
them selves as preserving the ideal society.
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Buddhism, moreover, unlike Hinduism, is not really in conformity 
with the ideals underlying the joint family. It is in many ways a very 
individualistic religion: salvation or N irvana, the release from the cycle of 
rebirth, m ust be obtained by each individual separately. Unlike Hinduism, 
Buddhism alm ost entirely ignores the family. The family does not worship 
as a unit b u t each person undertakes religious duties on an individual basis. 
Buddhist monks have only a lim ited role in family rites, for example, having 
a minor role in funerals and none a t all in  m arriages. Symbolically, 
whereas all Hindus including priests are expected during their lives to have 
family responsibilities, Buddhist monks are expected to completely cut 
themselves off from all family responsibilities. Sri Lankan Buddhism has 
no equivalent to the Hindu Mahabharata  with its emphasis on brotherly 
valour bu t emphasizes ra ther the simple pious stories of the Buddhist 
Jataka  w ith their stress on self-denial.
2.4.4 F em ale autonom y
Buddhism  may also affect family structure by its influence on the 
sta tus and autonomy of women. In Hinduism  a woman does not have a 
separate religious role from th a t of her family; it is even said th a t for a 
woman her god is her husband. In Buddhism, as noted, each person 
worships and performs good deeds separately. There is a much greater 
acceptance of the autonomy of women, if not of their total equality: 
adm ittedly a particularly  devout elderly woman of my acquaintance gives as 
her reason for performing good deeds her wish to be reborn as a man. 
Buddhism, again unlike Hinduism, does not emphasize m arriage and 
childbearing as the central religious duties of a woman. It is perhaps 
significant th a t in Sinhalese Buddhism women can be nuns ju s t as men can 
be monks, a position which excludes family responsibilities including 
m arriage. In reality, even though being a nun is religiously sanctioned, 
there is much less social approval for a woman being a nun. The proper
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ordination ceremony for nuns died out probably in the late ten th  century, 
and has never been revived according to legitim ate religious traditions. 
This does not, however, stop there being women who perform the role of 
nuns (Gombrich and Obeyesekere,1988:274)
The values associated with Buddhism run  counter to the values on 
which the joint family is based, the meek acceptance of patriarchal 
authority. Furtherm ore, the emphasis on individual identity lends some 
legitimacy to the concept of individuals having a role in decisions concerning 
m arriage.
The em phasis on female autonomy and individuality may also 
influence notions of female sexuality. In India, as in a num ber of Middle- 
E astern  countries, any suggestion of sexual in terest, or even of too much 
forwardness, can destroy the reputation of a girl and of her family. 
Consequently, it is im portant to ensure a girl's chastity and to ensure tha t 
no occasion occurs which could give rise to gossip. This is a major reason, as 
noted above, for early m arriage. If m arriage is very early then it will almost 
certainly be arranged; furtherm ore, the girl may virtually be forced to m arry 
into a joint household because a t th a t age she is not capable of performing 
w ithout assistance a role as wife and mother. Hence the strong emphasis on 
female chastity serves to emphasize the joint family and arranged m arriage 
as well as an early age a t marriage.
W hat are the overall implications of these various sociocultural 
factors on m arriage and m arriage patterns? By emphasizing the differences 
between Sri Lanka and India, I am not suggesting th a t Sri Lanka was 
unique in having a highly individualistic society in which women were 
accorded an equal place, virtually akin to a W estern society. Ascribed 
sta tus was, as in India, very im portant and behaviour was strongly guided 
by community expectations. Women's roles, in particular, were tightly
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restricted, and they were expected on the whole to fulfil their duties to be 
wives and mothers. But some of the reasons for very early m arriage in 
India were m issing in Sri Lanka, and some of the impedim ents to rises in 
the age a t m arriage and even to celibacy, were missing. The kinship 
system, family structure and religion all acted to allow a more independent 
role for men and particularly for women. There was much less emphasis on 
the need to m arry very early to prevent young men and especially young 
women from being too independent, and there has been much less 
resistance to changing circumstances in which the young play a part in the 
decision when to m arry and even if they will m arry a t all.
The following section concentrates on historical factors more closely 
related to change in m arriage. These factors are mostly related to Sri 
Lanka's colonial and post-colonial contact with the outside world, and its 
response to them.
2.4.5 A non-traditional society
Sri Lanka has had a very long history of contact with the outside 
world. Its geographical position has m eant th a t it has been a t the centre of 
the great trade routes crossing the Indian Ocean since ancient times. Trade 
connected it to the Indian subcontinent to the north, to Southeast Asia and 
more distantly  to China and the Middle-East.
Because of th is central position, Sri Lanka had very early contacts 
with Europeans first as traders (including Marco Polo) but la ter as 
colonizers. Coastal Sri Lanka had an unusually long period of colonial rule, 
over four hundred years, more than  twice as long as most other parts of 
South Asia. From the early sixteenth century until 1948 coastal Sri Lanka 
was ruled successively by the Portuguese, the Dutch and the British. In the 
interior the Kandyans, in contrast, retained their independence until 1815 
when they were conquered by the British.
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The colonial period was m arked by the development of an export 
economy based on plantation agriculture. Ceylon had long been famed as 
the source of cinnamon but this was overshadowed in the nineteenth 
century with the development of modern plantation agriculture; with 
coconuts and rubber on the lowlands and coffee and la te r tea in the 
Kandyan highlands.
The consequences of these developments are that, while Sri Lanka is 
not a rich country, it  does not have a true peasantry  isolated from the 
outside world, as is still true of m any of the ru ral areas of the m ainland 
subcontinent. This is especially true in Sri Lanka's low country where this 
study was concentrated; and where a majority of Sri Lankans live. While 
agricultural income and more often home-grown food are im portant for 
many families, few are totally dependent upon it. Most im portantly, wealth 
from traditional agriculture as distinct from the proprietorship of a 
p lantation has rarely been the basis of great wealth.
The shrinking role of traditional agriculture owed much to the 
development of the plantation sector. The two rarely competed directly. 
The plantation sector was geared to export whereas traditional agriculture 
was entirely domestically oriented, growing mostly food crops such as rice. 
The two forms of agriculture grew different crops, were territorially 
segregated and had essentially separate work forces; the plantations 
imported their own labour force of Indian Tamils.
While plantation agriculture may not have directly competed with 
traditional agriculture, it affected it indirectly. It supported an economy in 
which traditional agriculture had only a very minor role. The indigenous 
population of Sri Lanka benefited from plantation agriculture in th a t a few 
families had capital in some of the sm aller plantations (particularly in 
coconuts), by the provision of services to the plantations and to the planters,
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the infusion of money into the economy, by the government's provision of 
infrastructure for the plantations and by the benefits of the government's 
increased tax revenue. The benefits to government revenues were 
particularly  im portant for they allowed a large government sector with an 
unusually extensive range of services, for a developing country. In 
particu lar they provided an extremely impressive system of education and 
health  care. The state  became a major source of jobs and largesse.
Inevitably, such far-reaching economic changes have had a major 
impact on Sri Lankan society and more specifically on m arriage. One of the 
most im portant ways in which economic change has affected social 
institu tions is by replacing the traditional village-based social hierarchy 
with a modern town-based one. In the peasant societies th a t still dominate 
much of South Asia each village is in m any ways a separate social universe 
with its own elite based on the ownership of land, and on ascribed status 
such as th a t derived from m embership of a particular caste. Now, however, 
the Sri L anka village elite cannot compete in social standing with the new 
urban elites where position is based on their access to the new sources of 
income and education.
A num ber of factors can be suggested to explain these changes, which 
have been much more thoroughgoing than  elsewhere in South Asia. An 
im portant factor is simply the sheer wealth resulting from the plantation 
sector. Local agriculture did not provide access to sim ilar wealth. The local 
elite lost prestige as it could not compare in wealth to the town elites, and it 
also lost its control over the village as an increasing proportion of the labour 
force worked outside the village.
Village elites in Sinhalese areas probably never had the same hold 
economically over the villages th a t they had in neighbouring India. Moore 
points out th a t there is a very small landless population dependent on
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agricultural employment provided by the village elite. He does not 
speculate on why this is so except to note th a t such a class is found in the 
Tamil and Muslim areas of northern and eastern  Sri Lanka, and th a t it 
'conforms to the more hierarchical and traditional nature  of the Sri Lanka 
Tamil and Muslim social structures' (Moore, 1985: 188).
The weakness of the Sri Lanka village elite is not purely economic. 
There are a num ber of other im portant factors. A key factor here is 
geography. Sri Lanka's very high population density, especially in the 
Southwestern lowlands, m eant th a t villages had much greater contact with 
each other and with the towns than  would have been the case in a more 
sparsely populated country.
Moreover, Sri Lankan villages, especially in the w etter parts of the 
country (the wet zone), are not generally nucleated, bu t tend to be widely 
dispersed w ith houses scattered here and there. The reason for this is 
probably principally ecological. In regions where farm ing is heavily 
dependent on a lim ited am ount of irrigated land tied to a few w ater sources 
villages are tightly concentrated round those sources. This is the case in 
most of South Asia bu t is not true of Sri Lanka where high and relatively 
even rainfall m eans th a t there are m any w ater sources.
The lack of village nucleation seems to have weakened village 
identity as well as the village elite's hold over the village. In a sense when 
there are no clear cut boundaries with neighbouring villages the village has 
less of an identity. Villagers have less concern with w hat occurs in their 
village because w hat happens in the next village is also im portant to them. 
The elite too is likely to have in terests in neighbouring villages. Perhaps it 
is significant also th a t each house has much greater privacy. Not only are 
houses more dispersed but they are surrounded by their own gardens of 
ornam ental and food trees and many even have their own well or a t least
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easy access to one; in India one of the m ain occasions for village gossip is 
while the women are queuing to draw w ater from the well. The greater 
privacy may reduce the impact of community attitudes, for people can to 
some extent ignore them. It is perhaps also im portant th a t each household 
is largely self-sufficient; with their own fruit trees including jack-fruit, 
breadfruit, coconuts and mangoes, households can provide much of their 
needs.
Perhaps an equally im portant factor is the comparative weakness of 
the caste system in Sri Lanka, a t least amongst the Sinhalese; the Muslims 
claim not to believe in  caste at all. Sri Lanka's caste system is superficially 
sim ilar to India's with a hierarchy of castes each with their traditional 
occupation. Caste, however, has much less of an impact on an individual's 
life. It is im portant in the choice of a m arriage partner but is of limited 
significance elsewhere. I t is noteworthy, for example, th a t Sri Lanka does 
not have either Brahm ans or H arijans (untouchables), who provide the top 
and the bottom of the caste hierarchy in India, nor do they have a strong 
concept of pollution. The absence of these factors removes some of the more 
salient aspects of caste. Its importance was greater in the past but there 
are reasons for believing th a t it was never as all-pervading as it is in Indian 
society. The major difference between the Sinhalese and the Indian caste 
systems is th a t amongst the former the system lacks a religious basis. 
Buddha never rejected caste outright bu t he did regard it as irrelevant to 
a tta in ing  enlightenm ent. One did not need to be a B rahm an to know the 
tru th . In effect, Buddhism  distinguishes between th a t which is eternal 
where true knowledge lies and the everyday reality or ra ther illusion in 
which people operate. The former is perm anent and majestic, the la tte r 
im perm anent, taw dry and the source of desire and disappointm ent. Caste is 
relegated from the sacred to the profane world in which we operate. This 
does not m ean th a t caste and religion were entirely separate. The main
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Buddhist fraternity  of monks in Sri Lanka, and indeed the only one until 
the nineteenth century, the Siyam Nikaya, still restricts ordination of 
monks to the Govigama, the highest and largest caste, constituting about 
ha lf the population. Worship, however, has always been open to members of 
all castes equally.
The full distinction between Buddhism as a religion and caste as a 
secular activity seems to have been comparatively recent. The nineteenth 
century was m arked by w hat has come to be called the Buddhist Revival 
Movement, which grew out of an a ttem pt to counter the activities of 
C hristian missionaries. P a rt of the strength of the missionaries was th a t 
through their schools they offered access to W estern knowledge and to jobs 
such as clerks in the towns. The Buddhist Revivalists responded not by 
stressing non-W estern values bu t by adopting much of the organization and 
approach of the m issionaries, setting up schools, printing presses, Sunday 
schools, the Young Women's Buddhist Association (YWBA) and so forth 
(DeSilva 1981:346), and by presenting a Buddhism more in sympathy with 
W estern rationalism , supposedly close to the original Buddhism cleansed of 
im purities such as caste.
The Revival Movement's approach to caste was influenced by the fact 
m any of their key supporters came from a num ber of lower castes which had 
taken advantage of the economic changes wrought by colonialism to a much 
greater degree than  did the dom inant Govigama caste. A major role in the 
movement was performed by a new Buddhist fraternity, the A m arapura 
Nikaya, established by m embers of these castes and open to all irrespective 
of caste background (Malalgoda, 1976:87-105).
The lack of a religious sanction for caste weakened the hold of the 
traditional elite over the village population; ju st as their economic hold was 
weak so too was the ideological justification for their position. In Sri Lanka
108
there is little  correspondence between caste and occupational structure. 
While to some degree all castes were always concerned with agriculture 
they were also expected to carry out their caste occupation. There is little 
sign of th is today. Sri Lanka has no trace of the Indian ja jm ani system by 
which castes provide farm ers with their services in exchange for a share of 
the harvest grain (see B.Caldwell, 1991), though the system clearly once 
existed (cf. Knox, 1981: 205). This is presum ably a sign of increased 
commercialism bu t also of the lack of religious sanction. In India a major 
factor which m aintains the system is th a t the castes provide not ju st secular 
services but ritual services as well.
2.4.6 The req u irem en ts o f m arriage have ch an ged  as a v illage-based  
so c iety  has b een  rep laced  by a tow n-based  soc iety
This discussion may have appeared to stray from my topic, changes in 
m arriage, but it is in fact relevant. Changes in m arriage in Sri Lanka are 
closely tied to the replacem ent of an agrarian  village-based society by a 
commercial W estern-oriented town-based society. W hereas, formerly, 
m arriage was principally conducted within guidelines relevant to a village 
society, the guidelines are now those of the town. The m ain concern was 
th a t the m arriage p artn er should be from a family of equal or higher status. 
Where land was valuable, or in short supply, m arriage became part of a 
strategy to m aintain, or preferably expand, access to land. M arriage could 
be early because, as Dixon indicates, it was very feasible; all th a t was 
needed was access to land, which was generally obtainable especially in 
areas where chena  shifting cultivation was practised, and accommodation, 
which could either be with one of the spouses' families or in a simple house 
easily constructed with village m aterials.
More crucially, early m arriage, particularly early female m arriage, 
was desirable in the village, because the household greatly valued its 
reputation. On it rested not only the family's sta tu s bu t also its ability to
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achieve its aims, particularly in m atters such as m arriage where a desirable 
m atch could gain access to land and influence. To protect its reputation, 
particularly as a source of potential m arriage partners, it was necessary to 
ensure th a t no gossip sullied the family name; this m eant th a t it was 
advantageous to m arry  off daughters early so th a t there could be no 
question concerning their virginity, but more specifically to prevent any 
cross-caste liaisons. While caste lacked the religious sanction th a t it had in 
India, cross-caste relations were taken very seriously and are still, among 
many, a cause for concern.
Furtherm ore there were advantages in m arrying daughters as early 
as possible in the village context, where links with allied families were 
valuable, and where there was an advantage in having m any young men, 
including sons-in-law, to call upon if physical violence threatened or simply 
to help w ith farming. Most im portantly of all, there were no good reasons 
not to m arry  daughters early. The tasks of being a wife and m other were 
regarded as ones to be lea rn t on the job; no special train ing was needed and 
a girl was ready as soon as she reached puberty.
For men early m arriage was less desirable. Virginity was not a 
concern nor even cross-caste miscegenation. Men were not regarded as 
being in ternally  polluted as were women nor were they ultim ately regarded 
as responsible for the offspring of illicit unions. W ith men normally 
establishing separate households after m arriage, or a t least a separate 
economic unit, the families may have preferred them  to m arry la ter so that 
they could contribute their labour for longer. This may also have been true 
of young women but other considerations would have been of overriding 
importance.
However, while early female m arriage was regarded as advantageous 
in the Sri Lankan village in the past, nevertheless, the advantages involved
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were less than  among neighbouring societies in the region. This was true of 
concerns about sexual morality, caste, m aintenance of the family structure 
and m ortality and the influence of the community on family and individual 
behaviour. Similarly, there was less concern th a t a bride be young enough 
to readily accept the authority  of the family, as the Sinhalese family 
structure was less patriarchal and hierarchical than  generally in South 
Asia. The lack of a strong advantage in early m arriage, and the subsequent 
fu rther weakening of the community, help to explain the extent of change in 
m arriage patterns. There was less resistance to the forces pushing age at 
m arriage up.
The rise in the age a t m arriage is explained by the replacem ent of one 
set of factors by another set more relevant to the new society. The factors 
th a t were necessary for a good m arriage in the village, caste, family name, 
modest behaviour, are increasingly being replaced by factors more relevant 
to the new social hierarchy such as occupation and education.
An im portant distinction between the new factors and the old ones is 
th a t the new ones tend to concern the individual ra th e r th an  the family. In 
the village, provided the family was of suitable caste and name, and the girl 
or boy was of suitable character, the m arriage could go ahead a t a fairly 
early age. In the new context, the groom preferably has a perm anent job in 
a high-status occupation and is highly educated. Even if he does not m eet 
these dem anding criteria he should, a t least, have a job. Increasingly, it  is 
preferred th a t the bride too has a job and th a t she is educated, so th a t she 
can be a suitable m arriage partner to an educated husband and a good 
m other to her children. The concept of a m other needing to be educated to 
be a good m other is an in teresting  one. In the past there was less em phasis 
on motherhood as such than  on fulfilling a woman's role in the household. 
Now, however, a m other is seen as having a particular duty in assisting her 
children with their education and looking after their general welfare. This
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reflects the demands of the modern society where success depends on 
individual capability, particularly education. I t involves a reorientation of 
the family downwards with much more emphasis being placed on the needs 
of children.
These changes m ean th a t a low age a t m arriage is no longer 
m andatory. It is not relevant to the factors th a t are im portant now, which 
require a higher age a t m arriage. I t takes time to accumulate the necessary 
skills, education and jobs, but not only time is needed: the new attributes 
required are also associated with a changing concept of m aturity. For 
example, for a woman to be able to get a job, and be a good m other and wife, 
she now needs to be educated bu t also to have an elem ent of m aturity  and 
an understanding of the world, qualities associated with a woman of twenty- 
five or th irty , not a girl of fifteen.
2.4.7 The p artic ip a tion  o f the fam ily in  m arriage and its  im pact on  
age at m arriage
Perhaps, however, the most fundam ental change has been in the 
process of m arriage. In the past, families had a very prom inent role and 
were vitally concerned in the process of m arriage. Their in terests were 
directly involved for m arriage concerned both property and status. 
Furtherm ore, their participation in the m arriage was vital: Yalman (1971) 
argued th a t if the m arriage was not recognized by kin it did not truly 
constitute a m arriage.
Nowadays however, families are increasingly less actively involved in 
m arriage. There is less pressure from the community on them  to ensure an 
early m arriage age. Their in terests are less actively involved, though they 
would act to prevent an unsuitable m arriage. Their active involvement too 
is less required. M arriages do not depend as they did formerly on family 
resources including dowry. Now it is w hat the couple themselves bring to
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the m arriage th a t is more im portant. The greatest assistance a family can 
give its children for the future is to equip them  to make their own choices, 
ra ther th an  to organize their future lives.
Changes in the process of m arriage and in age a t m arriage are in part 
a resu lt of the same factor, the lessened pressure on the family to m arry 
young women early. To some extent changes in the process of m arriage are 
them selves due to the rise in the age a t m arriage. People who are older are 
generally in a better position to, and more likely to dem and to, choose for 
themselves. Nevertheless the acceptance of the right to make decisions 
concerning m arriage m ust in itself affect age a t m arriage. If a family leaves 
the m arriage choice to a son or daughter it is likely to provide less 
assistance in establishing a new household, thereby affecting the feasibility 
of m arriage. More indirectly the nature of the m arriage search itself is likely 
to affect age a t m arriage, partly  because the family's criteria for a search 
are likely to be more explicit and the resources a t its disposal, relatives, 
m arriage brokers etc., for the search are greater, so the m arriage search is 
likely to be undertaken more quickly. Furtherm ore an arranged m arriage 
does not require a period of courtship as love m atches do. Love matches 
tend to have a longer period of engagement than  arranged m arriages but 
the im pact of this on age a t m arriage is not straightforward: arranged 
m arriages can, and often do, involve a period of engagement while waiting 
for a suitable time to marry. This can be a very long w ait notably if the 
m arriage is agreed to a t a very early age, for example in N orthern India 
parents m ay agree upon m arriage when the m arriage partners are still 
children; in Sri Lanka, however, the wait is unlikely to be so long. The 
m arriage was always after puberty. Nowadays a m arriage is unlikely to be 
agreed upon unless the two partners have the necessary attributes such as a 
good job. The question of the feasibility of m arriage should not be a m atter 
of concern. W ith love m atches, however, arrangem ents may take a long
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time: a couple may get engaged long before they are ready to m arry. For the 
m an th is may have little effect on his age at m arriage, he will m arry when 
he has the necessary job, when it is feasible and when he is regarded as 
having the necessary m aturity  much as in an arranged m arriage. For the 
woman though the effect may be greater; in an arranged m arriage she 
would be able to m arry virtually when the m atch is made bu t in the love 
m atch she will have to w ait until her intended has the necessary attributes, 
especially the job. This has two implications. First, it may act to increase 
the female m arriage age. Secondly, even if it does not, it should increase 
the linkage between the male m arriage age and the female m arriage age. 
T hat is, as male age a t m arriage rises and falls so should female age a t 
m arriage.
2.5 C on clusion
In conclusion, an  adequate explanation for changes in m arriage 
patterns has to examine m arriage in its total social context. Doing so 
should help prevent too much concentration on short-term  fluctuations and 
too little  on long-term processes. Temporary economic problems, for 
example, can very easily be emphasized a t the expense of long-term social 
changes. Dixon's explanation of Sri Lankan m arriage, for example, places 
too much em phasis on the economic feasibility of m arriage, and not enough 
on w hat she calls the desirability of m arriage. The feasibility of m arriage 
may have been the m ajor determ inant of m arriage patterns in Europe but it 
is not of the changing m arriage patterns in Asia or other non-W estern 
societies. Europe already had a society where late m arriage and non­
m arriage were acceptable, and, in the case of late m arriage, preferred. The 
ability to m arry depended on the access of the m arriage partners to 
resources which, in Europe, were affected by often highly inequitable 
inheritance, and by the importance of very uncertain wage labour.
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The situation in Asia was very different; m arriage was more feasible 
for inheritance tended to be more equitable and because families were more 
involved in m arriage. Although there has been a change in the feasibility of 
m arriage in Sri Lanka while age a t m arriage has been rising, it is directly 
related to longer-term  changes in the desirability of m arriage. The 
feasibility of m arriage has been affected by the reduced involvement of the 
family in m arriage, but this is the outcome of changes in the desirability of 
m arriage.
The term  desirability, however, is a misleading one. Dixon's 
framework implies th a t desirability and feasibility have the same 
explanatory status, when in fact, desirability is a much more complex 
concept. Feasibility, in essence, merely relates to the economics of 
m arriage, desirability relates to much deeper issues concerning m arriage 
and society in general. It raises such questions as why people m arry and 
how this is related to family and kinship structure.
W hat has happened in Sri Lanka, and to, a lesser extent, in much of 
Asia, is th a t an older age a t m arriage is now desirable, or a t least a younger 
m arriage age is no longer desirable. It is not a question of fluctuations in 
the feasibility of m arriage, for, as Goldstone (1986) has shown for pre­
industrial England, fluctuations in  the feasibility of m arriage tend to be 
associated with changes in the proportion m arrying ra th e r than  changes in 
the age a t m arriage. Significantly, there has been little change so far in the 
proportions never m arrying. This may change in Sri Lanka as the 
feasibility of m arriage becomes more im portant as a consequence of the 
change in  the desirability of m arriage.
In this chapter a wide range of possible links between m arriage 
patterns and underlying social changes have been discussed. In the 
rem ainder of th is thesis, the data  from the field survey in Sri Lanka are
115
analysed to explore these issues in more detail, and in particular to study 
m arriage within its social context, to examine w hat factors influence the 
individual, and the family's role in m aking decisions regarding marriage. 
As changes in the role of the family seem to be central to developments in 
m arriage patterns, the data  are also used to examine why the family has 
been so involved in m arriage decisions and why this is changing.
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Chapter 3 
Methodology
3.1 The m icro approach
The causes of demographic change were investigated in Sri Lanka by 
a collaborative research program between the Department of Demography, 
the Australian National University and the Demographic Training and 
Research Unit, University of Colombo. I developed and researched the 
marriage theme within this study.
The total research program was primarily concerned with the long 
term causes of change in fertility and health behaviour, and the study of 
marriage which I undertook was regarded as an appropriate related module. 
It was felt that the most appropriate way to study such change was a 
community level micro-approach, combining an anthropological participant 
observation study and in-depth interviews, with a more structured survey- 
style questionnaire and census. The different elements complemented each 
other: participant observation gave the investigators a first-hand insight 
into the overall social context within which people had to organize their 
lives; the in-depth interviews gave insights into the problems with which 
individuals had to deal on their own, and as members of families; while the 
more structured interviews, and the census, of ultimately over 12,000 
persons, provided a basic demographic overview of the communities, as well 
as a base for testing statistically many of the findings of the study.
The more common approach in demography, the sample survey using 
only a structured questionnaire, was seen as inadequate on its own, given 
the research program's essential concern with the investigation of causal 
explanations of change over time. In particular, it was felt that over-
117
reliance on sample surveys had placed too much emphasis on short-term  
and essentially simple explanations.
Sample surveys are invaluable if what is required is overall levels 
and rates, differentials between groups and above all statistical 
associations; but they do not explain these statistical associations, 
differentials, levels or rates. The explanations for these are normally 
provided by the logical intuition of the analyst often from a very limited 
understanding of the society in question. If the logical connection is simple 
and straightforw ard this approach may be reasonable, but if it is not, as the 
previous chapter argues is the case regarding the causes of change in 
m arriage patterns, it is inadequate.
A case in point is the statistical association between education and a 
late age a t m arriage. This is an association th a t shows up in many surveys 
(e.g. Rindfuss et al., 1983) but which is rarely explained, presum ably being 
regarded as either too simple or too complex to explain. I t cannot be too 
simple, for, as noted in the previous chapter, the relationship between 
education and age a t m arriage is complex, being m ultidirectional and 
m ediated by other factors. Moreover, the relationship between education 
and age a t m arriage is, partly  as a consequence of its sheer complexity, 
likely to differ according to context, particularly between societies. Analysts 
who do not properly know the specific social and historical conditions, which 
can be very complex, may m isinterpret the m eaning of particular statistical 
associations and, in particular, may leave out im portant interm ediate 
variables and ignore m ultidirectional causation. Furtherm ore, there is an 
understandable quest for the most parsimonious explanation in data 
produced from the very lim ited num ber of questions asked in the typical 
survey, as a result of lim ited budgets and the understandable desire to 
interview as m any people as possible, because larger num bers increase the 
likelihood of statistically significant correlations; in this quest complex
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relationships may be ignored in favour of simple ones. This may be 
reasonable if the simple relationships are the true ones but it is dangerous if 
they are distortions.
This problem is increased by the understandable desire for 
generalizations applicable beyond the particular society being studied. It 
occurs in an acute form in such international surveys as the World Fertility 
Survey (WFS) which, though possessing many admirable qualities and 
having led to m any illum inating analyses, can, as a result of using a 
basically standardized set of questions, be insensitive to local conditions: 
pretesting is restricted to whether questions work, th a t is get suitable 
answers, ra ther than  w hether they are suitable questions. This problem is 
worsened by the fact th a t many of the analysts were not involved in 
collecting the data  and have very little knowledge of the societies concerned. 
Furtherm ore, m ultipurpose surveys often lack a sharp focus on any specific 
issue.
The tendency of sample surveys to simplify in the search for 
generalizations, added to a desire for easily defined and quantifiable 
variables, for which sample surveys are ideally suited, often emphasizes 
economic factors and ignores local factors which are more social, historical 
and ideological in nature. I t is not possible to comprehend the changes th a t 
have taken place w ithout understanding the interplay of social, ideological 
and economic forces a t the local level.
While it may be possible to redesign a sample survey to be more 
sym pathetic to local circumstances with greater local knowledge and more 
extensive pre-testing, it will still tend to lose much of the complexity of the 
local situation. A particu lar failing of sample surveys in analysing the local 
situation is their tendency to atomize, since sample surveys are by their 
nature  addressed to particu lar individuals. Typically, they ask these
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persons questions such as their preferred age a t m arriage, which trea t them  
as though they are autonomous individuals free to behave as they like. In 
reality, the proper questions may be how is the m arriage decision made, 
who has an input into it, and what factors are taken into account? These 
are not only complicated questions to ask, but an individual may not be in a 
position to answer, being only consulted after the real decision had been 
made. This may be true not only in the case of an arranged m arriage but 
even in the case of a love m atch, if it is made clear th a t it is time for an 
individual to m arry.
The sample survey, by itself, is particularly inadequate for studying 
change. Sample surveys are essentially a cross-sectional analysis of 
relationships or levels a t a particular moment. They do not tell us w hat the 
situation was like in the past. The dangerous tem ptation is to assume th a t 
w hat is associated with differentials now explains change over time. For 
example, because age a t m arriage is lower now among the less educated, 
and both age a t m arriage and education were lower in the past, it is easy to 
assum e th a t rising education levels explain rising age a t m arriage. While 
there may be some association, this is unlikely to be the m ain explanation. 
More to the point, the association itself does not explain the causal 
connection between the two. A good example of this is the relationship 
between employment and age a t marriage. As Dixon (1970) says, in the 
short term , age a t m arriage may decrease as employment increases, for 
m arriage becomes more feasible. In the long term , though, as societies 
become more dependent on wage labour, the very relationship between age 
a t m arriage and employment is likely to change. After all, long-term 
changes in the level of demographic characteristics are generally much 
greater than  any continuing differentials in these characteristics between 
segments of the population.
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The sample survey is especially inappropriate for studying long-term 
change in m arriage, for over time the very definition of m arriage can 
change; indeed changes in m arriage patterns are largely due to changes in 
w hat is desired in m arriage and hence in what m arriage is. W hereas once 
love m arriages would have been regarded as elopements they are 
increasingly accepted as genuine m arriages provided the family approves. 
Formerly, a love m atch was not acceptable as it was essentially a 
relationship between two individuals, whereas a m arriage then was 
regarded as involving the family too. In Chapter 2 differences were noted 
between customary and formal m arriage in the degree of family 
involvement, and what is expected of the m arriage. The increasing 
registration of m arriage has added the new element of government 
recognition into the definition of m arriage.
The one elem ent th a t truely defines m arriage is social acceptance, 
which in Sri Lanka, unlike the West, depends on family approval. But the 
social acceptance of m arriage is not always clear. A m arriage might s ta rt 
off with an elopement, being m et first with total opposition, then be granted 
grudging acceptance by one family and then the other, perhaps following the 
b irth  of a child, and ultim ately full approval. At w hat stage it becomes 
m arriage depends upon who is judging. When a partnership  becomes a 
m arriage is complicated by the fact tha t m arriages which are not accepted 
are likely to be much briefer than those which are, raising on another level 
the question as to w hether they are genuine m arriages or not. The sample 
survey is, consequently, not an appropriate way of investigating w hat is 
really m eant by m arriage in the society.
The research team  believed th a t a proper investigation of the process 
of social change underlying Sri Lanka's demographic transition required 
more than  simply a sample survey with a questionnaire; it required an in- 
depth investigation of all the interlocking factors th a t are involved in social
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change. Inevitably, this m eant study a t the level of the local community, for 
only a t this level can the precise interplay of the various forces be 
appreciated. The disadvantage of the approach was th a t the findings cannot 
be claimed to be scientifically representative of the country as are sample 
surveys, but the team  felt th a t this loss was small compared to the gains. 
This point is addressed below.
3.2 In vestiga tin g  the soc ia l con text w ith in  w h ich  ind iv id u als  
condu ct th e ir  lives
The study involved a num ber of different but related elements. First, 
the investigators participated as much as possible in community life, to 
acquaint them  with the various factors tha t affected community members. 
The investigators found it much easier to participate in the life of the two 
rural communities than  in the more urban areas, largely because they are 
more genuine communities: people are more in terested in visitors, are 
always hospitable, and there is a more active community life, including 
ritual life. It also helped th a t we had points of contact. In the first village 
studied we were based a t the village temple which we reached early in the 
morning and left often late a t night. In the other village we had a house, in 
which the interviewers stayed, and at which the investigators stayed when 
we were not interviewing people or participating in village activities. It 
may also have been significant that we had the active support of the local 
authorities. In both villages the village headmen regularly called in on us to 
find out how the work was going. The most difficult area in which to 
participate in daily life was the urban middle-class area of Colombo. There 
was little sense of community, many im portant aspects of daily life occurred 
outside the local area, there was no equivalent to the village headm an, and, 
above all, there was some suspicion of inquisitive outsiders. The urban 
slums were in an interm ediate situation. Environmentally, they were much 
the most difficult areas to work in, one area being largely flooded during the
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investigation, but they have a much stronger sense of community, and are 
generally friendlier than  the middle-class areas. Admittedly, this 
friendliness can sometimes be frightening; in one area in which the team  
worked, heroin trafficking was rife and there were a num ber of characters 
in whose presence I felt distinctly uneasy. This criminal presence m eant 
that, while we had permission to work in the area, the police kept 
something of a watch over our activities, for our protection but perhaps also 
to ensure th a t our work was not an elaborate cover for criminal activities.
While community participation is valuable in giving the investigator 
a feel for local life, it is no substitute for a deep understanding of family and 
community life, and more particularly for the experience of social change. 
Such understanding and experience exists in abundance in the inhabitants 
of those communities, it is a m atter of how to tap it. After all, one of the 
advantages of studying the demographic transition in countries such as Sri 
Lanka is th a t much of it has occurred over people's lifetimes. Unlike the 
case of the West, one is not entirely dependent on historical documentation, 
it continues in people's memories. W hat the respondents have to contribute 
is particularly  im portant when discussing the relationship between the 
social structure and demographic variables, a relationship which is 
fundam ental to the investigation of Asian m arriage but is often taken for 
granted.
3.3 U sin g  the resp on d en ts as in vestiga tors
Demographers, like most social scientists, generally question people 
about certain  characteristics and a ttributes which the investigator regards 
as significant, but rarely  ask w hat the respondents themselves believe to be 
significant. The respondents' answers are to be analysed, and therefore they 
should not form p a rt of the research design. It is felt th a t the respondent's 
explanations are subjective and particularistic, related only to th a t
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individual's specific circumstances. It is up to the analyst to determine the 
true m eaning behind the interviewee's statem ents, through the use of 
statistical correlations and the other methods available to the social 
sciences. It is frequently felt th a t only thus will generally applicable models 
and generalizations be obtained.
However, such models only inform us about relationships th a t were 
true  when the survey was taken and not earlier, and are systematically 
biased against the local and particularistic. General models, to the extent 
th a t they are true, can only explain part of the change th a t has taken place, 
and they tell us very little about the process of change. Moreover, much of 
the apparent subjectivity of the answers provided by the respondents often 
reflects the inadequacies of the surveys, ra ther than  of the respondents. If, 
for example, a question concerns the immediate circumstances of m arriage, 
then the answers are likely to be much more diffuse than  if the question 
addresses the process of m arriage, on which there is usually broad 
agreem ent.
The other often cited reason for not taking the respondent too much 
into confidence is the need in a scientific endeavour not to influence the 
respondent's behaviour and beliefs. Apart from philosophical questions 
about defining social science as science in this sense, the value of w hat can 
be lea rn t from respondents far outweighs any problems of contamination.
Generally respondents have a great deal of commonsense and insight 
to contribute about the major factors, social and physical, affecting 
behaviour in their society, and also about what they see as having been the 
major developments promoting social change. This does not m ean th a t the 
investigator can simply sit and listen and later write up what he or she has 
heard, as analysis. The investigator has an im portant role both in eliciting 
the information from respondents and in ultim ately determ ining w hat it
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m eans. This may sound not very different from w hat has ju s t been 
criticized as treating respondents as simply objects for analysis ra ther than  
as agents able to in terpret their own society. It is, though, a more subtle 
and sym pathetic type of analysis than  the more orthodox analysis commonly 
practised.
While the respondents have a much more extensive experience of 
their society than  the investigator will have, it will often be anecdotal, 
rarely systematized, and possibly contradictory. Usually, but not always, 
considerable probing is necessary to obtain their experiences, bu t the 
probing should not be random, it should be informed by the investigator's 
understanding of what he (or she) is trying to discover, or otherwise the 
investigator will simply ramble in often interesting but essentially circular 
discussion. The investigator's understanding of w hat he is trying to 
discover needs to be informed by w hat he has learn t from his participation 
in the life of the community, a critical in terpretation of w hat has been heard 
from previous interviews, previous reading of the litera tu re  concerning the 
local society, and, above all, w hat he knows concerning demographic theory 
and the theory of social change.
Clearly what is critical is how the investigator uses his knowledge. If 
he uses it in an unsuitable way, he can predeterm ine w hat he finds despite 
protestations to the contrary from the respondents, th a t is the investigator 
commits the error of, in effect, making the respondents agree, or 
m isinterpreting what the respondents have to say. An example of this is the 
case of m arriage squeeze. Before working in Sri Lanka, I was involved in 
the field work of the Indian Research Project conducted by the Demography 
Departm ent, A ustralian National University and the Population Centre, 
Bangalore. This project investigated the causes of demographic change in 
South India also using a micro-approach. When we asked about the rising 
age a t m arriage, and increasing dowry, the most common reason cited was a
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shortage of grooms for women to m arry. A num ber of w riters have tended to 
assum e th a t this is not the genuine explanation: w hat the respondents are 
expressing is a socially perceived shortage arising from shortage of desirable 
men. In the past w ithin each caste there was relative homogeneity with 
little difference between grooms and there was little difficulty in finding a 
suitable groom for a woman. Indeed, it was the woman who was in demand 
for her productive and reproductive capabilities, th a t is her ability to work 
hard  and to bear m any children. Now, the situation has changed with every 
family desiring an educated son-in-law with a good job and links to the city. 
Thus, m any families with nubile daughters are competing for the hands of a 
few very desirable men. While there is some tru th  in this argum ent, it  too 
easily dismisses the argum ents of the respondents. There is indeed a 
shortage of grooms. W ith a large age gap between m arriage partners and 
falling m ortality, South India has moved from a situation in which the 
m arriage m arket favoured the brides to one in which it favoured the grooms 
a t much the same time as when age at m arriage and dowries began to rise 
(cf. Caldwell et al., 1988: 80-107).
However, it would be simplistic to conclude th a t only the m arriage 
squeeze was involved. Sri Lanka has had a m arriage squeeze sim ilar to 
th a t of South India, yet respondents rarely cite the shortage of men as a 
factor in delaying age a t m arriage or in increasing dowry. The reasons for 
this are discussed in C hapter 4. Where a less intensive study m ight have 
stressed the superficial sim ilarities, the micro-approach indicates th a t the 
respondents in South India are correct when they cite the shortage of men 
as a factor in delaying female m arriage and th a t the respondents in  Sri 
Lanka are correct when they do not cite groom shortage as a factor in 
delaying m arriage.
To be sure the m eaning of what the respondent has related is not 
being m isinterpreted, the investigator needs to consider carefully w hat
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exactly it does mean, to compare it with what has been learn t elsewhere, to 
follow it up with supplem entary questioning either with the original 
respondent or with others, and, most im portantly, to find whatever 
alternative evidence is available. A very useful exercise is to outline 
possible hypotheses to the respondents themselves. While this might 
appear to be a case of leading the respondent, in my experience, while a 
respondent m ight agree to simple statem ents, when presented with a whole 
hypothesis, he or she will often have very sensible and pithy things to say.
3.4 In-depth in terv iew s
In the Sri Lankan survey two sorts of in-depth interviews were 
conducted. The first type was by the investigators themselves. It was very 
flexible, following up any leads th a t seemed useful to obtaining an overall 
picture of the society and of social change. Interviews were conducted with 
a wide range of people to gather a diversity of views. The second type was 
conducted by the project's interviewers. This was generally more restricted, 
being guided by a list of probing questions prepared by the principal 
investigators. Although the interviewers were not m eant to be restricted to 
this list, inevitably there was some tendency this way, though the better 
interviewers would follow up in teresting leads. Furtherm ore, the principal 
investigators sa t in on as many interviews as they could, directing the 
interviews in directions th a t promised value. They also read all transcrip ts 
after the completion of the interviews and discussed with the interviewers 
their precise m eaning and implications. This encouraged the interviewers 
to be more adventurous in their interviews.
These interviews were family interviews. The wife should be present 
if a t all possible but any family member was welcome. The m arriage 
histories, as well as the other topics with which the survey was concerned, 
were collected for all members of the family and each explained their roles
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with regard to each m arriage which had occurred. While the presence of 
other family members might restrict personal confidences, my experience 
was th a t respondents were rem arkably candid. If the interviews were 
restricted to individual people, a distorted picture of reality would have 
emerged. Im portant decisions are not made in isolation; they are made in 
consultation and often reflect pressures from other people, particularly 
family members, in a way th a t interviews with all the family members could 
to some extent reproduce. Furtherm ore, family members were usually quite 
prepared to express different opinions about w hat had occurred and 
comment on each other’s responses.
The two types of in-depth interviews, those conducted by the 
principal investigators and those conducted by the interviewers, were 
complementary. The interviews conducted by the investigators provided 
m any of the new leads for further investigation by the interviewers. This 
allowed for exploration of more specialist areas, for example, in the case of 
health, with midwives, and, in the case of m arriage, with m arriage brokers. 
Since the investigators were either foreigners or Sri Lankan social scientists 
their interviews created more in terest and generally drew in a greater range 
of people with more to contribute. While there was a certain loss of 
confidentiality, this was more than  made up for by the wide range of views 
presented.
The interviews conducted by the trained interviewers also provided 
ideas. The sessions sat in on by the investigators and the reading of 
transcrip ts and follow-up discussions between the interviewers and the 
investigators were extremely instructive. These interviews also 
complemented those conducted by the investigators by revealing general 
patterns. Thus, if a particular hypothesis arose from previous interviewing, 
discussions between the investigator and the interviewers, or from some 
other source, this could be explored through the more general in-depth
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interviews. If there was little support for the hypothesis it could be rejected 
or modified; if there was support for it, it could be further investigated.
3.5 The survey com ponent
Besides the in-depth interviewing a num ber of techniques were 
retained from more conventional demographic approaches. All the families 
were questioned using lengthy structured interviews, which included a basic 
census for determ ining m atters such as population structure, family 
composition, background variables such as ethnicity, religion, education, age 
a t m arriage, proportion celibate, and proportion divorced or separated. 
Additional questions concerned various aspects of the central themes 
including m arriage. For example, there was a specialized investigation 
concerning the m arital intentions of all unm arried people aged over 16 
years and their families; unm arried women over 30 years of age and 
unm arried men over 35 years of age were asked about the factors which had 
led to them  to delay their m arriage more than  usual, and about their future 
intentions; and women over 60 were asked about how m arriage and other 
conditions in their youth differed from current conditions. Even the 
structured interviews had some of the characteristics of the unstructured  in- 
depth interviews. Questions were open-ended and interviewers were 
encouraged to write down all answers and to follow up any interesting 
points th a t might arise.
The survey component grew over time, as questions concerning 
hypotheses formulated as a result of the in-depth work were added to the 
questionnaire. This helped to show how widely shared were particular 
attitudes and characteristics, and to cast light on new areas th a t the in- 
depth interviews suggested were linked to specific topics of interest. Adding 
questions to the survey also helped to test hypotheses implied by the in- 
depth interviewing: the reverse of the normal procedure where the analyst
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tries to explain observed correlations. The procedure of adding questions to 
the survey has the disadvantage th a t many questions cannot be run for the 
earlier research areas. The analyst had to take this into account.
A second by-product of the expansion of the survey component was 
th a t the interviewers tended to reduce their in-depth questioning. This was 
an inevitable response to the fact th a t many of the topics were now covered 
in the survey, and th a t the interviewers were getting more experience of 
focusing on the critical issues. While the survey component of the 
investigation grew, the interpretation of the survey m aterial still depended 
critically on the in-depth interviews and the experience of the investigating 
team  in the field.
Regarding m arriage, the main additions to the survey were sections 
on why unm arried women over th irty  and men over thirty-five had delayed 
m arriage, more questions on the process of m arriage, and questions to older 
women on w hat had changed particularly in m arriage over time.
3.6 The sam ple
The census and survey covered all families in the survey areas. The 
in-depth interviews by the trained interviewers were conducted in every 
second household.
This means, in term s of sampling, th a t within survey areas the 
survey was not a representative sample, for it attained  complete coverage. 
Thus, there is no question of confidence lim its or how representative the 
sample is of the survey areas. To the degree to which it was properly asked, 
and in  this I have great confidence, it is a total description of the survey 
area.
The real question is to w hat extent the experience of the survey areas 
represent th a t of Sri Lanka. The project did not seek to reveal w hat the
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Overall situation in Sri Lanka was with regard to m arriage patterns or with 
regard to fertility and m ortality rates. It sought to explain w hat was known 
to have occurred in a country which had long possessed good statistics. 
Consequently a representative sample was not sought. R ather the project 
chose survey areas in which the causes of social and institutional change 
could be investigated. The localities chosen were concentrated in Sri 
Lanka's South-West, the part of the country which most clearly shows the 
effects of social and economic changes.
Nevertheless, even if the sample was not a scientific one, it was 
approxim ately representative of much of the country. The South-West 
contains half Sri Lanka's population. More significantly, all the principal 
ethnic and religious groups were covered and the survey areas were chosen 
so as to cover the three sectors of the population, urban, ru ral and estate, as 
well as poor and better off. While the research areas were not scientifically 
representative of Sri Lanka's population, the collection of census m aterials 
means th a t it  is possible to compare the demographic patterns of the areas 
to the overall and regional rates in Sri Lanka. As the next chapter expands 
on these rates, it will suffice to note th a t the aggregated data  from the 
surveyed areas surprisingly closely approxim ated those of the more 
scientific samples and the main differences can be explained relatively 
easily using the data gathered by the micro-approach.
3.7 The n atu re o f p roof in  the m icro-approach
A critical question concerning the micro-approach concerns the 
question of representativeness ju st discussed. While the micro-study should 
reflect the realities of its study area it cannot be proved th a t it is 
representative of the region or country it is in. But its quantitative data 
approximate those from structured survey approaches, and it  is perhaps of
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more critical importance tha t the causal explanations provided by the 
micro-surveys in very different and far-apart areas are in broad agreement.
On another level the question of proof concerns how a particular 
finding in the micro-survvey can be shown to be true. For example, the 
analyst might argue th a t a particular pa ttern  of behaviour, such as age at 
m arriage, is explained by a particular factor, perhaps the organization of 
the family or kinship system or the economy. In using information from a 
sample survey the analyst would not try  to prove such an assertion. All it is 
necessary to prove is th a t there was a statistical association between age at 
m arriage and family structure and th a t it is logical to assume th a t there is a 
causal connection. The analyst cannot, and generally does not, try  to prove 
th a t his or her connection is the right one. The analyser of the micro-study 
is, in a sense, going further in arguing th a t this particular approach helps to 
isolate particu lar causal factors. Unfortunately, ultim ate proof of the kind 
desired is probably impossible in the social sciences. In physics or the other 
hard  sciences where the objects of study are innately simple and can be 
studied in laboratory conditions, it may be possible to say th a t something is 
caused by something else. In the social sciences, the objects of study, such 
as people and social and economic institutions, tend to be so complex, and 
the relations between them  so complicated, th a t it is impossible to be certain 
of the causality of a particular relationship. The analyst is restricted to 
trying to explain the principal relationships. This is a m atter of judgem ent 
both in the analysis and in obtaining the m aterial on which the analysis is 
based. In a sense, the problem for the analyst of a micro-survey is th a t 
much of the analysis occurs a t the stage of the data collection, and depends 
on the judgem ent of the investigator. Analysts are inevitably affected by 
their preconceptions, some deriving from their own society and education 
and some deriving from their reading of the literature. Such difficulties are
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impossible to avoid for it is the analysts' background and the litera tu re  th a t 
determine the key questions they want to investigate.
Analysts have to be aware of the difficulties in w hat they are 
attem pting to do, and has to be able to support their case by supplem entary 
evidence. For example, findings in in-depth interviews m ight be supported 
by evidence from structural interviews, or from documentary evidence. 
Most im portantly, the findings of the study will be supported or not 
supported by further studies.
The problems ju st discussed of proof using the micro-approach are not 
a particular disadvantage of the micro-approach. The nature of the micro­
approach means th a t the analyst has to face problems inherent in proving 
causation in the social sciences. The analyst of statistical data  can 
unconciously simply avoid the issue.
3.8 U n dertak ing the project
The project was directed by a group of investigators from the 
A ustralian National University and the University of Colombo including 
Professor J.C. Caldwell, Dr. Indra Gajanayake, Mrs. P a t Caldwell, Mr. 
Laxm an Disanayake and myself. In January  1985 a team  of fifteen young 
women who had recently graduated in the social sciences were recruited and 
train ing  began. In February the first of the research sites, the village of 
Bondupitiya, was chosen. This was a fortunate selection for the initial part 
of a project of this kind involves very considerable supervision and 
continuing training. Many of the interviewers had had previous experience 
in survey work but of a very different kind from w hat was being employed 
here. They were used to asking a lim ited range of questions quickly and 
hurrying on to the next interview. Here, they had to learn  to be patien t to 
listen to w hat the respondent was trying to articulate and to seek the tru th  
by asking sensible and rewarding follow-up questions. Inevitably this was
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difficult: significantly the best interviewers were generally those with no 
previous experience. The village was also a fortunate choice for the first 
research work because, as noted, villages are among the easiest places in 
which to conduct field work. People are friendly, easy to talk  to, and 
interested. There are fewer diversions from research. For the supervisors, 
it is easy to find the interviewers, as the villagers almost invariably know 
where the interviewers are.
Supervision mostly involved reading the incoming questionnaires and 
discussing them  with the interviewers, and sitting in on as m any interviews 
as possible. Reinterviews were also arranged for a sample of the 
households. Training took place in much the same way, by way of example 
in interviewing and discussion of completed interviews. It was 
supplemented by sessions a t the end of each day, and sometimes a t lunch, 
when findings were discussed, problems tha t interviewers had had were 
reviewed, and observations tha t the investigators and the interviewers had 
made were listened to and discussed.
The interviewers were largely unchanged until the end of the survey. 
This m eant th a t they built up a wealth of experience, and developed a team  
cameraderie. As the survey continued, the investigators could afford to 
indulge more in their own interviewing. Nevertheless, a fairly close 
supervision was kept on the interviewers a t all stages.
The interviews were conducted in Sinhala. The interviewers 
transla ted  them  into English but were also encouraged to provide the 
original Sinhala version as well for la ter cross-checking. As not all the 
investigators spoke Sinhala, some of the interviewers had also to act as 
in terpreters in their presence. Few problems were encountered in this. A 
substantial am ount of discussion in English also took place. The data from 
the structured interviews were coded at the A ustralian National University.
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A fairly sim ilar procedure was followed in the 1987 survey of a tea 
estate in the Kandyan highlands. A new team  of interviewers was 
recruited. Two of the interviewers from the former team  participated, who, 
as well as conducting their own interviews, helped in the supervision of 
others.
The major problem in this survey was tha t many of the respondents 
were Tamil with lim ited ability to speak Sinhala, whereas the interviewers 
were Sinhalese, only some of whom spoke fluent Tamil. In the sensitive 
political circumstances of the time, there were good reasons to be concerned 
th a t a Tamil interviewing team  m ight have raised suspicions among the 
mostly Sinhalese officials of the area. There had been a num ber of acts of 
sabotage in the area which had been attributed to Tamils from Colombo. 
Our problems were greatly reduced by the fact tha t one of the investigators, 
Dr. Guruswamy, a non-Tamil Indian national was able to speak Tamil 
fluently. His presence helped both with the interviewing and in giving 
confidence to the respondents, who were very aware of being a minority 
surrounded by a Sinhalese majority: memories were still strong of the 1983 
riots in which many Tamils were killed.
Besides the problems of interviewing, the other m ain problems were 
logistical. For the ru ral areas, we had to provide housing and to some 
extent transport. In one area we recruited a nightw atchm an to guard the 
interviewers' house.
O ther problem areas were mapping and logistics. Before any 
interviewing, all areas were mapped. Good mapping is essential in a field 
study to ensure th a t everyone who is supposed to be questioned is 
questioned. This is ju st as true where the entire population is being studied 
as where a random sample is being used. The only way to ensure th a t this 
actually happens is to prepare detailed maps, or otherwise households will
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inevitably be overlooked by interviewers. Such households are likely to 
include a disproportionate num ber of the more isolated and the poorer 
households; this is especially so in Sri Lanka where houses are often very 
dispersed and there is no obvious street pattern. The project employed two 
geographers from the University of Colombo to prepare detailed maps, 
based on a framework provided by existing aerial mapping. The maps 
proved to be very accurate in the field, but we subjected them  to a system of 
continuous rechecking on the ground, sometimes adding households 
previously hidden or removing a deserted house or a ruin.
My work in the project concentrated on the nature of the m arriage 
transition. From the beginning of the project, I had been involved in 
determ ining w hat appeared to be the major questions th a t needed 
answering concerning the m arriage transition. Initially, the need to 
supervise and tra in  the interviewers in the field m eant th a t questions on 
m arriage th a t I developed could only be asked in conjunction with the other 
them es of the project. Later I was able to conduct more focused interviews 
on w hat was happening and had happened to m arriage. In this endeavour, 
I worked with Indrani Pieris (now my wife), whose knowledge, not only of 
Sinhala, but more especially of her society, was of great assistance. This 
work helped me to understand a society other than my own and the role of 
m arriage w ithin it. More particularly, it assisted, in conjunction with the 
other investigators, in formulating questions for the interview ers’ in-depth 
interviews, and for a greatly expanded section on m arriage in the structured 
interview, with more questions on the process of m arriage and more on the 
changing conditions of m arriage.
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Map 1 Sri Lankan Field Sites
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3.9 The research  areas
The 1985 research was conducted in seven locations in W estern 
Province (see Map 1) in Sri Lanka's South-W estern Low-Country (as 
opposed to the Up-Country Kandyan areas which before 1815 were under 
the rule of the Kandyan kingdom). The low-country is the most densely 
populated part of Sri Lanka with about half of Sri Lanka's population in 
approximately one-sixth of its area. It is the part of Sri Lanka which has 
been most subject to foreign influence, first in the form of trade and later 
the colonial rule of the Portuguese, Dutch and British. Not surprisingly, it 
is the area which shows most clearly the effects of social and economic 
change. The W estern Province is Sri Lanka's commercial heartland  and 
includes Colombo and extensive commuting areas as well as prosperous rice 
and cash crop areas (principally rubber, coconut and cinnamon).
The W estern Province's population is principally Buddhist Sinhalese 
but there are also significant populations of Muslim Moors and, in Colombo, 
Tamils and Burghers (a group claiming descent from the earlier Dutch and 
Portuguese conquerors). The religious composition is sim ilarly mixed. The 
m ajority of the Sinhalese are Buddhist but a significant number, especially 
north of Colombo, are Catholic. Similarly, the Tamils are mostly H indu but 
have a large Catholic minority. The Moors are Muslim and the Burghers 
are mostly Protestant. Language is also split, with the Sinhalese speaking 
Sinhala, the Tamils and the Moors speaking Tamil, and the Burghers 
English.
The lim ited num ber of survey areas possible in an in-depth study 
m eant th a t a random selection of field sites would have been meaningless. 
The sites chosen had to be reasonably representative of Sri Lanka's 
population while a t the same time being possible to survey. This last 
requirem ent involved a num ber of issues.
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One of these was tha t it could be mapped. The project required good 
maps. These were much easier to obtain where previous aerial mapping 
had been conducted, and could be updated on the ground. This was a 
lim iting condition but not a major one as aerial mapping had been extensive 
though not total.
A more im portant lim iting condition related to the political condition 
of the country. While we were in Sri Lanka intensive fighting was occurring 
in the North and the E ast of the country where the Sri Lankan Tamil 
population was concentrated. Tamil rebels were fighting the Sinhalese 
dominated government and arm y for a Tamil homeland. Work in these 
areas would have been impossible: this was one reason why a representative 
sample would not have been possible even if we had wanted to conduct one. 
Even in the area where the project was concentrated there were problems. 
In 1983 there were bloody anti-Tamil riots in Colombo and the major towns 
in this region in which upwards of two thousand people may have been 
killed: the precise num ber is unknown. There was continuing resentm ent 
between the Sinhalese and the Tamils. There was strong pressure from the 
University, reportedly originating in the security services, not to recruit 
Tamils, on the grounds th a t we would be used as a front, by seditious 
elements. Our interviewers were Sinhalese, although we gave preference in 
the E states study to those who could speak Tamil. In the circumstances, it 
is very likely th a t Tamil interviewers may have been looked upon with 
suspicion by Sinhalese and by government officials. It would have been 
difficult interviewing in Tamil areas with a Sinhalese interviewing team  
who could not speak Tamil. More im portantly though, it is very likely th a t 
government officials would have been suspicious of our motives in 
interviewing in a Tamil area, in view of the 1983 riots and of the situation 
in the north and the east.
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These difficulties of working in Tamil areas, combined with the lower 
Tamil proportion in the South-West, m eant tha t Tamils were slightly under­
reported in the region covered by the 1985 survey. This, however, was 
partially  compensated for by our 1987 survey of a tea estate (Rahatungoda) 
in N uw ara Eliya District, Central Province in the Kandyan Highlands, 
where the majority of the population were Tamil. The net effect of our 
sample was th a t Indian Tamils who dominate the estates were somewhat 
overrepresented whereas Sri Lankan Tamils who dominate the population 
of the North and the E ast were underrepresented. In the circumstances the 
seven areas chosen were as representative of Sri Lanka's diverse ethnic and 
religious composition as was possible (Table 3.1 and Table 3.2). The main 
difference from the wider population was the overrepresentation of Moors 
(Muslims). This was the consequence of choosing a slum site in Colombo 
(for analytical purposes in the Table it is divided into two - Jum m a Masjid 
Road and M aligawatta) where Muslims were highly represented.
The seven field locations were chosen in part to ensure th a t the major 
ethnic and religious groups were represented and in p art to ensure th a t the 
major living conditions were represented. At the final stage of choice a 
random  selection was made from localities listed in the previous census. 
Two villages were chosen as being reasonably typical of the South-west. 
The villages provide an in teresting contrast, one - Bondupitiya - being a 
mixed caste village with a high proportion of the lower caste, the other, 
Loluwagoda, consisting predom inantly of high caste Govigama, who make 
up about h a lf Sri Lanka's Sinhalese population. An urban slum was 
selected partly  because it was a distinctive environm ent bu t also because it 
was typical of areas in which Muslims live. A squatter area, New Kelani 
Bridge, with a much lower proportion of Muslims, was seen as a useful 
contrast to the slum. It was also the one area to have a sizable proportion of 
Tamils. Nugegoda was seen as representative of the middle-class areas of
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Colombo. W elisara was selected as representing the extensive community 
areas surrounding Colombo, and also for its high proportion of Christians.
Table 3.1 Religious distribution (per cent) of the population in the seven survey 
areas in Southwest Sri Lanka, 1985
R e l i g i o n A r e a
Bondu-
pitiya
Ma l i g a -
watta
Jumma 
Mas jid 
Road
New
Kelani
Bridge
Nuge-
goda
Loluwa-
goda We l i s a r a
Buddhist 100 . 0 1 1 . 3 1 7 . 9 5 7 . 1 8 5 . 3 9 5 . 6 4 3 . 7
Hindu 3 . 2 3 . 5 1 4 . 4 0 . 1 - 5 . 3
M u s l i m 8 3 . 2 7 8 . 4 1 4 . 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 5 . 2
C a t holic 1 . 1 - 9 . 0 8 . 8 2 . 8 3 9 . 3
Protestant 1 . 1 0 .1 4 . 8 3 . 6 1 . 1 6 . 5
Total 2305 1160 737 1498 1705  1704 1847
Source: Primary analysis of Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1985.
Table 3.2 Religious distribution (per cent) of the survey population compared 
with the Southwestern region (1981 )and Sri Lanka (1981)
Religion Survey^ South West 
Region^
Sri Lanka^
Buddhist 66.8 75.2 69.3
Hindu 3.5 4 . 7 1 5 . 5
Muslim 17.3 7.0 7 . 5
Catholic 9 . 8 11.7 6.9
Protestant 2.6 1 . 3 0 . 8
Total 100.0 100.0 1 0 0 . 0
Source: 1 Primary analysis of Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1985.
2 Department of Census and Statistics, 1986
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The total survey population was 10,956 distributed between 1,974 
households. Of the two villages, one, Bondupitiya (population 2,305) was 
located to the south of Colombo in a mixed rice, rubber and cinnamon 
growing area. Many people in the village had jobs in the tourist resorts 
along the coast or in Colombo, often staying in Colombo during the working 
week and returning home on week-ends. The other village, Loluwagoda 
(population 1,704), north-east of Colombo, is primarily concerned with the 
production of coconuts and coconut products. Both had predominantly 
Buddhist Sinhalese populations.
Although the term urban slums is used here for two of the areas, 
Maligawatta and Jumma Masjid Road (populations 1,160 and 737), and 
middle class for another, Nugegoda (population 1,705), this should not give 
the impression that these areas are uniformly poor or well-off. In Sri 
Lanka, neighbourhoods tend to be fairly mixed with rich and poor often 
living next door to each other. The main differences are that the slums are 
characterized by crowdedness, poor environmental conditions (the main 
slum studied is subject to flooding) and distinctive occupational and ethnic 
composition. Many of the slums' inhabitants work in trade whereas people 
in the middle class area are more likely to work in high-status white collar 
jobs. The occupations are closely related to the ethnic composition. The 
slums have, as noted, a high proportion of Muslims who are mostly found in 
commerce, whereas the middle class area has a high proportion of Sinhalese 
and particularly Burghers who gravitate towards clerical positions. The 
squatter area (population 1,498), in contrast, is more uniformly poor, 
consisting largely of recently arrived immigrants. It has a very mixed 
population. The commuting area (population 1,847) lies just to the north of 
Colombo. It is a prosperous area with a high proportion of Christians.
Just as there are some difficulties in distinguishing between slum 
and middle-class areas the distinction between rural and urban areas is less
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in Sri Lanka and especially in the South-W est than it is in most other Asian 
countries. For example, the villages were not nucleated but stretched hither 
and th ither between rice fields and plantations of rubber and coconuts. 
They had little sense of geographic identity. More im portantly, m any people 
worked outside the village community either on a daily basis or actually 
residing for long periods at their place of work, often coming home for 
weekends. Others depended on outside income. Only a minority were 
dependent on agricultural income. For an outside observer m any of the 
urban areas, though clearly urban, had something of a ru ral character. For 
example, ju s t as many rural households are surrounded by their gardens 
and fruit trees so too are many urban ones. This lack of a clear distinction 
is particularly  true of the commuting area which has characteristics of both 
urban and rural areas.
In 1987 a further survey was conducted in the up-country above 
Kandy. This site consisted of a tea plantation, Rahatungoda Tea P lantation 
(population 1,290), with the workforce either working on the plantation or 
providing services to them  (e.g. shopkeepers). The tea estates were founded 
about a hundred years ago in the sparsely settled m ountainous areas above 
the rice fields of the Sinhalese. Many, like the one studied, replaced earlier 
coffee plantations which had been destroyed by disease. The English 
owners recruited Tamil labourers from South India for their workforce. 
Low-country Sinhalese now fill many of the m anagerial postings and also 
are most of the shopkeepers, while up-country Sinhalese contribute some of 
the tea pickers. The tea estates are of in terest because they were subject to 
early fertility declines (Langford,1981,1982), even though their m ortality 
levels are not, by Sri Lankan standards, low. In term s of m arriage their 
very different economic and social circum stances are a valuable comparison 
for the analysis of lowland m arriage, though it is im portant to remember 
their different histories and cultural origins.
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Table 3.3 Religious distribution of the population in Rahatungoda Tea Estate, 
1987.
Religion Percentage
Buddhist 30.0
Hindu 68 . 8
Muslim 0.9
Christian 0.3
N 1290
Source: Primary analysis of Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project 1987.
3.10 C onclusion
Subsequent to the completion of the field work, the structural 
interviews were coded for statistical analysis. While the use of a probing 
list m eant th a t parts of the in-depth m aterial could have been coded, this 
was felt to be an inappropriate form of analysis for the purpose of these 
data, which were collected to show people's behaviour in their total context. 
Therefore, these interviews were simply transcribed and used to construct a 
file on the families, which in tu rn  was studied intensively for pa tterns and 
relationships.
In  conclusion, the micro-approach was selected as the most 
appropriate way of examining long-term social change at the local level. 
This approach involved a combination of participatory observation, in-depth 
interviewing and a more structured survey to give m any of the advantages 
of the more orthodox survey, such as information on prevailing rates in the 
survey areas and of the anthropological approach, a greater insight into 
local forces affecting behaviour. It has the disadvantage of not indicating 
representative overall rates but this was not the aim of the project. It also 
has the potential disadvantage th a t it is more dependent on the judgem ent 
of the analyst but if it is successfully undertaken, its value should more 
than  outweigh any potential shortcomings. The qualitative m aterial,
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gathered from censusing and surveying almost 11,000 persons in  1985, and 
over 12,000 by 1987, provided an adequate base for testing statistically 
many of my conclusions about Sri Lankan m arriage.
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C hapter 4
P attern s o f first m arriage
4.1 A new  m arriage system
The Sri Lankan marriage system differs greatly from that described 
by the nineteenth-century writers and even from that prevailing in most of 
contemporary South Asia. Sri Lanka has been transformed from a society 
in which marriages were arranged by families and relatives to one in which 
they are based on the individuals' own selection.
The Sri Lanka Demographic Change Project revealed that marriage 
patterns were also very different from the early descriptions. Marriage was 
very late for both sexes, with, in the main sample, a singulate mean age at 
marriage for men of 28 years and for women of 24 years. These results were 
consistent with the 1981 Census's 24.4 years (Nadarajah, 1986 : 100) for 
females. It should perhaps have been slightly higher, since in the 
Southwest marriage is a little later than average, but this is 
counterbalanced by the survey's weighting towards the smaller ethnic 
groups which have a slightly lower age at marriage.
This late age at marriage is not a recent occurrence. Tables 4.1a and 
b show life-table estimates of the quartiles of cohorts from the 1985 and 
1987 samples. Use of the life table is dictated by the need to account for the 
experience of people who were still unmarried at the time of interview. A 
simple calculation of the ages at marriage of people of a particular age who 
have already married will understate true ages at marriage to the extent 
that people may continue to marry beyond their current age group: while 
people who are still unmarried in their forties, for example, are unlikely 
ever to marry, people in their early twenties may well marry at a later date.
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For each cohort, the proportions married by each exact age were derived 
from age-specific first-marriage probabilities which themselves were 
calculated by relating the number of marriages at that age to the number of 
people initially at risk (estimated as the number of never-married people at 
the beginning of the age group minus half the never-married people who 
were interviewed at that age) (Elandt-Johnson and Johnson, 1980: 156-158).
Table 4.1a Life-table estimates of ages by which 75, 50 and 25 per cent of the age 
cohort had ever married - Southwest
Current Year of 1st 3rd
age marriage^- Quartile Median Quartile N
Males
1 5 - 1 9 *  * *  * *  * 624
2 0 - 2 4 2 4 . 0 *  * •k k 5 7 1
2 5 - 2 9 1 9 8 5 2 3 . 7 2 7 . 4 k k 5 5 1
3 0 - 3 4 1 9 8 0 2 4 . 1 2 7 . 5 3 1 . 2 4 2 5
3 5 - 3 9 1 9 7 5 2 4 . 8 2 7 . 8 3 1 . 4 347
4 0 - 4 9 1 9 6 7 2 4 . 8 2 8 . 0 3 1 . 4 4 6 5
5 0 - 5 9 1 9 5 7 2 4 . 7 2 7 . 3 3 1 . 1 3 4 0
6 0 - 6 9 1 9 4 7 2 5 . 2 2 7 . 7 3 1 . 5 2 0 2
70  + 1 9 3 7 2 5 . 5 2 8 . 5 3 5 . 0 109
Females
1 5 - 1 9 * * *  * *  k 615
2 0 - 2 4 1 9 . 8 k k *  ★ 622
2 5 - 2 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 . 4 2 2 . 4 2 7 . 2 4 6 3
3 0 - 3 4 1 9 7 5 1 9 . 9 2 3 . 5 2 9 . 1 4 1 3
3 5 - 3 9 1 9 7 0 1 8 . 9 2 2 . 0 2 6 . 7 3 7 2
4 0 - 4 9 1 9 6 2 1 8 . 2 2 1 . 1 2 5 . 2 461
5 0 - 5 9 1 9 5 2 1 8 . 3 2 0 . 9 2 4 . 5 3 3 0
6 0 - 6 9 1 9 4 2 1 8 . 5 2 0 . 8 2 4 . 1 2 0 7
70  + 1 9 3 2 1 8 . 0 2 0 . 5 2 4 . 1 1 1 9
Notes: 1 Approximate median year of marriage; values shown only when more than 50 
per cent married.
** Fewer than this proportion married.
Source: Primary analysis of Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1985.
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Table 4.1b Life-table estimates of ages by which 75, 50 and 25 per cent of the age 
cohort had ever married - Estates
Current
age
Year o f  
marriage1
1st
Quartile Median
3rd
Quartile N
Males
1 5 - 1 9 * * * * * * 51
2 0 - 2 4 * * * * * * 64
2 5 - 2 9 2 4 . 4 2 7 . 0 *  * 39
3 0 - 3 4 1 9 8 2 2 6 . 8 2 8 . 8 * * 36
3 5 - 3 9 1 9 7 7 2 5 . 1 2 8 . 4 3 1 . 4 45
4 0 - 4 9 1 9 6 9 2 4 . 9 2 7 . 8 3 2 . 7 78
5 0 - 5 9 1 9 5 9 2 3 . 0 2 5 . 5 2 8 . 3 42
60 + 1 9 4 5 2 1 . 9 2 6 . 3 3 1 . 3 19
Females
1 5 - 1 9 * * *  * * * 61
2 0 - 2 4 2 1 . 2 * * * * 58
2 5 - 2 9 1 9 8 2 2 1 . 1 2 4 . 3 * * 58
3 0 - 3 4 1 9 7 7 2 1 . 5 2 4 . 2 2 8 . 0 44
3 5 - 3 9 1 9 7 2 2 0 . 5 2 5 . 0 2 8 . 8 52
4 0 - 4 9 1 9 6 4 1 8 . 1 2 1 . 6 2 4 . 6 73
5 0 - 5 9 1 9 5 4 1 8 . 1 2 1 . 4 2 4 . 2 37
60 + 1 9 3 9 1 6 . 8 1 9 . 2 2 1 . 5 24
Notes: 1 Approximate median year of marriage; values shown only when more than 50 
per cent married.
** Fewer than this proportion married.
Source: Primary analysis of Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1987.
As Table 4.1a shows, in Southwest Sri Lanka, even for those who 
were over 70 years of age, the median age of marriage for males was 27.5 
years and for females 20 years, figures which are much higher than those 
prevailing even today in most of South Asia. Indeed the male age at 
marriage has hardly changed at all; if anything it has declined slightly. 
Female age at marriage, however, has risen continuously until the 25-29 
age group, though the earlier rise was comparatively slow. Similarly, the 
1987 survey in the tea estates (Table 4.1b) also found a very late age at 
marriage. The picture presented in Tables 4.1a and b is consistent with the 
movement of the singulate mean age at marriage as derived from the census 
(Table 4.2).
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Table 4.2 Singulate mean age at marriage (SMAM) by sex in census years 1901- 
1981.
Census Year Males Females Difference
1981 27.9 24.4 3.5
1971 28.0 23.5 4.5
1963 27.9 22.1 5.8
1953 27.2 20.9 6.3
1946 27.0 20.7 6.3
1921 27.5 20.6 6.9
1911 26.9 19.9 7.0
1901 24.6 18.5* 6.11
Note: 1 Fernando (1975) records the female SMAM for 1901 as 18.1 with an
difference of 6.5.
Sources: 1901-1921 census figures, Dixon, 1970: 205
1946-1981 census figures, Nadarajah, 1986: 100
For the purposes of comparing the project's findings with those 
recorded by the census it should be noted that the oldest cohort recorded 
here, those over 70 years of age in 1985 and 1987, would have been 
marrying approximately 50 years earlier on average, that is in the early to 
mid-1930s. Therefore, even discounting the difficulties with the marriage 
question in the early censuses, the first relevant census for a comparison is 
the 1946 census. The censuses are in agreement with the project findings 
that, over this period, age at marriage for males was relatively unchanged 
but that for females initially rose slowly and then more rapidly. The 1981 
Census SMAM figure does not reflect the recent dip in female age at 
marriage recorded in the project's 1985 sample, but then the census was 
earlier and the SMAM is for all current ages, and so is a relatively imprecise 
measure. However, the very high age at marriage for the 30-34 age group is 
corroborated by other evidence, namely the 1975 Sri Lankan Fertility 
Survey (SLFS). The SLFS found a SMAM for females of 25.1 years, slightly 
higher than that found by the Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project or 
by the 1971 and 1981 censuses, but this is in keeping with the fact that it
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was taken when our latest marrying cohort, the 30-34 age group, were most 
frequently marrying.
This rise followed by a recent modest fall in the female age at 
marriage is not quite the end of the story. An examination of proportions 
married by age indicates that far from the female age at marriage falling 
back to previous levels it has begun to rise again, or at least the fall has 
levelled off.
Table 4.3 is complex to interpret, not least because of the problem of 
small numbers, especially on the estates. Nevertheless, a few observations 
cam be made. First, for coastal females, the proportion married by age 19 
drops gradually in the older age groups before falling sharply from age 
group 35-39 (40%), to age group 30-34 (29%), then rises for age group 25-29 
(36%) before falling again for the 20-24 year olds (31%). The same pattern 
seems to show up at older ages with almost as high a proportion of 25-29 
year olds not having married by age 24 as of the 35-39 age groups, raising 
the question whether it is a marriage bust among the 30-34 age group or a 
marriage boom among the 25-29 year olds. In the estates, interpretation is 
more difficult because of smaller numbers. Nevertheless, clearly the 
proportions of females married by specific ages have fallen, and seem to 
have stabilized around 19 per cent for those married by age 19.
The dramatic changes in female marriage are brought out graphically 
in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 which show the proportions of women married by 
exact ages in the Southwest and estate samples respectively. Figure 4.1 
reflects the unusual circumstances of the mid-1970s in the marriage trends 
of age cohort 30-34, whose median year of marriage was approximately 
1975. However, it is also clear that there has been a continuing decline in 
the proportion married by exact age, with the youngest age groups being no 
more likely to marry than the 30-34 year olds. This pattern implies that
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two forces are a t work, one, perhaps economic, which influences whether 
specific cohorts can m arry when they desire, and the other more complex, 
perhaps relating to underlying changes in  the very context of m arriage 
influencing w hat the desired m arriage age is. It was the former force tha t 
explains the aberran t position of the 30-34 year cohort, the la tte r which 
explains the overall pattern.
Table 4.3 Proportions of women married by age (selected age groups)
A g e 2 0 - 2 4 2 5 - 2 9
Age groups
3 0 - 3 4  3 5 - 3 9  4 0 - 4 4 4 5 - 4 9 5 0 - 5 9 6 0 - 6 9 7 0  +
S outhw est
1 9 3 1 3 6 2 9 4 0  4 2 4 7 4 5 4 6 4 9
2 4 - 6 9 6 0 7 0  7 3 8 1 7 8 7 8 8 1
2 9 - - 7 9 8 7  9 2 9 3 9 3 9 1 9 0
N 6 1 2 4 5 6 4 0 4 3 6 9  2 4 3 2 1 1 3 2 2 1 9 9 9 9
E state
1 9 1 9 1 9 1 8 2 5 2 9 6 1 4 0 5 5 5 0
2 4 - 5 9 5 9 5 4 7 9 8 7 8 1 9 0 1 0 0
2 9 - - 8 4 8 1 9 0 1 0 0 8 6 1 0 0 1 0 0
N 5 8 5 8 4 4 5 2 4 2 3 1 3 7 2 0 4
Source: Primary analysis of the Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1985 and
1987.
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F i g u r e  4.1.  L i f e - t a b l e  e s t i m a t e s  o f  p r o p o r t i o n s  marr i ed  by 
exact  ages:  W o m e n  15 + , S o u t h w e s t .
Proportion
Married
- 4 — 0 — 0 1 0 - 3  y
C o h o  r t 1 5 - 1 9
— C o h o r t 2 0 - 2 4
C o h o r t 2 5 - 2 9
C o h o r t 3 0 - 3 4
C o h o r t 3 5 - 3 9
C o h o r t 4 0  - 4 9
—  C o h o r t 5 0 - 5 9
C o h o r t 6 0  - 6 9
C o h o r t
Exact
F i g u r e  4.2.  L i f e - t a b l e  e s t i m a t e s  o f  p r o p o r t i o n s  m arr i ed  by 
exac t  ages:  W o m e n  15+,  E s ta t e s
Proportion
Married
C o h o r t 1 5 - 1 9
—  C o h o r t 2 0 - 2 4
C o h o r t 2 5 - 2 9
C o h o r t 3 0 - 3 4
C o h o r t 3 5 - 3 9
C o h o r t 4 0  - 4 9
—  C o h o r t 5 0 - 5 9
C o h o r t
Exact Age
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Figure 4.2, for the estates, reveals quite a different pattern of change. 
There are two distinct patterns of marriage, with cohorts aged 40+ marrying 
much earlier than their younger sisters, and daughters. This implies some 
quantum change, a shift perhaps from a social context where it was not 
acceptable to delay a daughter’s marriage even if it was in the family's 
material interest to do so, to a situation where it is acceptable. This is 
consistent with the evidence. Significantly, the long-term change in 
marriage patterns seems to have been associated with the collapse of 
arranged marriage in the Southwest but not in the estates. These points 
are investigated in depth below.
Just as the proportion married by age is declining, so is the ultimate 
proportion married. The increasing numbers of young unmarried women 
may well be making spinsterhood at later ages more acceptable, and 
changes in the probability of marriage at younger ages probably do affect 
the overall probability of ever marrying.
4.2 M arriage sq u eeze  as an  exp lan ation  for the rise  in  fem ale age at 
m arriage
It was noted earlier that Fernando (1975) and others have claimed 
that the rise in the female age at marriage is a consequence of a marriage 
squeeze brought about by a rapid decline in mortality in the late 1940s. It 
has been argued in this thesis that, although the marriage squeeze probably 
has had a short-term role in forcing female age at marriage up, possibly in 
encouraging celibacy, and almost certainly in reducing the age gap at 
marriage, it seems to have merely accentuated trends that have been under 
way since at least 1900, according to both the censuses and earlier writings.
The evidence from the project tends to support this contention, that 
the marriage squeeze has been a contributing factor to changes in marriage 
patterns but is by no means a sufficient explanation for these changes.
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Table 2.2 in Chapter 2 lists the sex ratios for various marrying groups as 
indicated by the census. There are difficulties in interpreting such ratios for 
a survey population which in no sense is a closed population as Sri Lanka 
effectively is. Nevertheless, for purposes of comparison the ratios for the 
research population are provided in Tables 4.4. and 4.5.
Table 4.4 Males per 100 females by age groups in which marriages m ostly take 
place in survey areas (i.e. females 5 years younger than males)
Approximate 
median year 
of marriage
Coastal
N
Ratio M F
Estate 
Ratio M
N
F
M (20-24)
1990 92.7 573 618 104 . 9 64 61
F (15-19)
M (25-29)
1985 88.4 551 623 67.2 39 58
F (20-24)
M (30-34)
1980 91.6 425 464 63.8 37 58
F (25-29)
M (35-39)
1975 84.3 348 413 102.3 45 44
F (30-34)
M (40-44)
1970 73.1 272 372 57.7 30 52
F (35-39)
M (45-49)
1965 78.9 194 246 118.6 51 43
F (40-44)
M (20-34)
1985 90.9 1549 1705 78 . 7 140 178
F (15-29)
M (20-44)
1980 87.1 2169 2490 78.5 215 274
F (15-39)
Source: Primary analysis of the Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1985-1987.
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Table 4.5 with the sex ratios by religion has been included because 
each religious group to a large extent acts as a closed m arriage market. 
Even the Christians, who belong to the one religious group not closely 
identified with a particular ethnic group, nevertheless generally m arry only 
other Christians. However, the num bers in  the sm aller groups are so small 
th a t they m ust m arry outside the research area. Though the necessity for 
doing this is less, this would also apply to the larger religious groups.
Table 4.5 Males per 100 females by religion in survey ares
M ( 2 0 - 2 4 ) / F  (15 - 2 9 )
M
N M (20
F
- 4 4 ) / F  (15 - 3 9 )  N 
M F
C o a s t a l
All 90.9 1549 1705 87.1 2169 2490
B u d d h i s t 88.1 992 1126 85.2 1404 1648
H i n d u 123.5 63 51 109.0 85 78
M u s l i m 89.1 286 321 84.5 376 445
C h r i s t i a n 102.0 206 202 95.5 300 314
E s t a t e
A l l  * 78.7 140 178 78.5 215 274
B u d d h i s t 81.2 39 48 73.2 60 82
H i n d u 78.3 101 129 80.4 152 189
Notes: * Including Muslims and Christians.
Source: Primary analysis of the Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1985-1987.
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show ratios sim ilar to those of the general 
population as in Table 2.2 in C hapter 2. I t is much harder to determine 
w hether the sex ratios have affected age a t m arriage. The correspondence is 
not perfect in the research area between the sex ratios for the five-year age 
groups as listed in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 and proportions m arried by age in
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Table 4.3: women who were 35-39 years old had a particularly adverse ratio, 
yet m arried earlier than  younger age groups. Nor is the correspondence 
obvious for the five-year age groups in  the census. However, as Fernando 
(1975) notes, broader age groups are probably more meaningful, as women 
in the narrow age groups can m arry m en from the age groups adjacent to 
the one five years older than  them . At th is level the m arriage squeeze 
probably has had some effect. In general, overcoming the worst of the 
m arriage squeeze does seem to be associated with a narrowing of the age 
gap. Where the squeeze appears worst in the survey, in the estates, the age 
at m arriage has increased most, particularly  among women. As Table 4.5 
shows, the estate Hindus who have an especially late age a t m arriage have 
a sizable surplus of women, whereas the early m arrying coastal Hindus 
have a surplus of men; but small num bers and sample variation mean th a t 
caution is required in in terpreting these figures. A higher proportion of 
men than  of women would have left the estates to find work in the towns 
and elsewhere, as there is much less work for men than  for women on the 
estates; however, the communal riots of 1983, when m any Tamils in 
Colombo and other towns were killed or lost their houses and property, 
caused many em igrants to re tu rn  to their homes, thereby reducing this 
effect. The decline in the female age a t m arriage between the 30-34 year 
age group and the 25-29 age group indicated in Table 4.1, m ay be the result 
of a relaxation in the m arriage squeeze.
Nevertheless, it  is clear from Table 4.1, as well as from earlier 
censuses, th a t age a t m arriage was rising before the m arriage squeeze and 
th a t while the m arriage squeeze has been much less intensive for the 
younger age groups, age at m arriage has not recently fallen significantly. 
Indeed, Table 4.3 indicates tha t, following a short-term  decline in the age a t 
m arriage from age group 30-34 to age group 25-29, it has risen again among 
those aged 20-24.
156
This suggests that, even if the m arriage squeeze were responsible for 
a short-term  fluctuation in female age a t m arriage during the 1960s and 
1970s, other forces were involved in the longer-term rise in the age a t 
m arriage. Significantly, in the project’s in-depth interviewing, the difficulty 
of finding grooms was very rarely cited as a reason for not m arrying or 
m arrying later in Sri Lanka, even in the estates where the m arriage 
squeeze has been severe. This was in sharp contrast to my previous 
experience in South India where it was by far the most commonly cited 
reason for m arriage delay. Jones's findings for M alaysia approximate the 
Sri Lankan situation:
In summary, the m arriage squeeze has undoubtedly 
contributed to the rise in the age a t m arriage for M alay and 
Indian women since 1957. But its effect should not be 
exaggerated. The rise in age a t m arriage for men as well as 
women during this period indicates th a t the m ain reason in the 
case of women m ust have been changes in norms about the 
suitable age a t m arriage, which were no doubt linked to the 
fundam ental social and economic changes which had occurred 
in Malaysia since independence (Jones, 1980: 283).
As noted in Chapter 2, Fernando in  a more recent article places more 
emphasis on economic factors than  on the m arriage squeeze. This argum ent 
is also favoured by a num ber of other w riters including Dixon (1970) and 
Gombrich and Obeyesekere (1988:196).
4.3 The econom y and m arriage
Since independence the Sri L ankan economy has been m arked by 
periods of economic stagnation. In the early 1970s the problems were acute 
and the problem of youth unemployment was a major factor in the 1971 
uprising led by the People's Liberation Front, known by its Sinhalese 
initials as the J.V.P. [1] . In 1973-74 there were serious food shortages. 
Consequently, many families found it more difficult to finance m arriages
[l] In 1989 there was a resurgence of J.V.P. activity.
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and many couples were less able to take on the responsibility of supporting 
a family. In Dixon's (1970) terms, marriage had become less feasible.
The economic feasibility explanation for the rise in age at marriage 
has the advantage over the marriage squeeze explanation in that it applies 
both to the recent fluctuations and to the long-term rise in the age at 
marriage. As noted earlier, Dixon (1970) regarded the long-term rise in the 
age at marriage as being due to a gradual reduction in the feasibility of 
marriage. On this basis, the early 1970s was a particular crisis in an 
already chronically difficult condition.
There are considerable attractions in the argument that financial 
difficulties, and particularly delays in obtaining employment, were the 
essential reasons for the delay in marriage both in the long run and 
particularly in the 1970s. When we asked 313 unmarried women of sixteen 
years and over what attributes they required in a future husband, virtually 
all the women who expected to marry listed a job. Of the women, 37 did not 
expect to marry. Of the remaining 276, 221 (80 per cent) replied that a 
groom would have to be securely employed, and 42 (15 per cent) said they 
should be securely employed and have a good character. Four respondents 
said that he should be a professional, a businessman or a landowner, two 
said that he should be able to provide daily food, six that they had already 
chosen and one that he should be approved of by the family. That is, 269 
out of 276 answers involved the ability of the groom to support the family. 
Of the other seven, the six who had already chosen their grooms were 
almost certainly waiting until the groom had a suitable job, and in the 
remaining one, where family approval was desired, that would be unlikely 
unless he had a job.
The emphasis on the need for a groom to be employed is presumably a 
new constraint on the age at marriage. Once, in a more agrarian Sri Lanka,
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it would have been up to the families of the bride and groom to provide them 
with a suitable livelihood. Often they would live with the family after 
marriage. Even without family support, employment was not a problem. An 
individual could work on the land of his family or of his affines through 
marriage, labour for other farmers, or undertake shifting cultivation (known 
in Sri Lanka as chena or hena) on unclaimed land in the forest. 
Agricultural labour tends to be seasonal but it does not involve an initial 
period of unemployment while waiting for one's first job, as do many non- 
agricultural occupations, nor is it as sensitive to economic downturns.
The average age at which men are first employed has risen because 
nowadays education is much longer in duration than it was previously and 
because obtaining non-agricultural jobs often involves a lengthy period of 
prior unemployment. Time spent by males in studying should have had less 
effect on age at marriage than time spent unemployed as most men have 
always married later than the period that is generally occupied by study. 
Education, however, is likely to delay the commencement of the search for a 
job, and the sort of jobs made available by education are scarcer than other 
jobs.
Unemployment increased in the early 1970s, especially amongst the 
educated. Table 4.6 shows unemployment for 25-29 year olds as registered 
in the census.
Table 4.6 Unemployed males aged 25-29 in Sri Lanka
Year and per cent unemployed
Age 1963 1971 1981
25-29 6.3 14.0 12.6
Source: Nadarajah, 1986 : 108.
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While overall unemployment figures are not particularly high by 
international standards and seem not to affect more than  a small proportion 
of m arriages, the figures probably understate  the problem. Unemployment 
is much higher in the 20-24 age groups than  in the 25-29 age group as is 
indicated by Table 4.7 for the survey. Moreover, unemployment in the mid- 
1970s was probably higher than  in 1971 or 1981. Many of the jobs th a t are 
available are lowly paid and have little security. Bauer and Grosse (1982) 
have argued tha t in Sri Lanka age at m arriage is more affected by level of 
income than  the employment sta tus of the groom. Our interviews 
dem onstrated th a t the key factor is less the actual income than  the degree 
of perm anency of the job, though the two are related.
Nevertheless, even given th a t the employment problem may have 
been greater than  th a t indicated by the figures, it is hard  to dem onstrate 
th a t delayed employment has led to la ter ages a t m arriage. There seems to 
be a general correspondence between male unemployment and female age at 
m arriage. Both rose steeply between 1963 and 1971 and then levelled off. 
However, the direct effect of male employment should be on male age at 
m arriage. As Casterline, W illiams and McDonald (1986:359) point out, in 
all 28 countries in which men's age a t m arriage was asked in the WFS, 
including Sri Lanka, made age a t m arriage had a g reater variability than 
female age a t m arriage, presum ably because it was more subject to external 
factors such as employment. Yet, as Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 indicate, male 
age a t m arriage in Sri Lanka has changed rem arkably little over time, while 
it is female age a t m arriage th a t has changed. While most women insisted 
th a t a groom would have to be employed, very few in the in-depth interviews 
said th a t their own m arriage had been delayed by the lack of an employed 
man. There were a few examples of men who said th a t they did not w ant to 
m arry until they had regular jobs for otherwise their parents would have to 
support them; bu t the examples were surprisingly few. More common were
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cases of women saying that they did not want to marry until they 
themselves had a job, but this seemed to be a case of changing aspirations 
rather than the feasibility of marriage.
Another way of looking at the relationship between employment and 
age at marriage is to examine differences between communities. Table 4.7 
lists age at marriage by area and Table 4.8 employment status for males by 
age group and area. There is an apparent correspondence in the coastal 
areas between employment by age and average age at marriage but in the 
estates employment is very early but marriage is late. While there are some 
factors specific to the estates, which are examined in Section 4.9, it seems 
that the economics of marriage is more complex than the issue of feasibility. 
This can be seen by examining the ways feasibility could affect marriage.
Table 4.7 Age at marriage by area (for age group 30-39)
All Rural Urban poor Middle class
S outhw est
Male 27 27 25 27
Female 22 23 19 24
E state
Male 28
Female 24
Source: Primary analysis of the Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1985 and
1987.
Table 4.8 Employment status by age - Males (per cent)
Ages
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15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39
C oastal
All areas
Employed 19 66 87 94 95
Not employed 35 29 13 6 5
Students 46 5 0 0 0
(N) (621) (563) (542) (420) (345)
Rural
Employed 15 52 82 92 97
Not employed 35 41 18 8 3
Students 50 7 1 0 0
(N)
P oor urban
(231) (164) (182) (146) (119)
Employed 31 79 90 98 93
Not employed 48 20 10 2 7
Students 21 1 0 0 0
(N)
M iddle c lass
(190) (188) (198) (121) (95)
Employed 13 66 88 93 96
Not employed 23 28 12 7 4
Students 64 6 0 0 0
(N) (200) (211) (162) (152) (131)
E states
Employed 28 76 90 92 91
Not employed 24 19 8 8 9
Students 48 5 3 0 0
(N) (50) (62) (39) (37) (45)
Notes: 1 Employed means all paid work.
2 Rural consists of Bondupitiya and Loluwagoda, Poor urban of Maligawatta, 
Jumma Musjid Road and New Kelani Bridge, Middle Class consists of Nugegoda 
and Welisara.
Source: Primary analysis of the Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1985 and
1987.
4.4 The cost o f m arriage
The principal ways in which economic change could have affected the 
feasibility of m arriage are in raising the costs of m arriage itself, and raising 
the costs of establishing and m aintaining a household.
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The major expense in the marriage itself is usually the dowry, and for 
many families this can be a heavy burden, and in some cases does delay 
marriage. The precise effect of dowry on marriage depends, however, on the 
specific purpose of dowry in the society, and on the family's and individual's 
attitude to dowry. In South India where I worked previously and which 
has a similar marriage squeeze to Sri Lanka, dowry serves as a rationing 
mechanism by which the groom's family is able to demand a very large 
dowry, especially if he is regarded as desirable (cf Caldwell, Reddy and 
Caldwell, 1988: 80-107). The bride’s marriage is delayed while her family 
raises the resources necessary for the often-exorbitant dowry. The 
consequence of this is to raise the female age at marriage and squeeze the 
age gap between the marriage partners, thereby re-establishing the 
equilibrium in the marriage market.
In Sri Lanka, apparent evidence that dowry might have similar 
implications is provided by the fact that the highest proportion of families 
paying dowry was among the Sinhalese who have a later marriage age than 
Muslims or low-country Tamils. Yet, unlike in India, there is little evidence 
that dowry has delayed marriage or that it has acted as an intermediary 
rationing mechanism.
With a very few exceptions the only individuals in the project to 
suggest that the costs of marriage and dowry were significantly delaying 
marriage were Muslims and estate Hindus. C. (Household No. 8020), and L. 
(HH No. 8029), estate Hindus, both cite dowry as a major factor delaying 
marriage. In C.'s family this has affected the sons as well as the daughters; 
since the sons have had to delay their own marriage while raising dowry for 
their sisters. Few others, even of the estate population, mentioned dowry as 
a significant factor in delaying marriage. Most estate families regarded the 
principal factor delaying marriage as being the importance of female 
earnings to household income which meant that parents were reluctant for
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their daughters to m arry too early. Where women's earnings are more 
im portant than  men's there seems to be little  need for the bride's family to 
use dowry as an incentive for m arriage.
Dowry was most often cited as a factor delaying m arriage among 
Muslims. For example, R.B. (Household No.2015) has not been able to raise 
a dowry for her two unm arried daughters. She says th a t they are now too 
old to m arry according to the usual age a t m arriage for Muslims. The 
problem is th a t they do not have any relatives to help them; if they could 
afford to pay a dowry, her daughters' age would not be a problem. She is 
not suggesting, however, th a t girls need a dowry to m arry bu t only th a t they 
need a dowry once they are past the normal m arriage age. Indeed, Muslims 
are less inclined to pay dowry than  other communities in Sri Lanka. In the 
project's 1985 sample 44 per cent of Muslims had not paid any dowry 
compared to 34 per cent of Buddhists and 27 per cent of Christians. Many 
of those who had done so paid very small dowries. The fact th a t dowry is 
not universal indicates th a t it is not operating as a rationing mechanism, 
delaying female m arriage, to overcome a m arriage squeeze; ra ther it has the 
function of ensuring th a t all daughters ultim ately m arry, and thus is an 
indicator of the importance of m arriage in Muslim society.
Among the Sinhalese, dowry seems to have quite a different purpose 
and hence different implications for m arriage patterns. As Goody and 
Tambiah (1973) have noted, for the Sinhalese dowry is essentially a form of 
inheritance, where the daughter inherits her share a t m arriage. This 
in terpretation  of dowry as inheritance is in keeping w ith the evidence 
provided by Leach (1971:135-6) and Yalman (1971:174) th a t daughters who 
receive dowry are not generally entitled, as they would otherwise be, to a 
share of the family property.
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The equivalence of dowry to inheritance among the Sinhalese is also 
supported by the fact that dowry is often paid even in the case of love 
marriages, unlike the situation among the Muslims and the Tamils. This is 
also a sign that love marriage is more acceptable among the Sinhalese. P. 
(Household No. 1009) commented that at first her parents did not like her 
marriage, but three months after the marriage she and her husband went to 
see her parents and were given some dowry.
If dowry is simply a form of inheritance, it should have little impact 
on marriage. Consequently, it is not surprising that unlike the situation in 
South India, dowry does not seem to have increased in line with the 
marriage squeeze. A complicating factor here is that with increasing female 
participation in the labour force before marriage, many brides are 
contributing to their own dowries, though strictly speaking Sri Lankans 
distinguish between this and dowry proper.
The proportions of the respondents who have received dowry vary 
little by cohort when controlled for marriage type, family-arranged or self- 
arranged. There is not the same pressure in Sri Lanka as in India on 
parents to ensure that their daughters are married. This is related to a 
much greater emphasis in India on preventing premarital sexual contacts, 
perhaps a result of the fear of cross-caste miscegenation. Sri Lankan 
parents are able to wait until a suitable match comes along without having 
to offer large inducements in the form of a dowry to a potential groom. 
Indeed, most families today prefer a more mature woman with education 
and qualifications to an uneducated docile adolescent, who would once have 
been regarded as an ideal bride. A family will provide what dowry it feels 
able to, and what it feels should be the daughter's share of the patrimony. 
Dowry is a less important consideration in the marriage, than the bride's 
own attributes including her ability to earn an income.
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This is not to say that among the Sinhalese, dowry has no 
implications for marriage patterns; it does, but the mechanism involved is 
not feasibility. The impact is in terms of what it implies for the overall 
economics of marriage. Whereas in India, dowries are hardly feasible but 
still have to be raised, for the Sinhalese dowries do not raise particular 
problems regarding feasibility, but they do nevertheless affect the economic 
equations involved. In India families have little choice but to raise the 
necessary dowry, while in Sri Lanka, among the Sinhalese at least there is a 
choice. Families are able to consider whether early marriage or marriage at 
all is advantageous to the individual and also to the family. To the degree 
that dowry raises the cost of the marriage without compensating incentives 
to marry, it reduces the attractions of marriage. There is a certain 
similarity between this reduced advantage and feasibility, in that, for 
instance, in a short-term crisis such as occurred in the 1970s marriage 
becomes less attractive. Nevertheless, the difference is important if we are 
to understand marriage trends in Sri Lanka. In our sample only 3 per cent 
of married women gave problems with dowry as a factor in delaying 
marriage; this would be expected if the direct impact of dowry on marriage, 
feasibility, is unimportant. There is some evidence that the indirect impact 
of dowry through its effect on the economics of marriage may be greater; 
this is implied by the greater rise in the age of arranged marriages than of 
love marriages, the opposite of what would be expected if marriage was a 
matter of feasibility. If marriage is not in the interests of the family they 
may be increasingly reluctant to be involved in it. D. (HH No. 6033), who 
believes that economic and social problems, by which she apparently means 
dowry and caste, will act to delay marriage in future, concludes that the 
consequences will be more love marriages. E. (HH No. 1031) sees the 
significance of dowry not in its effect on age at marriage but on the degree of 
control it gives parents over marriage. Her parents could not influence their 
daughter's marriages because they could not afford, or were not willing to
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undergo the sacrifice required, to pay for a matchmaker or to give a dowry. 
The issue of arranged and love marriage is examined in Chapter 5. If 
dowry, however, needs to be understood in terms of economic cost, it needs 
to be examined in terms of the total assistance provided by families to their 
children.
4.5 The cost of estab lish in g  a hom e
The second factor mentioned in the feasibility of marriage was the 
cost of establishing a household, including a house and furniture. The 
increased expense of doing so, as well perhaps as a reduced willingness of 
the family to provide assistance, may have reduced the feasibility of 
marriage. In practice there is little sign of this being the case. While most 
Sri Lankan couples will eventually establish their own households, as 
shown in Table 4.9, most still initially reside with the parents of one of the 
two partners. This inevitably weakens the nexus between marriage and the 
ability to establish a new household.
Table 4.9 Domicile immediately after marriage, Southwest^
Type of domicile Per cent
With husband's family 3 5
With wife's family 2 9
Married couple alone 
Married couple plus children
35
of previous marriage 0
With non-relatives 1
Other - unspecified 0
N 1 9 8 9
Notes: 1 Female respondents only.
2 Question not asked in Bondupitiya.
Source: Primary analysis of Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1985.
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The period of residence with parents and the reasons for separation 
were asked in W elisara (the commuting area north of Colombo). This area 
had the highest proportion in the survey of couples who had established 
their own residence on m arriage: of female respondents 49 per cent did so as 
against 36 per cent for the six areas including W elisara where domicile after 
m arriage was asked.
Table 4.10 can be interpreted as m eaning th a t a m ajority of the newly 
m arried couples either do not live with their parents or do so for less than 
six m onths but it would be more accurate to say th a t those who need 
paren tal support in establishing themselves can stay with their families for 
the required periods. The figures, moreover, in effect overstate the 
separation of many households. Even where a young couple build their own 
house, it is very often on land shared with the house of the parents or close 
relatives. The parents are able to assist them  not only w ith the house site 
bu t w ith m any of the other needs encountered in establishing a new house.
Table 4.10 Duration of residence with parents of either husband or wife following 
marriage
Duration Per cent
Did not live with parents 49
Less than 1 year 10
1 - 2  years 14
3+ years 13
Still living in parental house - 
parents dead or absent
4
Still living with parents 10
N 408
Source: Primary analysis of Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1985.
The project's data  gave little indication either th a t domicile with 
parents following m arriage was linked to the need for economic support or
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th a t young couples were increasingly being denied a place in the family 
home. The project found th a t in Southwest Sri Lanka there was little 
difference in domicile following m arriage by age cohort, age a t marriage, 
type of m arriage (arranged or love match), education or area of residence. 
The lack of variation by age cohort and particularly by education does not 
suggest th a t W estern ideologies are driving Sri Lankan society towards the 
nuclear family and neolocality. If th is were happening, one would expect 
younger cohorts to be more likely to live separately from the beginning than  
older cohorts, and more particularly one would expect any change to begin 
with the more educated who are most subject to outside influences, but 
there was very little differential by age or education. Most surprising for 
the outsider is the finding th a t there is no variation in residence by type of 
m arriage. This is probably more significant for w hat it indicates about the 
different m arriage types than  w hat it says about different household 
structure. Nevertheless, it implies th a t any ideological differences with 
regard to m arriage type have little impact on household structure. The 
explanation seems to be th a t the joint family has never been an ideal in Sri 
Lanka and th a t the complex households th a t exist are not equivalent to the 
patriarchal jo int families of India bu t are more equivalent to a collection of 
conjugal units. These units are linked by kinship bu t live together 
essentially for pragm atic reasons ra ther than  because living together is the 
ideal.
The pragm atic reasons for starting  m arried life with parents cover 
much more th an  simply feasibility. The lack of variation in initial residence 
by age at m arriage and area strongly suggests th a t the difficulty of 
establishing a household is not the essential reason for living with the 
larger family. If it  were, one would expect a higher proportion of those who 
m arry early to live with their families. Similarly, one would expect to find a 
higher proportion of those living in the urbanized areas residing with their
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parents than in the rural areas where land for house sites is more available 
and rents are cheaper.
Outside the estates, where housing is allocated by the estate 
management, difficulties in establishing a household were never raised in 
the interviews as a reason for delayed marriage. Nor was the feeling widely 
expressed that the young lived with the parents after marriage out of 
economic necessity. A cursory glance at the situation in Sri Lanka offers a 
clue as to why this might be so. A couple outside the towns is generally able 
to acquire land relatively cheaply, or even is given a block of land, either by 
their families or by the government which makes blocks of land available for 
house building. On this they will initially build a hut, and as they acquire 
income, housing loans being rare in Sri Lanka, they will commence building 
a much larger house: a common sight in Sri Lanka is a half-completed 
mansion with the family living in one room or in a hut next door. Given that 
this is so, the question arises why some younger families do live with the 
older generation; what determines residence and what are the implications 
of this for marriage?
The primary reasons for living with the parents are partly sentiment, 
in that it is the correct behaviour, and partly because it is convenient not 
having to establish a household immediately, and it provides a useful 
socialization period while the groom and bride learn what is expected of 
them and get to know each other's families. Moreover, there are often some 
pragmatic advantages in living with the family. During the early period of 
marriage, young couples generally have accumulated few possessions and 
are materially much better-off if they live with their parents; this is 
particularly so as many more expensive goods such as a radio or a well 
enrich the lives of not just the owners but the whole household. Living with 
the older generation also provides advantages in household management 
and particularly child care. Cooking and other household duties can be
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shared, and the grandmother or another relative can help look after 
children. This is especially valuable to couples where the wife is in paid 
employment outside the home. Finally, many young couples live with the 
older generation until the latter's death because the house is their share of 
the inheritance. In return, the parents are looked after in their old age.
Hence, while the relationship between parental accommodation and 
feasibility of marriage is more apparent than real, parental accommodation 
does have real economic and other advantages particularly for the younger 
generation and ultimately for the older generation. Indeed, in view of the 
practical advantages of being in a joint household, it is surprising that more 
couples do not stay with their families. Respondents were asked in 
Welisara and the estates why they moved out of the parental house.
The figures for Welisara are included in Table 4.11. The figures for 
the estates have been omitted because the population is dependent on the 
whims of the estate management, and the young couple move out when they 
have been allocated a house in the estate lines.
Table 4.11 Why did the couple move out?
Reason Per cent
Bought a house 12
Built a house 17
Rented a house 11
Parents gave a house 2
Built a separate room onto 1
parents' houseAccommodation provided by employer 7
Necessary for economic advancement 4
Wanted to live near job/business 12
Parental home overcrowded 9
Family discord 8
Wanted to live on their own 14
Don't believe in living with in-laws 2
Parents moved away 1
N 142
Source: Primary analysis of Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1985.
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The table is ambiguous as the stated reasons do not always tell us 
what the underlying reasons are. Essentially though, it indicates that most 
people stay in the household while the benefits outweigh the costs, that is 
while it is convenient and practical. People move out when they can afford 
to, but more importantly when the inconveniences of living together 
outweigh the advantages. For example, the advantages of company, mutual 
possessions, and childcare come to mean less as the younger family grows, 
as they build up their own possessions and as children grow older and need 
less care, while the disadvantages increase, such as the house becoming too 
small and too crowded, with the potential, at least, for a rise in household 
conflict concerning issues such as authority, favouritism and especially 
household expenditure.
Sri Lankan residential patterns reflect, then, pragmatic concerns 
within the particular institutional constraints that operate. While the 
feasibility of establishing a new household is one element in these concerns, 
it is not the primary element.
The implication of this discussion is that the feasibility of 
establishing a household is not the primary factor delaying marriage. 
People are able to marry, for, if they wish to, they can live with their 
families, or they can live separately if they are prepared to live austerely.
4.6 F am ily a ssistan ce  and m arriage
That the feasibility of marriage is not the primary factor delaying 
marriage in Sri Lanka is also suggested by a comparison of the ages at 
which arranged and love matches take place. In Table 4.12 age at marriage 
is measured by the proportion married under 20, 20-25 and 25+ years of 
age, for men currently aged over 40 who married before 40 (to avoid the 
truncation effect), for men currently aged 25 to 39 who married before 25, 
and for men aged 25 to 29 who married before 25; the figures are for
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Southwest Sri Lanka only, as type of m arriage data  for males on the estates 
are not available. If feasibility were a major problem in m arriage, one 
would expect tha t those who had family support, as is the case in arranged 
m arriages, would m arry earlier, but the data  indicate th a t men who had 
arranged m arriages m arried la ter than  men who had love m arriages; the 
difference for women is m arginal (see Table 4.15) bu t for this analysis it is 
the m en’s figure which is im portant.
The arrangem ent of m arriage seems to delay m arriage ra ther than  to 
advance it. Arranged m arriage may be less feasible than  love m arriage, 
requiring as it does expensive m arriage ceremonies, large dowries and so on; 
arranged m arriage is also increasingly being used as a last resort for those 
who find it  hard to arrange their own m arriages. Nevertheless, the 
principal explanation for the lateness of arranged m arriage m ust be tha t 
families do not desire earlier m arriage. It is the reason for this th a t needs 
to be uncovered.
Table 4.12 Age at marriage for arranged and love marriages for various age groups 
who married by selected ages - Southwest, males
Age at marriage Arranged
%
Love
%
N
%
Aged 40+ who married before age 40
under 20 48 52 33
20-24 53 47 208
25-29 54 46 323
30 + 63 37 235
Aged 25-39 who married before age 25
under 20 18 82 66
20-24 25 75 298
Aged 25-29 who married before age 25
under 20 14 86 36
20-24 24 75 124
Source: Primary analysis of Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1985.
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This is not to deny that the feasibility of marriage is an important 
factor in some circumstances. It is, no doubt, a factor preventing some 
marriages, especially in situations of extreme economic stress such as 
existed in the 1970s. In this sense it is a limiting factor but it is not the 
primary factor influencing the timing of the majority of marriages.
4.7 Socio-cu ltural factors in  the tim in g  o f m arriage
If the feasibility of establishing a household and the marriage squeeze 
are not the principal determinants of changes in the timing of marriage 
what is or are? The sections which follow examine a number of possible 
factors that influence decisions regarding marriage timing.
Among the most difficult factors to deal with are social cultural 
causes. These involve the whole belief system or ideology that people have, 
as members of a society or a community; as was outlined in Chapter 2, such 
beliefs inevitably influence social institutions such as marriage. For 
example, beliefs concerning female status and autonomy have important 
implications for how marriages occur and the timing of marriage. Similarly 
beliefs which require the protection of the purity of castes or families from 
corruption through mixing with lower castes or families may encourage 
early marriage to prevent undesirable liaisons.
What constitutes a particular belief system is a rather amorphous 
concept. Equally, it is difficult to say who precisely holds it. The 
characteristics probably most closely associated with a particular set of 
beliefs are religion, ethnicity, and, in the modern context, education, though 
in a society such as Sri Lanka, most people share many basic concepts.
This analysis uses religion rather than ethnicity as an index of 
people's beliefs, as ethnicity is a sensitive question in Sri Lanka and, 
following the 1983 riots, the project opted to ask only religion and caste but
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not ethnicity. This is not a major problem for the analysis, as in Sri Lanka 
religion and ethnicity are closely linked: all Buddhists are Sinhalese and 
most Sinhalese are Buddhists; all Hindus are Tamils and most Tamils are 
Hindus; and all Moors are Muslims and most Muslims are Moors. 
Christians provide the only real difficulty.
Tables 4.13a and 4.13b list age at marriage by cohort and religion. It 
is clear that religion has long been, and continues to be, a strong predictor of 
age at marriage especially for females. The explanation of this is, in part, 
that other socio-economic characteristics linked to religion are associated 
with late marriage, such as education: Christians and Buddhists have 
higher levels of education and marry later than Muslims. The causal links 
here, though, are not obvious. Increasing rates of education are associated 
with rising ages at marriage; but religion itself does seem to have an 
independent effect on both the level of education and age at marriage. 
Many Muslim parents, for example, do not see the need for education as 
they regard marriage as being more important for a girl than education.
N.K. (Household No. 2019) notes that, according to Muslim custom, 
girls have to stay with their parents until the parents arrange their 
marriages. She says that, after reaching menarche, girls do not go to school, 
with the result that they do not hope to get jobs and their only expectation 
is marriage. Consequently, she herself married without delay'. But times 
are changing, and she has decided that her daughters will go to school even 
after menarche. A.W. (Household No.2027) gives a father's perspective: 
according to Muslim custom, parents must arrange the marriages of the 
children. Otherwise 'they cannot receive God's pleasure'. So the parents 
take great care of their daughters and do not send them to school after 
menarche. If they want to go anywhere they must be accompanied by a 
chaperone. 'The girls are protected under the parents' care at all times'. 
They conclude 'Muslim parents do not consider that girls should be
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educated. The parents want to protect the girls until their m arriages'. A.X. 
and his wife (Household No.2029) comment that, among Muslims, girls are 
protected very carefully. After a girl has reached puberty, her parents 
decide to remove her from school. Then they decide to m arry off the girls as 
soon as possible. Clearly, too much education would endanger a girl's 
reputation and consequently her ability to m arry, and is furtherm ore 
unnecessary for a girl's future role as a wife.
Table 4.13a Age by which 50 per cent of the population had married - using a life - 
table, Southwest
Age B u d d h i s t N
R e l i g i o n  
H i n d u  N M u s l i m N C h r i s t i a n N
1 5 - 1 9
M a les
409 22 112 81
2 0 - 2 4 - 355 - 20 - 113 - 83
2 5 - 2 9 2 8 . 2 360 2 5 . 6 23 2 5 . 3 101 - 67
3 0 - 3 4 2 7 . 8 277 2 6 . 9 20 2 5 . 9 72 2 7 . 9 56
3 5 - 3 9 2 8 . 1 228 2 5 . 7 13 2 8 . 5 53 2 7 . 0 53
4 0 - 4 9 2 8 . 5 314 2 4 . 7 14 2 6 . 7 67 2 7 . 2 70
5 0 - 5 9 2 7 . 5 249 2 5 . 5 11 2 6 . 2 45 2 8 . 5 35
6 0 - 6 9 2 7 . 7 145 2 9 . 5 5 2 8 . 3 20 2 6 . 9 32
70 + 2 8 . 0 89 - 1 3 1 . 0 3 3 0 . 5 16
1 5 - 1 9
Females
395 17 126 77
2 0 - 2 4 - 410 2 0 . 7 25 2 1 . 9 112 - 75
2 5 - 2 9 2 2 . 9 321 1 9 . 2 9 2 0 . 2 83 2 4 . 1 50
3 0 - 3 4 2 4 . 6 277 2 0 . 0 12 2 1 . 7 62 2 3 . 0 62
3 5 - 3 9 2 2 . 7 245 2 3 . 0 15 1 9 . 1 62 2 3 . 0 50
4 0 - 4 9 2 1 . 4 305 1 7 . 0 18 1 7 . 3 62 2 3 . 8 76
5 0 - 5 9 2 1 . 1 242 2 0 . 0 5 1 8 . 6 42 2 1 . 5 41
6 0 - 6 9 2 1 . 0 150 1 8 . 0 3 1 7 . 0 23 2 1 . 3 31
70 + 2 0 . 5 93 0 1 8 . 0 11 2 1 . 3 15
Source: Primary analysis of Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1985.
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Table 4.13b Age by which 50 per cent of the population had married - using a life - 
table, Estates
Religion
Ag e Buddhist N Hindu N
M a les
15-19 — 18 — 32
20-29 27.3 29 27.3 74
30-39 27.8 25 29.1 56
40-49 28.7 21 28.4 58
50 + 23.5 16 26.1 50
Females
15-19 - 21 - 41
20-29 23.3 27 24.9 88
30-39 23.5 34 25.8 60
40-49 19.5 20 21.7 54
50 + 18.0 17 21.1 7
Source: Primary analysis of Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1987.
The precise causation involved in education and age at marriage may 
depend on the nature of the marriage process. Where young men or women 
arrange their own marriages, as amongst Sri Lanka's Christians, their 
religion may influence age at marriage through education: religion may help 
to determine the likelihood of a boy or a girl attending school which, in turn, 
may influence their behaviour with regard to marriage. In contrast, where 
the parents are primarily responsible for arranging marriages, as is still 
true of Sri Lanka's Muslims, then religion may independently determine 
both the education of children and their marriages.
Whether or not these arguments are correct, causation is necessarily 
complicated and multifaceted. Religion and ethnicity are associated with 
sets of beliefs that have important implications for age at marriage. 
Chapter 2 contained a discussion of how concepts regarding the need to 
preserve the purity of castes are associated with early marriage which is a
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way to prevent cross-caste liaisons. These beliefs exist in Sri Lanka among 
both Tamils and Sinhalese but they are strongest among the former. 
Among the Sinhalese, cross-caste affairs might lead to estrangement from 
the family, but they do not lead to the family itself being ostracized as still 
occurs among Tamils and in India. For the Sinhalese, unlike the largely 
Hindu Tamils, caste is primarily a social institution with little religious 
justification. Buddha, himself, ignored caste, regarding it as unimportant. 
In Hinduism, caste has divine origins as is stated, for example, by the 
Rigveda (cf. Hindu Scriptures 1966:10), the earliest and most authoritative 
of the Hindu scriptures, and is based on a concept of religious pollution 
whereby the higher castes are less polluted than the lower castes. In effect, 
their blood consists of different substances. Sexual activities, especially 
across caste lines, endanger the purity of the girl and, through contact with 
her , the family and community. It is vital to ensure the girl's purity, and, if 
this is not done, to break all contact with her. Such concepts are much 
weaker in Buddhist and Christian Sinhalese society and therefore so is the 
need to ensure female chastity and correct marriage.
Consequently, age at marriage has generally been earlier among 
Tamils than among Sinhalese, even controlling for factors such as 
education. The other major group of Sri Lanka's population, the Moors 
(Muslims), also have an early age at marriage, which seems to be due to a 
belief in the need to control female sexuality, related, not to the need to 
maintain the purity of one's blood, but to family honour.
Socio-cultural beliefs thus mean that Tamils and Moors should marry 
earlier on average than Sinhalese. This is generally the case in the coastal 
area, but it is not true in the estate survey, as Table 4.13 shows, where 
Tamil Hindus have the highest marriage age of any group. The need to 
prevent any suggestion of premarital affairs is clearly no longer ensuring 
early female marriage in the estates. While parents in India are paying
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ever higher dowries in a desperate effort to get their daughters married (see 
Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell, 1988: 80-107), in the estates, as in the rest of 
Sri Lanka, there has been a passive acceptance of rises in the female 
marriage age.
One reason for the difference is related to the composition of the 
estate population. The Tamil Hindus of the estates consist primarily of low 
Harijan (untouchable) castes. While these people are conscious of caste 
with regard to each other, nevertheless pollution infringements cannot and 
do not have the same impact as they have in the higher castes. In India 
these castes have a reputation for being laxer about infringements than the 
higher castes.
There are adso economic reasons why pressures for a lower female age 
at marriage may have been weak in the estates. First, a boycott of the 
family, though serious, does not threaten them economically as it would do, 
for example, in a village community where landowners and labourers are 
part of the same community. The estate management consists of outsiders 
who are not concerned with community affairs. More importantly, women 
are now the main income earners and young men and their families are 
scarcely in a position to reject a young woman simply because she is above 
the preferred age for a bride, as she is financially much more important to 
them than they are to her. Hence, while there were influences encouraging 
earlier marriage, they were not strong enough to prevent the rise in the age 
at marriage when countervailing trends appeared.
Countervailing trends were particularly strong in the estates, 
especially among the Tamil Hindu population. This population was badly 
affected by the economic problems of the 1970s, a time of virtual famine on 
the estates. The Tamils had little access to resources including help from 
relatives living away from the estates; and the estates suffered an acute
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accommodation shortage which was particularly bad for the Tamil 
population who had no access to alternative land or accommodation 
elsewhere. Furthermore, as Table 4.5 indicates, the marriage squeeze 
seems to have been extremely tight on the estates. Perhaps most 
importantly, the Tamil Hindus were particularly dependent on the earning 
power of the women who worked as tea-pickers, as the men found it difficult 
to get alternative work off the estates because of discrimination, language 
problems and lack of contacts.
Clearly, socio-cultural factors, as represented by religion and 
ethnicity, are important in understanding continuing differentials in female 
age at marriage in Sri Lanka and also in explaining why age at marriage for 
females was previously early. They do not, however, explain the rise in the 
age at marriage except in the negative sense that some factors holding age 
at marriage down, such as the emphasis on female chastity, were weaker 
than elsewhere in South Asia. The factors that explain the rise in age at 
marriage have to be found elsewhere.
4.8 E d ucation  and age at m arriage
The marriage squeeze and the feasibility of marriage have already 
been discussed as possible factors and have been found to be inadequate to 
explain the long-term rise in the age at marriage. One factor, however, 
which is undoubtedly of significance is education. Indeed, a number of 
writers have attributed the rise in the age at marriage in Asia and in Sri 
Lanka largely to rising levels of education (Tilakaratne, 1978; Ogawa and 
Rele, 1981; Rindfuss et al.,1983).
As Table 4.14 shows, as education levels have risen, so has age at 
marriage. In Southwest Sri Lanka, when controlled by education the female 
marriage age has risen only marginally, while the male age at marriage has 
fallen marginally. The greater rise in the female age over male age and the
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consequent reduction in the age gap parallels the greater rise (from a lower 
base) in female education levels, though, presumably, given the same 
education level, the female marriage age will always remain somewhat 
lower than the male marriage age. The very high levels of education in Sri 
Lanka for both males and females partly explain Sri Lanka's very late age 
at marriage compared to the rest of South Asia. However, this is not true of 
the estates where marriage is late despite limited schooling.
Unfortunately, the figures for the estates are based on small 
numbers and have had to be grouped into much larger categories both for 
age and education. The numbers for some groups, notably the younger 
males with no education, are still too small even after grouping to be 
reliable[2]. The figures show that there has been some rise in marriage 
ages, particularly for females, even while holding education constant, 
though this may be affected by the need to use wider categories. The 
situation in the estates appears to be related to a distinct set of 
circumstances where the daughters' earnings from tea picking constituted 
such a large proportion of the family income that the families were reluctant 
to surrender it, where there was an acute accommodation shortage, and 
where a particularly tight marriage squeeze prevailed.
However, while education may be closely related to the rise in the age 
at marriage, the causal linkage is not clear. Even if education is an 
underlying cause of changes in the marriage age, it may well work through 
a number of intermediate factors such as employment. The difficulty in 
tracing the causal links is not only that a number are likely to be involved, 
but they are likely to be different in kind, some affecting aspirations, others 
being more direct in their effects.
[2] The categories were chosen with an eye to getting useful figures for the 
more important female age at marriage - the problem being that female 
education rates are much lower than the equivalent male rates.
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Table 4.14a Median age at marriage by cohort and education - Southwest
0 1-3
Education
4-6 7-9 10+
% N % N % N % N % N
Male
1 5 - 1 9 - 44 - 7 0 - 1 1 5 - 1 5 8 - 2 3 7
2 0 - 2 4 - 3 4 - 5 9 - 1 1 9 - 1 0 4 - 2 4 6
2 5 - 2 9 2 4 . 5 3 1 2 4 . 4 65 2 5 . 4 9 9 2 5 . 2 1 2 5 - 2 1 6
3 0 - 3 4 2 6 . 0 1 3 2 3 . 7 34 2 5 . 8 81 2 6 . 5 1 0 4 2 9 . 5 1 7 9
3 5 - 3 9 2 8 . 0 1 8 2 5 . 9 2 8 2 6 . 3 6 6 2 6 . 6 8 6 2 9 . 2 1 4 2
4 0 - 4 9 2 7 . 3 2 1 2 6 . 3 4 5 2 7 . 6 1 0 4 2 7 . 6 1 1 2 2 8 . 8 1 6 3
5 0 - 5 9 2 2 . 7 2 1 2 5 . 6 44 2 7 . 2 1 0 2 2 7 . 7 9 6 2 9 . 4 65
6 0 - 6 9 2 5 . 7 1 6 2 7 . 6 3 0 2 6 . 9 64 2 7 . 7 4 4 3 0 . 0 3 8
7 0 +  2 5 . 3
Female
1 7 2 6 . 3 14 2 7 . 5 3 2 2 8 . 8 2 9 3 2 . 5 9
1 5 - 1 9 - 6 3 - 67 - 1 1 3 - 1 4 9 _ 2 2 4
2 0 - 2 4 2 0 . 0 5 4 2 0 . 8 6 6 2 1 . 0 1 2 4 2 1 . 1 9 2 - 2 7 5
2 5 - 2 9 1 9 . 6 4 5 1 9 . 8 42 2 5 . 4 91 2 1 . 3 8 7 2 5 . 4 1 9 4
3 0 - 3 4 2 0 . 8 2 9 2 1 . 0 44 2 5 . 8 87 2 3 . 2 8 2 2 7 . 3 1 6 6
3 5 - 3 9 1 8 . 7 42 2 0 . 5 3 6 2 6 . 3 8 7 2 1 . 0 7 0 2 5 . 3 1 3 1
4 0 - 4 9 1 8 . 0 5 6 1 9 . 0 6 6 2 7 . 6 1 2 2 2 0 . 9 8 3 2 5 . 0 1 2 9
5 0 - 5 9 1 9 . 4 7 9 1 9 . 3 5 2 2 7 . 2 9 6 2 1 . 1 6 2 2 4 . 3 3 9
6 0 - 6 9 1 9 . 0 6 0 2 1 . 1 2 6 2 6 . 9 6 3 2 1 . 2 4 4 2 7 . 0 1 5
7 0  + 1 9 . 4 5 7 1 9 . 5 1 5 2 7 . 5 1 5 2 1 . 0 1 7 2 6 . 0 1 0
Source: Primary analysis of Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1985.
Tilakaratne (1978: 190) suggests that the explanation for the impact 
of education is that higher levels of education have increased 'the 
aspirations of a large number of educated youth for wage employment. In 
the absence of employment opportunities this situation leads to 
postponement of marriage'. That is, the rise in the marriage age is a result 
of the joint effect of two factors, one, education raising aspirations, and two, 
the lack of jobs. This is, in effect, a variation on the concept of the feasibility 
of marriage. It is not simply that marriage has become less feasible but that 
higher aspirations brought about by education have changed the standards 
by which feasibility is measured. If the individual is to accept anything less
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than wage labour, then the family will have wasted their investment in his 
or her education. Ogawa and Rele (1981: 227) emphasize the direct 
influence of education in preventing people from marrying (students are 
unlikely to marry) and the greater opportunities education gives women to 
follow alternatives to marriage.
Table 4.14b Median age at marriage by cohort and education - Estates
0
Education
1-3 4 +
Age % N % N % N
Male
1 5 -1 9 0 9 41
2 0 - 2 9 2 4 . 9 11 2 5 . 5 21 - 70
3 0 - 3 9 2 8 . 3 5 2 7 . 5 15 2 8 . 9 61
4 0 - 4 9 2 8 . 0 7 2 8 . 0 10 2 7 . 7 63
50 + 2 4 . 0 10 2 6 . 3 18 2 6 . 0 37
Female
1 5 -1 9 10 19 33
2 0 - 2 9 2 1 . 3 26 2 3 . 9 42 2 6 . 8 48
3 0 - 3 9 2 2 . 8 26 2 7 . 8 24 2 4 . 7 46
4 0 - 4 9 1 8 . 8 25 2 3 . 0 15 2 2 . 9 35
50 + 2 0 . 8 45 2 0 . 0 7 2 1 . 5 12
Source: Primary analysis of Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1985.
Evidently education is a two-way thing. It delays men's age at 
marriage because it delays their obtaining employment, and therefore 
reduces the feasibility of their marriages. Education also delays women's 
age at marriage because it increases their ability to obtain modern 
employment, and, therefore, makes it more feasible for women not to 
marry.
While the relationship between employment and education is 
important in understanding the influence of education on age at marriage,
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education is actually a better indicator of age at marriage than employment 
by itself, indicating that other connections between education and age at 
marriage must also be important. Indeed, the relationship between age at 
first employment and age at marriage may partly be through education.
One of the main impacts of education on age at marriage may be that 
it legitimates new modes of behaviour. It changes a person s place in 
society, and their relationship to their family and to others. Of particular 
relevance here is how these changes are reflected in the processes of 
marriage. There seems to be a prima facie case that such changes should 
lead to a rise in age at marriage. Educated children are likely to expect and 
to be a granted a say in deciding when they will marry; this is especially 
true of those able to support themselves by working in prestigious 
occupations obtained as a result of education. They gain more say over their 
marriage, while simultaneously there is less incentive for the parents to 
pressure them into marrying early. But it is not simply a matter of those 
who are educated being granted more say in their own marriage; part of the 
reason why they are granted it is that the parents themselves are different. 
Parents who want to educate their children are more likely to expect their 
children to act independently than those who do not. Those parents who 
deny education to their children often do so precisely in order to prevent 
their child, often a daughter, from becoming headstrong, stubborn and 
unwilling to accept authority.
These factors suggest that those who are more educated have more 
control over their own marriages. The right of veto or even the right to 
arrange one's own marriage may tend to delay marriages; after all, one of 
the main reasons for arranged marriage in South Asia is to ensure that girls 
marry before their reputations can be questioned. Thus, one would expect 
a higher level of education to be associated with a later age at marriage, and 
both with greater individual control of marriage. This should especially be
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so if parents who w ant educated children are also parents who expect an 
element of independence or m aturity, an element which comes not ju st 
through education but also through age.
While age at m arriage is linked to level of education, as shown in 
Tables 4.14a and b, the link through control over m arriage is more difficult 
to demonstrate. The survey found th a t for women there was only a 
m arginal difference in age a t m arriage by w hether the m arriage was an 
arranged or a love match; in contrast to m en whose love m arriages were on 
average earlier (see Table 4.12). In Table 4.15 age a t m arriage is m easured 
by the proportion m arried under 20, 20-25 and 25+, for women currently 
aged over 40 who m arried before 40 (to avoid the truncation affect), for 
women currently aged 25 to 39 who m arried before 25, and for women aged 
25 to 29 who m arried before 25. The two broader groupings, over 40 and 25 
to 39 both show th a t for females a higher proportion of early m arriages were 
arranged than  were la ter m arriages. The difference seems to be explained 
partly by ethnic-religious groupings and partly  by education. Ethnic- 
religious groups where arranged m arriage prevails, such as the Muslims 
and the Hindus, tend to m arry earlier than  groups where love matches 
prevail. Similarly, arranged m arriage is slightly more common among the 
less educated who m arry earlier. It m ight be noted th a t the ethnic groups 
who m arry earlier tend to have lower levels of education. Since ethnicity- 
religion logically precedes education and age a t m arriage, the factors which 
m ean th a t some groups favour education may be related to the factors which 
make them  more likely to accept late m arriages and love matches.
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Table 4.15 Age at marriage for arranged and love marriages for various age groups 
who married by selected ages - Southwest and Estates (Females)
Southwest
Age at marriage Arranged % Love % N
Aged 40+ who married before age 40
Under 20 69 31 435
20-24 62 38 322
25 + 59 41 180
Aged 25-39 who married before age 2>5
Under 20 42 58 242
20-24 39 61 129
Aged 25-29 who married before age 2>5
Under 20 25 75 150
20-24 28 71 130
Estates Aged 40+ who married before age 40
Under 20 95 5 58
20-24 87 13 52
25 + 88 12 17
Aged 25-39 who married before age i25
20-24 59 41 32
25 + 62 38 55
Aged 25-29 who married before age <25
20-24 45 54 11
25 + 61 39 23
Source: Primary analysis of Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1985 - 87.
There is little to indicate that the move from arranged to love 
matches is responsible for the change in the age at marriage. Indeed, the 
association of arranged marriage with early marriage is weaker than might 
be expected considering that one reason for arranged marriages commonly 
given is that young girls are unable to choose an appropriate groom. While 
this raises the question for whom the groom is appropriate, the family or the 
girl, it is undoubtedly true that for very young girls there is a question
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w hether they have the necessary m aturity  to make such a decision. 
Moreover, for females in the narrow age group 25-29, age a t m arriage is 
younger for love m atches than  for arranged m atches, a relationship th a t is 
contrary to what would be expected from the influence of ethnicity and 
education.
There are several factors a t work here. There is little pressure now 
for m arriage to be early. The pressures for early m arriage were, it seems, 
always less than  elsewhere in South Asia because of the weakness of caste, 
and differences in religious ideology and society. Significantly, such 
pressures as still exist are expressed in the project’s in-depth interviews by 
the Muslims and to a lesser extent the Tamils but very rarely by the 
Sinhalese.
While arranged m arriage is no longer being employed to achieve early 
m arriage, it is increasingly being used for late m arriage, th a t is to m arry 
those who have failed to find partners or who would have difficulty in 
marrying. One characteristic of Sri L ankan newspapers is the m atrim onial 
advertisem ents. Very commonly these are for people who are in danger of 
becoming too old to m arry, for example, women approaching 40 years of age. 
Hence it is logical that, whereas age a t m arriage was previously earlier for 
arranged matches, it now seems to be earlier for love matches.
Nevertheless, the striking point about the age of arranged m atches as 
against th a t of love matches is not th a t the relative tim ing of the two has 
changed but th a t they are very sim ilar overall. This suggests th a t we may 
be m isunderstanding arranged m arriage and its influence on age a t 
m arriage. Changes in the processes of m arriage are im portant in explaining 
changes in age a t m arriage, but the causation involved is more complex 
than  a simple dichotomy between arranged and love m arriages, and in this 
context the very term s arranged and love m atch are misleading. The term s
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imply that the two types of marriage are polar opposites, when, in practice, 
they have much in common. Except for convention, family-arranged and 
self-arranged might be more appropriate. Changes in age at marriage are 
not so much influenced by a shift from arranged to love matches as by the 
responses of both forms of marriage to the same changes in the social and 
economic contexts.
If the greater freedom provided by the ability to choose one's own 
spouse brought about by education does not help to explain the rise in the 
female marriage age, what then is the link between education and a later 
marriage age? The link probably lies in changes in what is required in a 
marriage partner, especially a wife, changes in which education has played 
a major part. These changes have affected all marriages irrespective of how 
the choice is made, whether it is made by the family or the couple’s own 
choice.
The impact of education may not be on the degree of control exercised 
by the young over their marriages but on what is required of them for 
marriage. Education is associated with a shift from the ascribed attributes 
dominant in traditional society, such as family and caste status, to the 
achieved status prevailing in modem urbanized society, as, for example, is 
associated with a high-prestige job. Education is the key to succeeding in 
this society while simultaneously it serves as a marker of the social graces 
and social status. It is as a consequence of this change in what is required 
of the marriage candidates that age at marriage has risen.
Education is thus part of a much larger reorientation of society: 
village-based society in which ascribed status was critical has gradually 
been replaced by a more outward-oriented society in which achieved status 
is increasingly important. This change has been accompanied by a 
transformation in what is desired in marriage partners.
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In the past, marriage was early primarily because there was little to 
restrain it from being early. Individual attributes were unimportant, except 
for those which reflected upon family status such as female morality, which 
favoured an earlier marriage age. What mattered was the family's economic 
resources and its status. Family status and resources were matters 
essentially irrelevant to the age of the bride and groom. For females in 
particular there were few factors holding back age at marriage while there 
were advantages in early marriage. The bride was not expected to be 
educated or particularly mature. What she needed to know could be learnt 
through experience, with the assistance of her mother-in-law and her 
mother. Marrying early allowed her to bear more children; the ability to 
bear many children was an advantage as the cost of rearing children was 
low and child mortality was high. For males it was not quite as straight­
forward as this; a slightly older age at marriage was preferred. While 
financially the whole family might support the marriage, the family's 
overall financial ability depended on the number of able-bodied adults, 
particularly males, working. Furthermore, even if the family accepted 
initial responsibility for helping the new couple, the groom was expected to 
be primarily responsible for supporting his family. The groom's support for 
his new family would inevitably reduce the support he provided to the 
family as a whole. Nevertheless, the delay was not great, as in an 
agricultural community adults were able to contribute fully at a relatively 
young age.
The change in age at marriage has less to do with a reduction in the 
family contribution to marriage than to changing requirements in marriage. 
Nowadays, family status and family property are less important than in the 
past. Increasingly, financial well-being and status are dependent upon 
acquired characteristics, particularly education, which inevitably involve a 
lengthy period while they are being acquired. This, as Dixon pointed out,
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will delay the period before first employment with consequences for the 
feasibility of marriage. More im portantly, it m eans th a t families are unable 
to make a considered decision with regard to m arriage until after the 
desirable characteristics have been acquired. The most im portant attribute, 
education, takes m any years to acquire; it will be even longer before a 
suitable job is obtained. This is not so much a m atter of the feasibility of 
m arriage as of maximizing one's bargaining position. Only where it is 
possible to dem onstrate th a t a m an has achieved a desirable position will a 
woman's parents be willing to accept him  as a desirable person for her to 
m arry. It is only then th a t the young m an’s parents will be able to obtain 
an optimal bride for him. Thus, those who have jobs are able to m arry not 
because it is feasible for them  to do so but because they are desirable 
grooms.
W hat is true of the male is also true of the female. Her age at 
m arriage is similarly delayed because she is expected to have characteristics 
th a t were not required of a bride earlier. As the family has become more 
involved in the outside world beyond the local community, so too has the 
wife's place in the family changed. Previously, a wife's role in  the family 
was well defined: she was expected to perform housework, and give due 
deference to her husband, mother-in-law and mother. She nurtu red  her 
children, but, beyond that, did not give them  special attention, though the 
situation among the Sinhalese was not as extreme as in the Indian joint 
family where too much affection for the children would be seen as 
endangering the in terests of the family as a whole. Children grew up 
quickly and were soon helping their parents. Now, however, the well-being 
of the family and of the family members depends much more strongly on 
w hat they can achieve. W hereas previously the standing of individuals 
depended upon the standing of their families, now the situation has 
reversed with the standing of the family reflecting th a t of the individuals
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who constitute it. The family's role has become in effect that of enabling its 
individual members to achieve their potential: the mother of the children 
has a vital role in assisting them to do so. Clearly, there is a strong element 
of feedback involved. Young girls need to acquire certain characteristics so 
they can assist their children in turn. The mother's increased interest in 
her children extends to other spheres and she is now expected to keep a 
much closer watch on her children's health than previously, and take them 
to the newly available health clinics if required.
The new emphasis on a specific set of achieved characteristics has 
had the consequence of raising the age at marriage: for marriage, males are 
preferred who are educated and have a good job (itself associated with 
higher levels of education), while females are preferred who are educated 
and have a certain maturity, a quality which males have long been expected 
to have. The change in what is expected of females, the respectability of the 
jobs made possible by education and an element of Dixon's feasibility of 
marriage, rising expectations also associated with education, have meant 
that having a suitable job has also increasingly been seen as desirable for 
females, as it has long been in the special circumstances of the estates. This 
has the combined effect of encouraging the girl's family to delay her 
marriage until she has acquired a job, and once she has done so, reducing 
the motivation of the family to marry off one of the family's breadwinners. 
Complicating this is the fact that the acquisition of a job will give the young 
woman much greater control over whom she will marry and over the timing 
of her marriage.
However, it is too simple to see the changes that have taken place 
merely as a result of the time needed to acquire the desired attributes, for 
there has also been a change in the net gain from marriage for families and 
individuals. In the past, families had much to gain from early marriage, 
particularly for females. An important element here was a morality which
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encouraged early m arriage before gossip of any kind could arise, and a 
desire to prevent liaisons with unsuitable partners from other castes or 
lower sta tus families in general. An alliance with another family, and 
particularly with a useful son-in-law, was also an im portant advantage. In 
re tu rn  there was little  to be gained from delaying the m arriage especially as 
the other family normally preferred a younger bride who was more likely to 
have am unsullied reputation and be able to bear more children.
There was less pressure to m arry m ales early because there was less 
to be gained from doing so. Their reputation was much less a t threat. 
Furtherm ore, the family had little to gain economically if a son was to 
m arry too early. While he would eventually need grandchildren to help look 
after him in his old age, his m arriage, especially if arranged, would require 
considerable assistance from the family and would divert his labour away 
from helping his family of origin: th a t is he would have to support his family 
of procreation.
The m ajor change has been a reduction in the gains from the early 
m arriage of females whose position has in some ways become more like th a t 
of the males. There is now little pressure concerning female morality. 
Indeed, there is virtually total acceptance of unm arried girls and women 
living with the ir families or alone until quite late ages and there is even 
some acceptance of spinsterhood. A major p art of the change has been th a t 
undesirable m arriages, from the parental viewpoint, are no longer the 
disaster they were formerly, and, in particular, families are less worried 
about their daughters eloping with men from low castes or low-status 
families. The reasons for this are complex but they have much to do with 
breakdown of the local community and its replacem ent by a new town-based 
hierarchy in  which achieved traits , especially education, have a much 
greater role. Furtherm ore, there is little  desire on the groom's side for a 
young bride. They, too, prefer a more m ature and preferably educated
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bride. There is little value in a daughter marrying early to establish a 
useful alliance as these are much less useful than they used to be.
The economic advantage of marriage has also changed so as to 
discourage families arranging early female marriage. In the past, a delayed 
marriage meant that families had the perceived disadvantage of having to 
support a daughter without having the advantage of a useful son-in-law or 
alliance with his family and also without all the children, especially sons, 
she could have borne who could participate in daily activities and help look 
after the senior generations as they grew older. Now these advantages have 
less value while the disadvantages have grown. One particular 
disadvantage is the assistance that has to be given to the younger 
generation when they marry. The most obvious example of this is the 
dowry, for, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the family has to provide a 
dowry without getting much in return.
More important than the dowry is the assistance that families have to 
provide after marriage. The family is expected to give support if the 
younger couple encounter difficulties including economic difficulties, 
particularly if the marriage is arranged in which case it is their 
responsibility to ensure that it is a successful marriage.
The effect of these changes is less to encourage families to actively 
seek later female marriage than to cause them to disengage themselves 
from active participation in promoting marriage altogether. This is of 
particular relevance to the arrangement of marriage as is discussed in the 
Chapter 5.
One factor with the potential for encouraging the family to more 
positively favour later marriage is an increase in the economic contribution 
by unmarried daughters to the family. Among poorer families women have 
worked before marriage, but more prosperous families have long preferred
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women not to work in outside employment. However, with the increase of 
factory and especially clerical employment, this has changed and women's 
employment has become much more respectable. One of the characteristics 
of contemporary Sri Lanka is the large num ber of young women who work, 
especially in the growing textile industry. A m ajority of Sri Lankans 
working in the Middle E ast are women; mostly as domestics.
But the economic attraction for the family of women's labour should 
not be overstated. Even with the increase in female labour, unemployment 
is still high and young women, like young men, often find it very difficult to 
find a suitable job. Secondly, even if the girl gets a job, the family may not 
benefit much m aterially. Amongst the Sinhalese the children of the family 
are not expected to contribute greatly to the family before m arriage, the 
parents bearing most of the household expenses.
Indirectly, though, there are significant economic benefits accruing to 
the parents from working daughters, in th a t the young woman contributes 
to her own dowry, though this may not reduce the am ount th a t parents have 
to contribute; and, even if she does not contribute much to her parents, a t 
least she bears much of her own expenses. The possibility of employment 
has also opened up new avenues of independence for women, not necessarily 
from m arriage altogether, but also as more authoritative figures within 
m arriage. Many women now prefer to delay their m arriages until after they 
have acquired employment, in part to gain more experience of the outside 
world, but also because their husbands m ight well prevent them  taking up 
such employment after m arriage.
The changing economics of m arriage in the low country thus means 
th a t families are no longer pressing the young to m arry early. In contrast, 
the changing economics of m arriage in the project's up-country sample in
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the tea estates has meant that it is in the family's interest to actively delay 
marriage.
4.9 D ifficu lties o f m arrying on  the e sta tes
Women are the major earners in estate families; the prime demand 
for labour in the estates is for tea plucking, work traditionally done by 
women. This means that there are few economic advantages for a woman’s 
own family in marrying her off early. Her income makes an important 
contribution to the family. What is more, a later age at marriage does not 
seem to be related to the need to pay a higher dowry on the estates. Men, 
after all, will not be expected to support their wives but rather will be 
supported by them.
K. (Household No.8323), for example, argued that, although girls 
should marry at around 18 years and boys at 20 so that they would be able 
to have children early for old-age support, parents' desires for their 
children's earnings were delaying marriage. Similarly, V. (Household 
No.8162) remarked that parents are delaying girls' marriages because they 
want the girls to finance their own weddings as much as possible. Some 
parents do not even think of getting their daughters married as they want 
to live on the girls' earnings. V. commented: 'That is why some of the girls 
elope and get married. How long can anybody wait?’. His point is 
highlighted by the case of R. (Household No.8136), two of whose daughters 
had eloped. While R. said his daughters had remained unmarried because 
nobody wanted to marry them, and somewhat contradictorily added that 
anyway the suitors that did come were bad characters and their horoscopes 
did not match, it was clear that he had made little effort to marry them. 
The neighbours said that he had only been interested in the girls' earnings, 
and suggested that he had let the girls elope so that he would not have to 
spend anything on their weddings. S. (Household No.8380) insisted that he
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had tried to arrange his own daughters’ marriages but noted that some 
parents are only interested in living on their daughters' earnings. His 
daughters claimed to the contrary that his only efforts were in drinking 
their earnings.
Even daughters who do not directly contribute to family income can 
do so indirectly by looking after siblings while others in the household work. 
These are among the reasons given as to why J.'s (Household No.8309) and 
T. L.'s (Household No.8073) marriages will be delayed. Sometimes, 
however, other factors force the parents' hand. M. (Household No.8327) 
explained that, although his daughter was earning an income, he had to 
arrange her marriage as her mother was dead and no one could look after 
her.
Thus female employment in the estates is acting to delay marriage. A 
young woman who is unemployed, however, is almost impossible to marry 
off, even though it may be in the parents’ interest to do so. L. (Household 
No. 8359) said that her daughter P. is often sick and cannot work much so 
she does not expect her to marry soon; her other daughter K. does not want 
to marry because her earnings are needed to support the family but her 
mother says they are trying to arrange her marriage.
While it is in the economic interests of the girls' families to delay 
their marriages there are some dangers in doing so: one is that they will not 
be able to arrange an advantageous match. This is likely to be a bigger 
disadvantage from the girl's point of view than her family's as they expect 
little help from their daughters after marriage, and family alliances are not 
so valuable in the proletarianized society of the estates where family 
property is of little value, and residence, work and other activities are 
controlled by the estate management. There is a disadvantage, however, in 
that, if the marriage is unsuccessful, they may have to take responsibility
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for their daughter; though this may not be an economic disadvantage if she 
continues to work.
S. (Household No.8380) philosophized that:
Some parents are not initially interested in getting daughters married 
(because they earn money) and they do make sincere efforts. Later on, 
when they finally realize that the daughters have to be married, it is too 
late and the girls remain unmarried. People come, have a look at the girl 
and go away because no one wants to marry a girl who is too old.
It was basically a problem of childbearing:
There are many girls who are older than boys and they cannot find suitable 
partners. If a girl is older than the boy, he will be in his prime when she 
has attained menopause. Such a marriage will lead to incompatibility. 
There will be no problem in having sex, but childbearing will not be 
possible.
According one of the project's investigators, Lakshman Dissanayake, people 
in the estates cited the best age for a female to marry as between 20 and 25. 
A woman over 25 had less chance of a young husband and most probably 
she would have to marry a man over 35; therefore, the parents prefer to 
arrange their daughter's wedding before she is 25. Clearly, though there 
are many marriages after 25, the decline in the age gap suggests that not all 
the women are marrying much older men; indeed there were a number of 
examples of women marrying younger men.
It is apparent that the importance of women's earnings means that 
men's families will accept them even at an older age. Indeed there is some 
evidence that it may encourage men to marry earlier, resulting in a 
narrower age gap. A. S. (Household No.8007) remarked that when his 
mother died they lost their main source of income and that the family was 
subjected to much hardship. Eventually he wanted to marry, and asked his 
father about it, as it would help the family economically, as well as help his 
sisters, because it is better if there is a woman to look after girls. 
Admittedly the age gap between A.S. and his wife was a lengthy eight years.
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While the importance of female earnings is apparently the principal 
factor explaining why the female age at marriage is so late now, it does not 
fully explain the dramatic rise in the female marriage age. Presumably, 
female earnings have always been important though they may have become 
more important as difficult economic times on the estates and 
discrimination against Indian Tamils off the estates mean that Tamils have 
found it increasingly hard to find full-time employment. The marriage 
squeeze has been an important factor, being particularly sharp in the 
estates, but it does not seem to be a complete explanation: there are signs 
that the worst of the sqeeze may be over but little sign as yet of a significant 
fall in the female marriage age. Secondly both male and female marriage 
ages have risen in the estates though the rises were greater among females.
A second major factor has been a shortage of accommodation. One 
household head A. (Household No.8039) commented that a number of his 
sons and one daughter were of marriageable age, and that he had arranged 
their marriage with relatives. The problem was that they still had not 
found places to live. He thought it would be difficult for all the sons and 
their wives to live in one house as it was already crowded. He said that all 
the sons would get married as soon as they found accommodation. 
Similarly, M. (Household No.8046) says her daughter R. still has not 
married at 35 years because they are poor and do not have a place for her to 
stay; she lives with a relative in Colombo. If she could get her house 
repaired, she would bring R. back and arrange her marriage. This may be 
an excuse, however, for as is examined below, there are advantages for the 
household in not marrying daughters.
The most important factor, apart from the increasing importance of 
female earnings, has probably been the reduced concern about elopements 
with inappropriate men. While this is still a worry it is no longer enough to 
override the benefits of keeping the girl at home.
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4.10 Interim  find ings and the im portance o f rela tin g  m arriage  
pattern s to w ider issu es o f m arriage
This chapter has examined a number of the various suggestions that 
have been put forward to explain Sri Lanka's rising age at marriage. It has 
found that the existing hypotheses either fail to explain long-term change 
adequately or fail to explain all the facts.
A particularly relevant argument in the Sri Lankan context, that the 
marriage squeeze has encouraged a higher female marriage age, does help 
to explain recent fluctuations but it does not explain much more 
fundamental long-term change. The most commonly cited reason for the 
changes in the age at marriage, Sri Lanka's prolonged economic crisis and 
its effect on people's ability to marry, what Dixon (1970) calls the feasibility 
of marriage, again has immediate attractions but fails to explain all the 
facts. This factor should have had a greater impact on the male marriage 
age than on the female marriage age, yet it is the latter that has risen most, 
particularly in the last few years.
There is little evidence that male age at marriage has fluctuated in 
line with employment opportunities. Indeed, what stands out about trends 
in age at marriage is their long-term consistency as opposed to the short­
term fluctuations typical of the job market. There seems a stronger 
correlation between age at marriage and education, which itself is 
associated with a later age at first employment, than between age at 
marriage and employment itself.
Another questionable argument associated with feasibility is that 
Asian marriage was early compared to Western marriage because where 
marriage was a family concern families both organized the marriages and 
supported the young couple, who often were incorporated into the wider 
family, and did not need to acquire independent means to marry. In Sri 
Lanka, family assistance does not seem to have stemmed the rise in the
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marriage age, for the average age of arranged marriage is rising as fast as 
that of love matches, or faster. Yet it is only arranged marriage that is 
associated with family assistance. This may indicate that families simply 
have much less ability to ensure the future welfare of the new couple than 
they did previously, and concern for the future welfare of the couple is really 
a question of choosing the most appropriate marriage partner; but it is not a 
matter of the feasibility of marriage.
After all, many young couples live with their parents until they are 
financially able to move out. Even then a large initial investment is usually 
not necessary as they are provided with land by the parents and they are 
usually willing to live in very straitened circumstances, often in a 
ramshackle hut, until they can afford to build a more permanent home. 
Similarly dowry does not seem to be a major factor in reducing the 
feasibility of marriage in Sri Lanka.
Having noted the inadequacies of changes in the marriage market 
and financial difficulties in marrying as explanations of the rise in the age 
at marriage, I examined a number of the factors which the project data 
indicated were correlated with differentials in the marriage age. 
Continuing differentials in age at marriage by religion and ethnicity were 
noted, a point that might be related to the particular emphasis placed on 
female chastity by some groups. However, while religion and ethnicity are 
important in explaining continuing differentials within the population they 
do not explain long-term change in age at marriage. In contrast, the rise in 
levels of education does appear to do so. It is not simple to explain why 
education should do so, but it has been suggested here that the answer lies 
in the process of marriage, and particularly in what is required of the 
marriage partners.
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Finally, it was suggested th a t there has been an overall change in the 
whole economics of m arriage, w hat the family itself gains from early 
m arriage. In the past early m arriage brought substantial benefits to the 
family but now m arriage often brings substantial costs. The clearest 
example of th is was found in the estates where families are now heavily 
dependent on the earnings of the female members, and, in the absence of 
strong pressures to the contrary, families are understandably reluctant to 
m arry off their daughters and thereby face the risk of impoverishment.
These changes in the attribu tes required for m arriage and in the 
economics of m arriage have implications for aspects of m arriage beyond age 
a t m arriage, in particular how m arriage is arranged. I have examined the 
basic factors th a t seem to have been involved in the changing age at 
m arriage and identified changes in the requirem ents of m arriage and in its 
economics, as the key determ inants; it is now necessary to relate the 
changes th a t have taken place in m arriage to their wider social and 
economic context. In particular, C hapter 5 examines how m arriage 
partners are chosen and w hat criteria are used. This has required an 
exam ination of m arriage within the context of the family, for, only by 
understanding the structures of authority  w ithin the family, w hat is 
expected of each individual as a member of the family and w hat they can 
expect in re tu rn , is it possible to comprehend how and for w hat reasons 
decisions are m ade regarding m arriage and family m atters in general.
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C hapter 5
The p rocess o f m arriage
5.1 A rranged m arriage has d ec lin ed  dram atically
The most dramatic change in Sri Lankan marriage in recent years, 
and the one which even more than its high age at marriage sets the 
marriage regime of Sri Lanka apart from its neighbours in South Asia, is 
the shift from arranged to love marriage. This transformation shows up 
sharply in the project's data on respondents' year of marriage.
It is evident from Table 5.1 that the proportion of marriages that are 
Tove matches' rose continuously until the 1980s. In Southwestern Sri 
Lanka it has risen from quite low levels for those who married before 1940 
to the great majority amongst those who married in the 1970s and 1980s. 
In the Estates the changes have been more recent but the trend is clear 
nevertheless with love matches rising from negligible proportions to a point 
where they are challenging the previous norm, the arranged marriage.
This chapter examines why arranged marriage has given way to love 
marriage, concentrating on the economic and social context within which 
the changes have taken place. It focuses on how decisions with regard to 
marriage are made, and relates this to the nature of family structure and 
the kinship system in Sri Lankan society. It looks at what individuals 
within the family perceive their duties to be with regard to others, and how 
they seek to discharge them and what they expect of others. It notes the 
influence of cultural and religious concepts on these duties and obligations, 
and how new ideologies are modifying this influence. It also examines, with 
regard to family and kinship organization, what are the interests of the 
parties involved, and how these are changing in response to changes in
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external, particularly economic, conditions. Where appropriate, 
comparisons are made with the situation in Karnataka State in South India 
where I worked previously.
Table 5.1 Type of marriage by year of marriage - females.
S ou th w est
Age
Marriage
Arranged
%
Type
Love
% N
Before 1940 73 27 92
1940-1949 70 30 209
1950-1954 63 37 139
1955-1959 66 34 187
1960-1964 60 40 206
1965-1969 43 57 238
1970-1974 37 63 287
1975-1979 29 71 341
1980-1985 32 68 470
E states
Before 1950 94 6 31
1950-1959 93 7 42
1960-1969 87 13 54
1970-1974 67 33 33
1975-1979 59 41 41
1980-1987 62 38 74
Source: Primary analysis of Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1985 - 87.
Much of the discussion in this chapter is concerned with how the 
economics of marriage is influenced by institutional factors such as the 
family and kinship organization. In Section 5.13 it is noted that these socio­
cultural features themselves may reflect more fundamental economic 
realities, such as the most appropriate societal organization given a 
particular economic system such as rice farming; in Marxist terms the 
superstructure, of which social organization forms a part, reflects the 
economic base. However, this is a matter which I do not explore in depth,
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because, in the present state of knowledge, it would involve mostly pure 
speculation.
5.2 W hat is m eant by arranged and love m arriage?
The discussion of the increase in love marriage raises questions about 
precisely what arranged and love marriages are, and more generally what 
marriage itself is. These are points which are discussed throughout this 
chapter and which were to some extent discussed in Chapter 2.
Love marriage means one in which couples make their own choice, 
whereas in an arranged marriage the parents make the choice; but the 
difference is rarely as simple as this. Marriage, after all, is a social 
institution which, to be regarded as legitimate, has to be accepted by 
society. What we are interested in are changes in what society considers 
legitimate marriage. This has particular implications for the young couple 
in making their choice in a love marriage. What was in the past, and still is 
in the estates, considered an elopement, may now, in the low-country, be 
considered a legitimate marriage; Table 5.1 does not distinguish between 
elopements and love marriages. The difference between love marriage and 
arranged marriage in Sri Lanka must be kept in perspective; while Sri 
Lankans regard the difference as important, what is being discussed is not 
the difference between a completely atomized society where individuals 
make choices with complete autonomy from their families, and another 
where families make decisions without consideration for the interests of the 
young.
Not surprisingly, in a situation of transition from one marriage type 
to the other, there is very considerable overlap between the two types of 
marriage. In particular, most couples who have love matches first consult 
their families who will normally investigate the prospective marriage 
partners and their families very carefully before giving their consent, much
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as they would in an arranged m arriage. W elisara couples who had love 
m atches were asked w hether parents agreed to the m arriage (N=214): 86 
per cent answered th a t they did, 12 per cent th a t they did not, and 2 per 
cent th a t they had accepted it after the m arriage had taken place. In the 
estates, the figures are virtually identical (N=64): 86 per cent of parents 
agreed, 12 per cent did not, and in one case, 2 per cent, the husband's family 
only agreed. The choices of the young couple are examined by the older 
generation, and indeed the parents would be likely to nip in the bud any 
prospective m atch to which they were opposed. Similarly, bu t less often, the 
young could be consulted on arranged m arriages. Respondents in W elisara 
and the estates who had had arranged m arriages were asked w hether they 
had fully agreed with the decision (N=149): 95 per cent said they had, while 
only 5 per cent said they had not. In the estates (N=163), the acceptance of 
the parents' proposals was even greater with 99 per cent saying th a t they 
agreed and only one respondent saying th a t she did not. Acceptance of the 
parents' decision, however, is not the same as consultation, as is indicated 
by the high acceptance on the estates, where it is evident to the fieldworker 
th a t there is much less consultation with the children over their m arriage 
choices than  in  W elisara. Furtherm ore, few people are willing to say th a t 
their current m arriage is a mistake.
A more m eaningful question was w hether respondents had vetoed 
any m arriage arrangem ents made for them. In the low-country this 
question was asked in M aligawatta, Jum m a Masjid Road, New Kelani 
Bridge, Nugegoda, Loluwagoda, and W elisara. As Table 5.2 shows, 31 per 
cent of women in the low country and 22 per cent of women in the estates 
w ith arranged m arriages had rejected grooms; presum ably a higher 
proportion could have done so if they had wished.
205
Table 5.2 Number of proposed matches vetoed by women in Southwest and 
Estates
No. of proposals
Southwest
%
E states
%
None 69 79
1 14 12
2 8 2
3 or more 9 9
N 796 207
Source: Primary Analysis of Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1985 - 87.
'A rranged m arriage' does not imply total family control nor 'love 
m arriage’ total individual control: w hat are being distinguished are family- 
in itiated  m arriage and self-initiated m arriage. There has been gradual 
movement along a continuum from where families consult very little  with 
the children to one where the children consult little with the parents, the 
actual shift from the family initiating the m arriage to the individual doing 
so, being only one point on such a continuum. At present while the children 
may be increasingly in itiating  the m arriage, the family continues to take a 
close in terest in it. A love m arriage in which the family's in terests are not 
taken into account is an elopement, not a m arriage.
Nevertheless, given th a t the distinction between arranged and love 
m arriages should be kept in perspective, Sri Lankans do recognize 
im portant differences between the two. While family sanction is still 
required for a love m arriage, it is nevertheless regarded as less of a family 
affair and the family is likely to be less directly involved in it. In particular, 
the family is less likely to provide a dowry, though it often still does, and it 
is less likely to offer support for the young couple, especially im portant 
when the young couple are starting  off and in the case of m arital problems. 
However, even where it does not pay dowry, the family is still likely to pay 
for the m arriage celebration.
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Thus, there is an im portant difference between arranged and love 
m arriage, with arranged m arriage being much more a family concern than 
is love m arriage. Nevertheless, love m arriage still requires the sanction of 
the family and society to be regarded as a m arriage.
5.3 Are the r ise  in  the fem ale m arriage age and the d ec lin e  o f  
arranged  m arriage linked?
A comparison of Table 4.1 in C hapter 4 and Table 5.1 indicate th a t a 
num ber of the sharpest rises in the proportions of love matches have 
followed particularly sharp increases in the age a t marriage: for example, 
for Southw estern Sri Lanka the large rise in female age a t m arriage 
between the 40-49 year age cohort and the 35-39 year age cohort 
(approximate m edian years of m arriage 1967 and 1975 respectively) is 
paralleled by a sharp rise in the proportion of love matches. The linkage, 
assum ing there is any, is probably not through the increase in love 
m arriages leading to a la ter age a t m arriage. As indicated by Tables 4.12 
and 4.15 among younger cohorts, couples whose m arriages are arranged are 
on average slightly older than  couples who choose for themselves. It may 
simply be th a t the rise in the age at m arriage m eans th a t families are 
having to accept th a t the young are m ature enough to exercise more choice.
The linkage may also reflect the risk factor involved; the longer a 
family delays arranging a m arriage for a son or daughter the g reater the 
chance th a t he or she will meet a partner. When we asked respondents over 
16 years who were unm arried, their intended type of m arriage, 61 per cent 
said an arranged m arriage and only 30 per cent a love m arriage; the 
rem aining 9 per cent saying th a t they either did not expect to m arry or did 
not w ant to. Clearly m any of those expecting an arranged m arriage would 
end up selecting their own partner. The explanation is probably th a t those 
expecting a love m atch are those who have already m et their intended 
partner. Those who have not will generally answ er according to w hat is
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socially expected, th a t is an arranged m arriage, even though m any will 
eventually choose their own partners; the answers may have been 
influenced by the setting in which they were asked, as most of the 
unm arried lived with their parents. Once those who are unm arried meet 
someone they wish to m arry, among the Sinhalese, a t least, their parents 
will generally agree; if they do not accept love m arriages the young may 
simply elope without consulting the older generation. In C hapter 4 a 
num ber of examples were given, especially from the estates, of the la tte r 
situation. For example, V. (Household No.8162) noted th a t m any parents 
were reluctant to m arry off their daughters as they were living on their 
earnings from tea plucking, and commented: 'th a t  is why some girls elope 
and get m arried. How long can anybody wait?'
This risk factor th a t the longer an arranged m arriage is delayed the 
greater the likelihood th a t an individual will meet their own partner, along 
with the greater use of arranged m arriage as a m arriage of last resort, 
explains why arranged m arriages are now slightly la ter than  love m arriages 
even though the greater concentration of arranged m arriages among the 
less educated might lead one to expect the opposite.
The reasons why arranged m arriage was being delayed in certain 
periods, notably the 1970s, was partly  financial. In societies where 
m arriage is arranged, both the right of the family to arrange the m arriage 
and their duty to find resources for the dowry, the wedding ceremonies and 
the setting up of the young couple are p a rt of the same process. When there 
are economic difficulties and the family has insufficient resources they may 
prefer to defer m arriage ra ther than  bring inadequate resources to it. The 
point came out very clearly in the research in which I was involved in South 
India: see Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell, 1988 on the reaction of the 
m arriage m arket in South India to famine and drought. One way out, for 
both the person seeking m arriage and also the family, is a love m arriage
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which is accompanied by a much lower transfer of resources. If the 
advantages of arranged marriage have not increased while the costs have, it 
may economically be sensible for the family as well as the individual to 
accept a love match. Table 5.1 gives some support to this interpretation 
with the decline in arranged marriages during the difficult 1970s followed 
apparently by a slight increase in the 1980s when economic conditions 
improved.
However, difficulties in funding arranged marriage do not fully 
explain the longer-term changes in the age at which arranged marriages 
take place; if the costs of marriage affect the supply of marriage partners it 
would be expected that a lower transfer of reources would be accepted as 
adequate. This should allow the age of arranged marriages to return to its 
previous level. This has not happened, which suggests that there are more 
basic reasons for the changes in age at marriage and marriage type. Of 
course while a reduction in transfers may allow arranged marriage to revert 
to an earlier age it would also reduce the attraction of arranged marriage 
over love marriage.
The deeper connection between age at marriage and marriage type 
may be that the factors underlying the rise in the marriage age are also 
largely responsible for the increase in love marriage. Chapter 4, for 
example, identified as one of the major explanations given for the rise in the 
marriage age the increasing importance of individual-level attributes over 
family-level attributes. This also has important implications for the 
effectiveness of the family or the individual for choosing the most 
appropriate marriage partner for the family and the individual. Section 5.4 
examines how changes in Sri Lankan society and economy have affected the 
family's hold over the individual, the individual's and the family’s interest 
in arranged and love marriage, and the advantages of the individual and 
the family as the initiators of the search for a marriage partner.
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5.4 Why did the young accept the arrangem ent o f th e ir  m arriages in  
the past?
The changed circumstances refer to the situation described in 
Chapter 2: in Sri Lanka a local community- and family-oriented society was 
replaced by a wider largely urban-oriented society in which the individual 
had a greater role. A socio-economic system had emerged where 
advancement depended less on family status and wealth and more on the 
individual's qualifications, particularly educational ones and to a lesser 
extent ability. Family influence, for example in obtaining a position and in 
politics, is still much more important than is generally the case in Western 
countries, but the influence is increasingly that obtained through informal 
networks, such as old boys' networks, rather than ascribed traits such as 
family status or caste. The result is that arranged marriage is less 
advantageous for all concerned than it used to be.
It is conventional to regard the arrangement of marriage in terms of 
parental control over children and the breakdown of arranged marriage as 
being a response to the breakdown of that control. But this is too simple a 
picture of what has happened. It is true that the family's control over the 
means of production is much weaker than it was; family land has become 
much less important while wage labour is increasingly available. Work off 
the family farm has long been available; yet the project's figures indicate 
that the pronounced increase in love matches has been comparatively 
recent. Even before the great expansion in wage and salary labour it was 
possible for the young to get access to chena plots of land for swidden 
agriculture, yet at least in the project areas there seems to have been very 
little self-selection in marriage before about 50 years ago. In the estates, 
where employment has long been provided by the estate management and 
not by the family, most marriages are still arranged.
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A num ber of anthropologists have commented that, in the past among 
the Kandyan Sinhalese a t least, m arriage was often relatively informal, but 
this does not m ean th a t it was not arranged, simply th a t the arrangem ents 
and the search for the partner were minimal. Where the family had little 
property a t stake or where the most suitable partners were known and 
indeed were likely to be close kin, a long search and complex arrangem ents 
were unnecessary. This situation is quite different from love m arriage 
where the responsibility for choosing their own partners is left to the young.
In economic term s, the young now have a much longer period of total 
dependency on their families than  formerly: their employment, and thus 
economic independence, has been delayed while they receive the education 
and training on which their future depends. Yet the areas where the young 
are dependent on their parents longest as indicated by employment status, 
the middle-class areas of Nugegoda and W elisara and the villages of 
Bondupitiya and Loluwagoda, have comparatively low levels of arranged 
m arriage compared to the poor urban areas and the estates where economic 
dependence is less.
In Table 5.3 the proportion who are family dependent, as defined by 
their sta tus as either not employed or full-time studying, is compared to the 
proportion of arranged m arriages. For the la tte r a total figure is given, but, 
as this is affected by past conditions and age structure, a figure for those 
aged under 30 is also provided. On balance, where the young are more 
dependent on their family, there are fewer arranged m arriages, not more.
211
Table 5.3 Employment status by ages - males, and the proportion of arranged 
marriages - females.
Proportion family 
dependent (%)
Proportion arranged 
marriage (%)
15-19 20-24 25-29 All ages <30
Middle Class 87.5 33.7 12.3 39 17
N (200) (211) (162) (716) (140)
Rural 84.8 48.2 18.1 49 21
N (196) (164) (182) (708) (185)
Poor Urban 68.9 21.3 10.1 52 37
(190) (188) (198) (699) (286)
Estates 72.0 24.2 10.3 75 59
N (50) (62) (39) (281) (68)
Source: Primary analysis of Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1985 - 87.
The explanation, in part, is that while the period of total economic 
dependence on the parents may have lengthened, once the period ends the 
young have a more complete independence than before. They depend less 
on family property or assistance as they are able to get their own jobs based 
on their own qualifications. But it would be wrong to interpret the shift to 
love marriage simply as a weakening in the economic control of parents over 
their children.
In the project's in-depth interviewing no respondents implied that 
they did not have a love marriage because they were economically 
dependent on their families. Some did say that they did not receive a dowry 
because they had married contrary to the family's wishes, some that they 
had a love marriage because of family opposition, and very few that they 
had to delay their marriages because they lacked the resources to marry. 
Where the young were economically dependent on their families this could
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have acted to prevent love marriages, but there is little empirical evidence 
for this.
What had changed was not that the young were taking advantage of a 
new found economic independence to marry as they wished, but that the 
whole social and economic system of which arranged marriage was part, had 
broken down. In the past not to have an arranged marriage would have 
meant being cut off from the whole network of kinship links on which 
village society was based, and having to forgo the advantages arising from 
arranged marriage.
5.5 N ot to have an arranged m arriage w ou ld  have m eant soc ia l and  
econ om ic iso la tio n
In a status based society, such as Sri Lanka was, an individual’s 
social identity was based on his or her position as a member of a family. It 
might have been possible to be economically independent undertaking chena 
agriculture but to do so would have meant isolation from the vital social and 
economic ties of village society.
Many of the social and economic institutions in village Sri Lanka 
depended upon kinship links and to be cut off from them would have 
resulted in a loss of important social and economic support. Family 
alliances, for example, were of considerable importance to the individual 
family members. In almost any activity an individual was likely to require 
assistance, and the support of a network of families and individuals linked 
by marriage was likely to be of critical importance.
The most important source of support for the individual, however, 
was the family itself. Not to accept an arranged marriage would have been 
seen as denying family responsibilities; the family would not have been 
obliged to fulfil its responsibilities in return.
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One such responsibility was dowry. In addition, where reciprocal 
obligations were met, the family would also provide assistance with 
accommodation and eventual help in starting a new househhold, providing 
land and so on. Finally, it would take responsibility for the marriage both 
in trying to overcome problems that might arise in the marriage and in 
taking care of the consequences if the marriage broke up.
Tables 5.4a and 5.4b list the answers given to the question on the 
disadvantages of love marriage to the young couples concerned. To simplify 
the interpretation the answers have been grouped into what seemed to me 
the most appropriate categories. Economic and accommodation problems 
have been grouped with lack of family support on the basis that there is a 
causal link between the two. There was remarkable agreement between the 
main sample and the estates on the nature of the major disadvantages of 
love marriage. Most respondents referred to the lack of assistance from 
parents, and, to a lesser extent, financial problems apparently arising from 
the break with the parents, though some mentioned other factors such as 
the lack of dowry and marital discord arising presumably from the result of 
inappropriate selections made by the young and the lack of support from 
their families.
There are a few minor differences: in the estates there is much less 
reference to dowry indicating that dowry is smaller but suggesting also that 
other issues are more important. There are interesting differences between 
answers within each of the categories. For instance, in the estates more 
respondents answered that, if the marriage broke down, the families would 
not help them whereas in the low-country the emphasis was solely on the 
possibility of receiving less assistance from the families, the difference 
implied being that the break between parents and children is more absolute 
in the estates.
Table 5.4a Disadvantages ^  in love m arriages for couples - Southwest^
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D isad v an tag e No. p e r cen t
No family support/ econom ic &
accommodation problems 353 53
Some parents don’t help them 140 21
Must solve own problems 121 18
Economic problems 86 13
If marriage fails no family support 6 1
Estranged from the family 52 8
Estranged from parents 35 5
Parents and relatives will disown them/
be antagonistic 9 1
Parents' anger 8 1
No dowry 26 4
No dowry 18 3
Husband may reproach wife for lack of
dowry 7 1
Husband's parents will be antagonistic
because there is no dowry 1 0
Marital problems 98 14
Marital discord 59 9
They may choose unsuitable partner 32 5
Marital discord after early years 5 1
Cross-religious marriage may cause discord 2 0
Cross-caste marriage 6 1
They may marry across caste 6 1
Problems 6 1
Problems unspecified 6 1
No basic problems 130 19
No disadvantages 128 19
None if patient and understanding 2 0
Total (671) ( 100)
Notes: 1 First responses only.
2 Loluwagoda and Welisara only.
Source: Primary analysis of Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1985.
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Table 5.4b Disadvantages ^  in love m arriages for couples- Estates
D isa d v a n ta g e N o. %
No family support/ econom ic &
accom m odation problems 125 32
Some parents don't help them 58 24
Must solve own problems 36 15
Economic problems 9 4
No property from parents 5 2
Lack of accommodation 2 1
Estranged from the family 22 9
Estranged from parents 15 6
Parents and relatives will disown them/
be antagonistic 7 3
No dowry 3 1
No dowry 3 1
Marital problems 40 17
Marital discord 13 5
They may choose unsuitable partner 10 4
Marital discord after early years 7 3
Marriage breakdown/divorce 5 2
Husband may abandon wife 5 2
Cross-caste marriage 3 1
They may marry across caste 3 1
Problems 17 7
Problems unspecified 14 6
Malicious gossip 3 1
No basic problems 29 12
No disadvantages 28 12
None if patient and understanding 1 0
Total (239) (100)
Note: 1 First responses only.
Source: Primary analysis of Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1987.
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The argument that love matches were rare in the past because of the 
importance of the assistance provided by families may seem to differ only 
marginally from the argument that it is the family's hold over the children 
that forced them to have arranged marriages. Nevertheless, there are 
important differences. First, the concept of the family's hold over the 
children implies an element of coercion which may not be there, for many of 
the younger generation prefer arranged matches even when they have the 
means to marry independently. Secondly, the concept implies that there is 
a pent-up desire for love marriage merely held back by coercion whilst in 
fact it is changes in the society which have led to the demand. Thirdly, even 
the poor, whose families could not afford to pay dowry, did not have land to 
give and could not provide accommodation, still preferred arranged 
marriages simply for the less materialistic of the reasons mentioned above.
Marriage has changed because the structure of society has changed. 
The advantages brought by arranged marriage are much smaller for all 
concerned than they used to be. Family ties are less central to the lives of 
individuals than previously. The family itself is economically less 
important, but, even where this is not the case, other family ties are less 
significant. Family alliances and other kinship-based links are much less 
important than they were formerly. Much of this change is due to the 
decreased importance of local institutions where kinship ties were critical. 
Now, governmental, bureaucratic and political organizations are much more 
important than they were, though local influence can still matter, for 
example, in procuring a position.
The reduced localism is also important in what the family can achieve 
in terms of the marriage itself. Where ties between families are strong the 
family is able to exert considerable pressure in the interests of its member; 
in particular it may be able to exert pressure to maintain the marriage. The 
converse of this ability to press the other family in the interests of the
217
individual is th a t the family and ultim ately the individual may also receive 
such pressure with the family feeling obliged to perpetuate a m arriage 
regarding which it has entered into commitments with another family. 
Individuals consequently may feel th a t they are not free to live their own 
lives.
A Family, however, can less effectively apply pressure where the 
other family takes the ties less seriously and where less pressure from the 
local community, for example through gossip, is exerted. A major 
contributory factor to the reduced importance of the local community here is 
th a t an increasing proportion of m arriages involve families who live far 
apart, and indeed the young couple may live away from both families.
The other factor reducing the value of family support is simply th a t 
the more m aterial assistance is less valuable than  it was; in particular, 
access to farm  land is of much less significance. Housing, however, 
especially in the towns, may be an exception to this generalization.
The overall reduction in the value of arranged m arriage for the young 
has not so much unleashed a pent-up desire for love m arriage but simply 
undercut the assum ption th a t arranged m arriage is the only correct form of 
m arriage and allowed the young to become more experimental in regard to 
m arriage. It has also altered, in a sense, the bargaining positions of the 
young versus the old. The old have had to become more accommodating to 
the wishes of the young simply because the young now have less to lose if 
they do not comply.
A distinction should be made between the situation in the low- 
country and the situation in the estates. The description given above of 
w hat seems to have happened applies principally to the Southwestern 
sample. In the estates, although the economic hold of the older generation 
over the younger generation is weak in th a t employment is provided by the
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estate management, society is much more local than in the southwest. The 
young are much more subject to local pressure and society is less likely to 
accept a love marriage as genuine. This localism also means that many of 
the advantages of arranged marriage remain. The family, for example, can 
use its links with the other family to help sort out problems concerning the 
marriage. Consequently, the old need not be so accommodating of the 
interests of the young as in the low country. One consequence seems to 
have been that the older generation have been able to put their interests 
first and hence have chosen to delay arranging their daughters' marriages. 
This in turn should lead to a reduction in the advantages of having their 
marriages arranged for the younger generation, but at present seems mostly 
to be leading to increased bitterness among the young that their parents are 
not fulfilling their responsibilities.
This discussion concerning the reduced value of arranged marriage 
for the young in the low-country raises a second point. While the 
advantages of arranged marriages for the young have lessened, families 
have, it seems, become more accepting of love marriages.
5.6 F am ilies now  accep t love m atches as gen u in e m arriages
Many of the factors which have reduced the value of an arranged 
marriage for the young couple have also reduced the value of arranged 
marriage for their families. Families consequently are more willing to 
accept love marriage.
Sri Lankans, themselves, seem to have no doubts that the principal 
factor in the increase in love marriage is that families are no longer actively 
attempting to prevent love matches. When we asked women over 55 years 
why there were fewer love matches in the past, in Southwestern Sri Lanka 
(Welisara only) 55 per cent of respondents replied that in those times 
families did not allow girls to go out unchaperoned (see Table 5.5a).
Table 5.5a Reasons for few love marriages in the past - Southwest^
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Reason % No
Girls were not allowed to go out unchaperoned 55 42
Young people had less freedom 19 15
Few opportunities for girls and boys to meet 4 3
Girls did not go to jobs 1 1
Children feared parents 6 5
Girls obeyed their parents 4 3
Girls were not educated 9 7
Did not know 4 3
Total 100 79
Note: 1 Welisara only.
Source: Primary analysis of Sri Lanka Demographic Change Project, 1985.
Most of the remaining answers also emphasized the lack of freedom 
given to the young and the unlikelihood of their forming relationships 
beyond those which their families created. Answers in the estates similarly 
emphasized the lack of freedom given to the young though there was less 
emphasis on chaperonage (Table 5.5b). There are a number of reasons for 
this latter difference, first that estate girls used to marry very early so 
chaperonage was less necessary, secondly that, as most girls worked, 
chaperonage would have been difficult (one possible reason for the former 
early marriage age), and thirdly that family and community attitudes were 
stricter and that therefore the young obeyed their families anyway, and 
hence chaperonage was of only secondary importance. When the women 
were asked the converse question, why love marriages had increased, they 
overwhelmingly said that the young today had more freedom (Table 5.6).
The somewhat greater range of answers given in the estates may 
indicate that the questions were asked and coded slightly differently though 
the survey went to considerable lengths to avoid leading questions, accepted 
open-ended answers and standardized the survey approach and coding. The
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main reason for it is that love marriage is still less acceptable in the estates 
than it is in the low country. Whereas the answers in the Southwest are 
overwhelmingly in terms of the young nowadays being allowed more 
freedom, there was more emphasis in the estates on the young not following 
tradition and parents not being able to control their children, though the 
answer that children have more freedom is common here too. Many of the 
additional answers are in terms of tradition and authority. That the estate 
parents are less willing to accept love matches is indicated by the much 
lower level of love marriages in the estates as compared to the low-country 
sample (see Table 5.1) despite the fairly late age at marriage nowadays in 
the estates.
Table 5.5b Reasons for few love marriages in the past - Estates
Reason % No
Young people had less freedom 22 13
Girls obeyed their parents 17 10
Girls were not allowed to go out unchaperoned 17 10
Few opportunities for girls and boys to meet 12 7
Children feared parents 8 5
Girls did not go to jobs 7 4
Parents protected young people 3 2
Girls were not educated 9 7
Did not know 12 7
Total 100 59
Source: Primary analysis of Sri Lanka Demographic Change Project, 1987.
An important sign of this increasing acceptance of love marriage by 
families and by society is that what defines marriage is changing. Whereas 
in the past marriage was defined in terms of mutual rights and obligations 
not only of the two individuals but also of the individuals with their families 
and between the families, it is now increasingly seen simply in terms of the 
two individuals themselves.
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Table 5.6 Reasons^ for the increase in love marriages, women over 55 years - 
Southwest^ and Estates
Reason % No
S ou th w est
Girls are allowed more freedom 42 33
Girls and boys both have more freedom 29 23
Girls go to school and tuition 18 14
Girls are disobedient 4 3
Girls go to jobs where they meet boys 2 2
Girls w ant to choose their own partners 1 1
More opportunities for girls and boys to meet 1 1
People are more lustful now 1 1
Don't know 1 1
Total 100 79
E states
Girls are allowed more freedom 7 4
Girls and boys both have more freedom 22 13
Girls go to school and tuition 8 5
Girls are disobedient 5 3
Girls go to jobs where they meet boys 5 3
Girls w ant to choose their own partners 2 1
More opportunities for girls and boys to meet 10 6
People are more lustful now 1 1
P aren ts cannot control their children 10 6
Girls and boys go to school 5 3
Girls leave home to work 5 3
Girls are educated, understand more 2 1
Young people are no longer protected 2 1
Young people do not respect tradition 2 1
Young people are influenced by films 2 1
Don't know 1 1
Total 100 59
Note: 1 First responses only.
2 Welisara only.
Source: Primary analysis of Sri Lanka Demographic Change Project, 1987.
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A love m arriage would not have been regarded as a m arriage bu t only 
as an elopement because it did not meet the criteria of a true m arriage. A 
m arriage involves certain rights and obligations between bride and groom 
and in  a family-based society between those individuals and their families 
themselves. The family would not have accepted a love m arriage because 
such a m arriage would have implied th a t the family’s in terests were 
secondary to the individual's interests, and therefore would not have 
entered into the reciprocal rights and obligations involved. In the past, 
m arriage paym ents were a very im portant sign of the recognition of 
m arriage; now they are increasingly seen as peripheral to m arriage, with 
dowry simply the bride's share of her family's inheritance.
5.7 The resp on sib ilities o f parents to ch ild ren  has ch anged  to 
encom pass m ore than  m arriage
The changes th a t have taken place whereby in the low country the 
young are now allowed greater freedom, were expressed by the respondents 
in term s of changes in family responsibilities. There seems to have been a 
subtle alteration in exactly w hat is m eant by family responsibilities. 
Parents continue to regard themselves as being responsible for the future 
welfare of their children but precisely w hat is concerned in this 
responsibility has changed; there have been corresponding changes in w hat 
the young owe their parents. In the past, and to some extent still, among 
the Muslims and the estate population parental responsibility m eant for 
boys prim arily a livelihood and for girls a good m arriage. Now it 
increasingly means education and to a lesser extent a good job. The change 
has been most m arked for girls. Interestingly, when women over 55 years 
were asked why age a t m arriage used to be earlier, two principal reasons 
were given: first th a t parents wanted to be free of responsibilities and 
second th a t girls did not have education. Parents now cannot simply fulfil 
their responsibilities by arranging m arriages for their daughters. In the
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estates the former reason was not given, probably because the respondents 
did not recognize any change in the family's responsibility with regard to 
m arriage.
The change in the family responsibility is a strong theme in the 
project's in-depth interviews. A. in Bondupitiya (Household No. 1005) 
comments th a t her m other m arried a t 13 because in those days 'paren ts 
were not educated and they wanted to be freed from the responsibility of 
their children'. She says of her own children (two boys and two girls) that, 
as long as the children are willing to study, she and her husband will pay 
for their education. She adds th a t their m ain expectation is for their 
children to obtain higher education and to have successful lives.
L. (Household No.7171), a widow living with her three daughters, son 
and adopted son, also aspires to get good jobs for her children. She paid for 
their education herself, so she w ants to see them  benefit by it. L ater she 
hopes to get them  m arried. H er own m arriage was a result, she says, of her 
parents' wish to be free from their responsibilities, so they decided to get her 
m arried. They gave her a dowry of three houses, one-and-a-half acres of 
land, furniture, gold jewellery and clothes. W hat stands out in L's example 
is that, whereas her parents seem to have seen their responsibilities to her 
as arranging her m arriage with a large dowry she sees her responsibilities 
prim arily as providing for her children's education and jobs and only 
secondly in term s of m arriage.
A sim ilar case is th a t of G. (Household No.5045). When asked what 
were the future hopes of her husband and herself, she said their only hopes 
were for their children's futures: to give them  a good education, to make 
them  good people and to arrange their m arriages. In S.’s case (Household 
No. 1001) her parents' concept of their responsibilities apparently had 
changed so radically th a t they wanted her to delay her m arriage as they
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hoped she would go to university. However, the changed nature of parent- 
children relations meant they had to accept her decision to marry. She 
expected that her own daughter would not marry until she was 25, because 
S. and her husband wanted their daughter to be educated and to get a job. 
They expect to give her a good education in the place of dowry. S. comments 
that if children have love affairs parents may not object, 'but they want 
them to have good habits and the ability to manage a family'. Her 
comments emphasize the point that parents now see their primary duty as 
equiping their children for life rather than marrying them off. Education is 
important not only for obtaining a better life through a good job and 
marriage but also because it makes the individuals better people, more able 
to manage their lives and their families, and it gives them good habits. The 
emphasis is very much on individuals rather than on the interests of the 
families. Of course, if the individual achieves high socio-economic status, 
that will reflect well on the family.
The interpretation given is subjective, being based on what is implicit 
rather than explicit in the statements of the three women, and reflects to 
some degree the nature of the questioning in the interviews which focused 
on the women's hopes for the future, and the circumstances of their 
marriages. A number of comments indicate that parents' expectations, or 
what they see as their responsibilities, have changed. A.S. and his wife D.S. 
(Household No.5035) want to give their girls a good education so they can 
have a good standard of living in the future. D.S., herself, however, could 
not continue her education because her parents did not believe that a girl 
needed to be educated for work. Similarly, Mrs P.'s parents (Household No. 
5033) took her out of school at grade 5 because they believed that girls did 
not need an education. In contrast to A.S. and D.S., the P.s took their 
daughter R. out of school because they wanted her to marry; however, this
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was after grade 10. R., herself, says she wants to give her daughter higher 
education.
Judging from these examples, parents in the past did not believe that 
girls needed to be educated. The reason given by A.S. and D.S. for parents 
not educating daughters was the belief that girls did not need to be 
educated for work. In part, this, no doubt, was simply that jobs for women 
requiring education did not exist, but more fundamental was a belief that 
women should not get jobs anyway and that therefore educating girls was a 
waste of time.
Moreover, education for girls was perceived as having serious 
drawbacks. S. (Household No.5025) said of her mother A.P. aged 85 years 
in 1985 that in her youth she did not receive much education because in 
those days girls were very protected and restricted. If a girl fell in love it 
would bring shame on her family so she was kept at home and could not 
study.
The risk lay both in the girl not being directly under the eye of the 
family and in education itself. It was unnecessary for girls to go to school 
but, worse, schooling tended to inculcate unsuitable ideas. Educated 
children tended to be more assertive, less obedient to parents, and, in due 
course, to husbands, and to become cut off from family - more independent. 
This argument is largely speculative, for, even though such views exist in 
many countries including India, they are not now prevalent in Sri Lanka. It 
is true that, when we asked women over 55 years what changes had caused 
age at marriage to rise, one answer was that education makes girls more 
independent, but the view that this was a bad thing was virtually never 
expressed.
Some Muslims and Tamils were sceptical of the value of education for 
girls but they never claimed that the values inculcated by education of girls
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were morally bad, though it is implicit in some of their statements. For 
instance, A.W. (Household No.2027) said that
according to Muslim custom, parents must arrange the marriages of their 
children. Otherwise, they cannot receive God's pleasure. So the parents 
take great care of their daughters. The do not send the girls to school after 
menarche. If they want to go anywhere they must be accompanied by 
someone. The girls are protected under the parents' care at all times.
Muslim parents do not consider that girls should be educated. The parents 
want to protect the girls until their marriages.
That is, for girls, marriage is more important than education and, to 
the extent that education conflicts with this objective, it must be secondary. 
The implication is that, if girls attended school, questions might be raised 
about their virtue and that, anyway, education is of little use for girls as the 
jobs made available by education, which would be outside the home, would 
be in conflict with the role of a married woman. There is no reference to 
whether the ideas inculcated by education are contrary to a Muslim 
woman's role but equally there is no suggestion that they in any way 
enhance it.
What is striking about such views is not that they exist but that they 
are so rare and when they are expressed it is in such a muted form. Most 
Sri Lankans including virtually all Sinhalese, nowadays, see no conflict 
between education and marriage and indeed would not regard education as 
conflicting with a woman's role, either as a wife or otherwise, but as 
enhancing it. A common statement by the respondents was that education 
made a person a better person. W.P. and G.P. (Household No.5045) said 
that their only hopes were for their children's future: to give them a good 
education, make them good people, and arrange their marriages. Education 
is regarded as necessary nowadays for a good life, good habits, and a 
successful future, whereas marriage itself, though desirable, is no longer 
wholly the family's responsibility.
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The more important difference is not between those who regard 
education as bad and those who regard it as good, but between those who 
regard it as necessary and those who regard it as unimportant. Quite a 
common reaction in the in-depth interviews to the question as to why the 
child left school, especially among the poorer families, was that the child 
was not interested in schooling. Though there may be little point in sending 
a child to school if he or she will simply play truant, this attitude seems to 
indicate that the family is not very interested in encouraging the child's 
education. Similarly, a number of families said that a child could not go to 
school because he or she had to work or help look after the younger children. 
While for the poor this undoubtedly has some validity it again indicates that 
education is accorded a low priority by these families. Surprisingly few 
respondents, however, felt this way and there was general acceptance that 
families should provide what education they could.
When we asked respondents 'what is more important for girls, a good 
marriage or good education?', the overwhelming majority said a good 
education. In Southwestern Sri Lanka (Welisara only), of 347 respondents 
who answered the question, 26 per cent said that marriage was more 
important, 61 per cent that education was, 11 per cent that they were 
equally important (or unimportant), while 1 per cent insisted that a job was 
more important than either (clearly this percentage would have been much 
higher if the question had explicitly allowed for this possibility). In the 
estates the percentage was curiously even higher: of 248 respondents, 17 per 
cent regarded marriage as more important, 74 per cent education as more 
important, and 9 per cent said that they were equally important. The very 
high figure in the estates seems surprising in view of the low levels of 
education actually prevailing there. From another point of view it may not 
be so surprising. While every girl on the estates is expected to marry 
eventually, her marriage will not fundamentally alter her life: she, after all,
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is likely to be the m ain income earner in the household. In contrast, 
education could potentially be the passport to a better life; the fact th a t this 
does not happen may simply indicate th a t the opportunities are not there. 
To go beyond prim ary school in Tamil medium, for example, it is necessary 
to go to the nearby town and most parents are reluctan t for girls to do so. 
Furtherm ore, achieving good grades is likely to require expenditure, 
particularly on private tuition th a t few families can afford. While her 
education may benefit the girl, it will not benefit her family who often 
depend on her income.
The general acceptance of the prim ary importance of education is 
indicated by Table 5.7 on 'w h at is more im portant to a girl: m arriage or 
education?’. It m ight have been expected th a t the less educated would have 
been less oriented to education but there is very little sign of this. A similar 
proportion of the less educated to th a t of the highly educated emphasize the 
importance of education. Perhaps it is the uneducated who truly  know the 
value of education, or perhaps the strategic m arriage to obtain a truly 
desirable groom retains its importance most among the better educated, 
who can hope to obtain such a match. Above all the belief in education 
dem onstrates the virtually universal orientation of the respondents to the 
new urban-based society, in which education is a vital a ttribute; and the 
fact th a t the old traditional village-based society no longer exists.
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Table 5.7 What is more important to a girl: marriage or education, by years of 
education of her parents
S o u th w est1
Education of Head Male of H ousehold
0-6 7-9 10+
Girls' Needs No % No % No %
M arriage 10 19 24 25 42 27
Education 35 67 58 60 98 64
Equal importance 7 13 14 14 12 8
Good job 0 0 1 1 1 1
Total 52 100 97 100 153 100
Education of Head Female of Household
0-6 7-9 10+
Girls' Needs No % No % No %
M arriage 20 20 33 34 37 27
Education 69 69 52 54 83 61
Equal importance 10 10 11 11 15 11
Good job 1 1 0 0 2 1
Total 100 100 96 100 137 100
E states
Education of Head Male of H ousehold
0-3 4-6 7+
Girls Needs No % No % No %
Marriage 15 25 15 16 4 11
Education 41 68 71 77 25 71
Equal importance 3 5 5 5 4 11
Good job 1 2 1 1 2 6
Total 60 100 92 100 35 100
Education of Head Female of Household
0 1-3 4+
Girls Needs No % No % No %
M arriage 9 24 6 21 3 7
Education 26 70 18 64 35 80
Equal importance 2 5 3 11 6 17
Good job 0 0 1 4 1 2
Total 37 100 28 100 44 100
Notes: The respondent is the head female of the household.
1 Welisara only.
Source: Primary Analysis of the Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1985 and
1987.
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While there is little difference by education level in the importance 
placed on whether a girl needs education or marriage more, there is a 
striking difference when the question is cross-tabulated by religion (Table 
5.8).
Table 5.8 What is more important to a girl: marriage or education, by religion
Buddhist 
No %
Religion 
Hindu 
No %
Muslim 
No %
Christian 
No %
S ou th w est (W elisara)
Girls' Needs
Marriage 36 23 9 50 7 39 40 26
Education 104 66 6 33 9 50 94 61
Equal importance 15 10 3 17 2 11 19 12
Good job 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
Total 157 100 18 100 18 100 154 100
E states
Marriage 5 7 31 21
Education 59 82 106 71
Equal importance 5 7 10 7
Good job 3 4 2 1
Total 72 100 149 100
Note: The respondent is the head female of the household.
Source: Primary analysis of the Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1985 and
1987.
Muslims, and especially Hindus, in Southwestern Sri Lanka, place 
much more emphasis on the importance of marriage for a girl than do 
Buddhists or Christians. On the estates, however, Hindus are almost as 
likely as Buddhists to emphasize education over marriage. The figures in 
Welisara are in keeping with the much higher proportion of arranged 
marriages amongst Muslims and Hindus; they support the statements from
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the in-depth interviews in which Muslims emphasize the importance of 
m arriage over education, as they show in w ithdrawing daughters from 
school so th a t nothing can happen which would affect their marriageability. 
Again, though, caution is required. In the estates, where arranged m arriage 
is prevalent, few parents rate m arriage over education. Moreover, when the 
same question on w hat is more im portant for a girl was cross-tabulated by 
w hether the household head's m arriage had been arranged or was a love 
m arriage, those who had had love m arriages favoured education only 
m arginally more than  those who had arranged m arriages. Surprisingly, 
there is very little difference in answers to the question by the education of 
the head and head female of the household, indicating the overwhelming 
acceptance of the primacy of education.
In brief, the decline in arranged m arriage in the low-country 
apparently is evidence of a shift from a situation where the family's prim ary 
responsibility was to ensure th a t children m arried well to one where its 
prim ary responsibility is to ensure th a t they have the attributes, especially 
education, necessary to prosper. In contrast to the low-country, in the 
estates, m arriage is still predom inantly arranged and parental 
responsibility is still prim arily concerned with m arriage. This is admittedly 
a responsibility th a t they are apparently increasingly reluctant to fulfil as 
indicated by the rising m arriage age and the comments noted earlier about 
the failure of some parents to put the in terests of their children ahead of 
their own. The question th a t needs to be answered is why did concepts of 
responsibility change in the low-country bu t not in the estates?
One answer is th a t there was much less concern with female morality 
and with the necessity for m arriage w ithin the same caste in the low- 
country than  in the estates, which allowed families to withdraw from 
making decisions concerning m arriage. To some extent this is true in th a t 
estate parents express much more concern about the dangers of daughters
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eloping and the risks of unsuitable marriages though this may also reflect 
the fact that there are economic advantages for them in keeping control of 
their children's marriages. It is also true that in the low-country historical 
and anthropological writings indicate there were greater concerns in the 
past about unsuitable marriages across caste lines or with lower-status 
families within the same caste. There clearly has been an important change 
in the pressure exerted on the family regarding the protection of family 
status. In the past a family that failed to ensure that its reputation was 
intact was subjected to heavy censure and even social ostracism by the local 
community. Nevertheless, this point should not be overemphasized. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, Sri Lankans in general and the Sinhalese in 
particular never seem to have placed as much emphasis on sexual morality 
or correct marriage in terms of caste and family status as is the case 
elsewhere in South Asia. Although the estate population is largely of Indian 
origin they too place less emphasis on these points, presumably because of 
their predominantly low-caste composition. Significantly they have been 
willing to delay their daughters' marriages and thereby risk elopement so 
this would not seem an adequate explanation as to why arranged marriage 
has declined in the low country but not on the estates.
A more important explanation for the change in the family's 
perception of its responsibility to children in the low country has been the 
increased importance of individual attributes. This reflects the increasing 
weakness of concepts of family and caste as well as the emergence of a social 
hierarchy in which social and economic success depends to a much greater 
degree than previously on the individual's own capacity. In the old 
situation the greatest assistance that could have been provided to an 
individual by his or her family was direct assistance in gaining a livelihood 
often through access to family property and assistance with a marriage, 
which itself depended upon family resources and status. In the new
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situation the family can only assist indirectly by enabling the individual to 
get the attributes necessary to be successful, especially education.
5.8 It is  no longer approp iate for fam ilies to arrange m arriages
The implication for marriage is that it is not necessary for families to 
arrange marriages any longer. To achieve a desirable marriage no longer 
depends specifically upon what the family can bring to it. Hence, it is not 
necessary for the family to be actively involved in organizing the marriage. 
Nor does the family have to be involved to protect its reputation and hence 
the possible marriages of other family members.
Furthermore, the family is no longer in a particularly good situation 
to determine marriage. The very nature and purpose of marriage has 
changed from one in which family interests are dominant to one in which 
individual interests are, and partly as a consequence of this, the family is no 
longer in such an advantageous position vis a vis the individual to 
determine who would be the ideal partner.
In the past the attributes which mattered were ones which the family 
was best placed to determine, matters like family background, and caste 
status, as well as a man's reputation; particularly as the young were not in 
a good position to determine many of these matters themselves. After all, 
dating and courting were virtually non-existent. While conditions were not 
as restrictive as in India, too much contact with the opposite sex was 
discouraged in case it led to gossip or, worse, elopement: these, of course, 
are the reasons why chaperonage existed. The earlier age at marriage also 
meant that those marrying were less experienced concerning the attractions 
of marriage partners.
Marriages are increasingly concerned with the conjugal relationship, 
so it is sensible that the couples themselves do the choosing. Table 5.9 lists
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responses to the question 'What are the advantages in love marriages for 
the couple?' By far the most common answer is that the young choose a 
compatible partner, somebody they can understand, with the only other 
significant answer in favour of love marriage being that it gives the young 
greater independence, allows them to plan their own lives and, in the 
estates, gives greater freedom of choice. The estate population was largely 
in agreement with the low-country population on most answers. In line 
with their lower proportion of love marriages, a higher proportion of the 
estate population could see no advantages in love marriages. Unlike the 
low-country population no one in the estates could see no disadvantages in 
love matches. Thus the prime perceived advantage of a love marriage for 
the young couple is that they are better able to choose a compatible partner.
Table 5.9a Advantages of love marriages for the young couple - Southwest^
A dvantages No. P ercen t
Compatibility/ can understand each other 551 82
Independence/can plan their own lives 
Good if they are compatible/depends
62 9
on their character 8 1
No dowry
No problems/no more problems than
8 1
an arranged marriage 
Can have a better life than parents/
5 1
no problems if they are rich 4 1
No advantages 35 5
Total 673 100
Notes: The respondent is the head female of the household.
1 Loluwagoda and Welisara only.
Source: Primary analysis of Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1985.
The need for the young to spend much more of their lives outside 
their local communities has made it more difficult for their families to 
choose suitable partners for them. In a local community families can use
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their local knowledge and contacts to choose an appropiate m arriage 
partner but today individuals often exist in very different contexts from the 
rest of their families. A highly educated young person may well be in a 
much better position to choose a m arriage partner than  his or her family 
members; the other family members, particularly the older ones, may well 
not have the requisite knowledge and experience to choose a suitable bride 
or groom. One reason why arranged m arriage may be more common in the 
estates is th a t the m arriage pool is so localized th a t the family will know 
virtually all the potential candidates, but this is not the case in the 
Southwest.
Table 5.9b Advantages of love marriages for the young couple - Estates
A dvantages No. P ercen t
Compatibility/ can understand each other 162 67
Independence/can plan their own lives/ 
freedom of choice 26 11
Good if they are compatible/depends 
on their character 4 2
No dowry 3 1
No problems/No more problems than  
an arranged m arriage 0 0
Love m arriages seem to work better 
than  arranged m arriages 1
Can live away from parents 1
Can prosper if they work hard 1
Can spend their earnings on themselves, 
not give to parents 1
No advantages 36 15
Total 242 100
Note: The respondent is the head female of the household.
Source: Primary analysis of Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1987.
The acceptance of love m arriage has become self-reinforcing. Once it 
has become accepted and even desirable to choose one's own partner, 
arranged m arriage has tended to become the preserve of those who find it
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difficult to m arry and those who have much a t stake, particularly  property; 
this type of m arriage has much in common with the family alliance th a t has 
always been associated with arranged m arriage. People without property 
will very likely find it easier to m arry a desirable spouse through a love 
m arriage than  an arranged marriage.
However, while the conjugal relationship has become more im portant, 
the aims of Sri Lankan m arriage still differ significantly from what 
increasingly are the aims of W estern m arriage, as exemplified by the 
phenomenon of the yuppies. The modern love m arriage of Sri Lanka, while 
a somewhat rom antic notion, is essentially related to having children. The 
prospective groom should be a good potential father and the bride a good 
potential mother. Their families will have in terests in these aims too and 
will w ant to veto any partners who are judged to be undesirable by these 
criteria.
The increased importance of individual a ttribu tes has m eant tha t 
families are in a weaker position to arrange m arriages than  earlier and 
have less need to do so: there is less advantage nowadays to be gained from 
arranging a m arriage. This is clearly true for the young, who can get w hat 
they desire in a m arriage partner more effectively through a love m arriage. 
W hat they lose through having a love m arriage, the active involvement of 
the family in the m arriage arrangem ents and in support provided after the 
m arriage, is less im portant than  it was. Not only do the young w ant it but 
the parents, and society, are willing to accept love m arriage. Why so many 
families no longer feel the need to be involved in m arriage, or even prefer 
not to be involved, can be understood in term s of the changing overall costs 
and benefits of arranged m arriage for the family.
Reference has already been made to the advantages and 
disadvantages of love m arriages for the young (Tables 5.4 and 5.9).
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Respondents were also asked what were the advantages and disadvantages 
of love matches for parents; the results are shown in Tables 5.10 and 5.11. 
In these tables all answers have been included (on the left hand side) but to 
facilitate interpretation they have also been grouped into larger categories 
(on the right-hand side).
The responses indicate that families are increasingly finding that the 
costs of arranging a marriage exceed the benefits. In Table 5.10 four 
principal disadvantages of love marriages for parents are given: that an 
unsuitable partner may be chosen; that parents will be worried if the couple 
have problems; that young people who have love marriages do not provide 
assistance; and that love marriages indicate rejection by their children and 
this is a cause of shame.
As was noted above, concerns that an unsuitable partner may be 
chosen are less relevant now than they were. The dangers in choosing a 
wrong match, especially with regard to caste and family status, are much 
less than they were, and family property is less significant to material and 
social success.
Social changes as well as the general change in the socio-economic 
system also mean that family support is much less important than it was. 
This is true of both the assistance provided by families to children and 
assistance provided by children to parents, as is shown by the fact that two 
of the principal answers as to the disadvantages of love matches to parents 
were that they are unable to assist the young and that the young will not 
assist them. The reduced significance of family assistance lessens the 
advantages of arranged marriage for the young and make them less inclined 
to accept the disadvantages of arranged marriage, particularly family 
interference and the selection of a spouse who may meet family criteria but 
not their own. It will also lessen the advantages to parents of arranged
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marriages while not reducing their economic and emotional costs, especially 
the assistance that they are now committed to providing to the young 
couple. Few families would probably conceive of the equation in such crude 
terms, and most would be willing to accept the responsibilities involved in 
arranging marriages if required, but these underlying realities mean that 
families are more willing to accept the desire of the young for love matches.
The one response that may be impervious to such change is the 
answer that love marriage implies for the parents rejection by children or 
shame. While this answer is undoubtedly affected by outside community 
attitudes, and changes therein, it would seem to be much more concerned 
with intra-family relations. This may be the critical factor which 
determines whether the conditions exist which allow for love marriage. 
Despite its apparent immutability, concepts of shame may be affected over 
time by the overall advantages and disadvantages of love marriage.
Significantly, rejection by children or shame is a more common 
answer in the estates where family structure is tighter, on the Indian 
model, and where love marriage is less accepted and less common. It is 
clear from the in-depth interviews in the estates that this is where the 
greatest ill-feeling concerning love marriage exists. The reason for this may 
be that the young have much less to lose from love marriage than the old; as 
noted in Chapter 4, the earnings of the daughters can be a major 
contribution to household income. Furthermore, many of the elderly in the 
estates suffer from poverty and isolation; this is reflected in the particularly 
high number of respondents in the estates who cited the principal 
disadvantage of love marriage for parents being that young people do not 
help them. Where the parents have little to lose, shame may be less of a 
factor in preventing love marriage.
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Table 5.10a Disadvantages of love marriages for parents - Southwest.
Disadvantage N % N %
Unsuitable partner may be selected 189 28
Parents distressed by cross-caste/
cross-religious marriages 17 3
Can't check caste/religion/property 28 4
Parents disappointed in hope for
good match 57 8
Can't check horoscopes 5 1
Have to help if they marry poor persons 16 2
Marriage may fail, parents have to
support/son/daughter/grandchildren 61 9
Have to help with marital problems 5 1
Worried if  couple have problems 154 23
Parents worried if young people
have problems 129 19
Worry about children's future 11 2
Parents unable to interfere/solve
couple's problems 10 1
Parents worry that daughter might
be deserted/mistreated 4 1
Rejection by children/shame 118 17
Ashamed/can't face children 23 3
Antagonism from children 10 1
Not much contact with children/
grandchildren 1 0
If couple live with parents,
discord between generations 1 0
Parents distressed by children not
consulting them 44 6
Parents disappointed at children's
ingratitude /disobedience 8 1
They will be sad/angry 34 5
Young people do not provide assistance 58 9
Young people don't help them 58 9
In-law problems 9 1
Incompatibility with in-law family 7 1
May have to bear whole burden of
supporting couple if parents-in-law
reject them 2 0
Dowry/property problems 2 0
Disappointed in hope for dowry 1 0
Property and dowry problems 1 0
Family duties not fulfilled 5 1 5 1
No disadvantages 140 21 140 21
Total 678 100 678 100
Note: The respondent is the head female of the household.
Source: Primary analysis of Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1985.
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Table 5.10b Disadvantages of love m arriages for parents - Estates.
Disadvantage N % N %
Unsuitable partner may be selected 50 21
Parents distressed by cross-caste/
cross-religious marriages 19 8
Can’t check caste/religion/property 0 0
Parents disappointed in hope for
good match 8 3
Can't check horoscopes 0 0
Have to help if they marry poor persons 3 1
Marriage may fail, parents have to
support/son/daughter/grandchildren 19 8
Have to help with marital problems 1 0
Worried if couple have problems 45 19
Parents worried if young people
have problems 35 15
Worry about children's future 3 1
Parents unable to interfere/solve
couple's problems 6 3
Parents worry that daughter might
be deserted/mistreated 1 0
R ejection by children/shame 67 29
Ashamed/can't face children 19 8
Antagonism from children 2 1
Not much contact with children/
grandchildren 8 3
Parents distressed by children not
consulting them 13 6
Parents disappointed at children's
ingratitude /disobedience 2 1
They will be sad/angry 14 6
Loss of respect from society 8 3
If children don't marry according to
custom parents will die early 1 0
Young people do not provide assistance 43 18
Young people don't help them 43 18
Dowry/property problems 1 0
Disappointed in hope for dowry
property and dowry problems 1 0
Family duties not fulfilled 0 0
Family duties not fulfilled 0 0
No disadvantages 27 12 27 12
Total 233 100 233 100
Note: The respondent is the head female of the household.
Source: Primary analysis of Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1987.
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While the costs of love m arriage have declined for parents there are 
also certain benefits as outlined in Table 5.11. For parents the main 
advantages of a love m arriage are th a t it is less expensive and, in particular 
for parents of the bride, th a t no dowry is involved, th a t it frees parents of 
responsibility for the m arriage, and that, provided the young people are 
happy, the parents will be happy too.
The reduction in responsibility is largely self-explanatory. If the 
family does not arrange the m arriage it has less responsibility for the 
consequences if it goes wrong. M arriage in this case belongs to the realm  of 
the individual ra ther than  to th a t of the family.
Table 5.1 la Advantages of love marriages for parents - Southwest.
Advantage N % N %
No dowry/less expensive
No dowry 130 19
302 45
No dowry/wedding expenses 151 22
Less expensive 21 3
Less responsibility
Freed of responsibility 178 26
215 32
No blame if marriage not successful 5 1
Not asked for help by family 3 0
No worries 29 4
Happy if young people happy
Happy if young people happy 90 13
90 13
Young people can live well 
and help parents
Young people can live well 3 0
3 0
and help parents
Depends on circumstances
Depends on circumstances 1 0
1 0
No advantage
No advantage 64 9
64 9
Total 675 100 675 100
Note: The respondent is the head female of the household.
Source: Primary analysis of Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1985.
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Table 5.11b Advantages of love marriages for parents - Estates.
A dvantage N % N %
No dow ry/less exp en sive  
No dowry 16 7
70 29
No dowry/wedding expenses 48 20
Less expensive 6 2
Less resp on sib ility
Freed of responsibility 41 17
49 20
Not asked for help by family 7 3
No worries 1 0
H appy if  you n g  peop le  happy
Happy if young people happy 29 12
29 12
Y oung people can  live  w ell 
and h elp  parents
12 5
Young people can live well 12 5
and help parents 
D epends on c ircu m stan ces
Depends on circumstances 1 0
1 0
Don't have to arrange m arriages
Don't have to arrange marriages 4 2
4 2
No advantage
No advantage 76 32
76 32
Total 241 100 241 100
Note: The respondent is the head female of the household.
Source: Primary analysis of Sri Lankan Demographic Change Project, 1987.
The differences between the Southwest sample and the estates are 
not large in terms of the relative importance attributed to the principal 
advantages of love marriage. The big difference is in the much higher 
proportion in the estates who can see no advantages, an answer that reflects 
the points made above regarding the disadvantages of love marriages for 
parents.
The responses concerning the advantages of love marriages for 
parents imply that they are felt less deeply than are the disadvantages of 
love marriage. It is only when the disadvantages count for little that the 
advantages make themselves felt.
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In summary, it may be said th a t arranged m arriage has declined 
because it is no longer in the in terests of the young to m aintain it, and, more 
im portantly, because it is no longer in  the in terests of the old to seek 
actively to m aintain it if the young do not desire it.
5.9 The reg istra tion  o f m arriage as a force for leg itim atin g  love  
m arriage
A factor th a t should not be underestim ated in legitimizing love 
m arriage has been the registration of m arriage. Until recently, m arriage in 
Sri Lanka generally did not involve legal sanction of the state. Marriage 
was in essence a m atter simply of w hether the family and the society 
recognized it as such.
The introduction of the registration of m arriage by the European 
colonial m asters m eant th a t for the first time the state  was involved in the 
recognition of m arriage. The consequence of this has been to allow couples 
21 years and over (Jayasuriya, 1976: 320) to register their m arriages 
contrary to the wishes of their parents. Nowadays families and society 
accept, albeit begrudgingly, registered m arriage as real m arriage, although 
they m ay still refuse to associate with the newly m arried couple.
In this area the reaction in Sri Lanka has been very different from 
elsewhere in South Asia. In India, for instance, the registration of m arriage 
is regarded as of little importance by anyone other than  bureaucrats and 
demographers; yet in Sri Lanka, the registration of m arriage is increasingly 
felt to be a necessity. Several reasons can be suggested for this difference. 
One is th a t the breakdown of the local community, which has gone much 
further in Sri Lanka than  in India, has brought w ith it a greater acceptance 
of state  authority  a t the individual level. This may explain why in Pul 
Eliya, the remote village studied by Leach (1971), and, in Terutenna, the 
equally remote village studied by Yalman (1971), both in the 1950s,
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m arriage registration was not taken seriously, whereas in the project s 1985 
sample in the low country it was.
A second reason is th a t m arriage among Sri Lanka's majority 
Buddhist community is not a religious rite as it is among Hindus who form 
the m ajority religious community in India. Because, among Hindus, 
m arriage involves a religious rite, the state 's recognition of m arriage m ust 
rem ain secondary, indeed virtually irrelevant. In contrast, where m arriage 
had not received the im prim atur of religious sanction, the sanction of the 
state is likely to count for more.
The critical point, though, is tha t, if a registered m arriage were 
perceived to be totally contrary to the in terests of the family, they would 
undoubtedly not have accepted it. The acceptance of the registration of 
m arriage as to some extent legitimizing m arriage is an indication th a t the 
relationship of the family to m arriage is changing, and th a t families are 
accepting m arriage as being prim arily an individual concern.
5.10 The in flu en ce  o f fam ily structure on ch an ges in  the  
arrangem ent o f m arriage
So far, I have dealt with changes in the comparative advantages and 
disadvantages of love and arranged m arriages and how this has resulted in 
the decline of arranged m arriage in Sri Lanka. I now deal with the specific 
question why arranged m arriage has declined so much further and more 
dram atically in Sri Lanka than  elsewhere in South Asia. To do this, a much 
wider view of w hat determ ines the overall advantages of a particu lar type of 
m arriage is necessary.
An obvious factor th a t reduced the advantages of arranged m arriage 
was the am ount of commercialization in Sri Lanka. However, as other 
South Asian regions such as G ujarat, Bombay and Kerala have had long 
histories of comparable commercial development but have not experienced
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similar changes in their marriage systems, this cannot have been the key 
determinant.
More important has probably been the much stronger emphasis 
elsewhere in South Asia on female sexual morality which in India is related 
to the much greater emphasis on ascribed status particularly as pertaining 
to caste. Parents want to control their children's (or at least daughters') 
sexuality, thus inhibiting the development of courtship institutions needed 
for self-selection in marriage. Even more important is the great concern to 
the parents as to who is actually chosen as the marriage partner.
Though concern about sexual morality and about ascribed status are 
undoubtedly important, it is unlikely that they are the entire explanation 
for the weakness of arranged marriage in Sri Lanka compared with other 
parts of South Asia. Almost certainly pre-existing differences in family 
structure are also important. The decline of arranged marriage was 
discussed in Section 5.8 in terms of the net benefits of arranged and love 
marriage to the older and younger generations. The precise benefits and 
costs of arranged marriage in this situation depend upon the overall 
structure of the family. Arranged marriage seems to have broken down to a 
much greater degree than elsewhere in South Asia because of a number of 
economic and ideological changes superimposed on top of a social system, 
particularly a family system, that was always different.
The reason why the family and the couple in Sri Lanka now have 
little to gain from marriage is partly that economic changes have led to the 
decline of the family as the primary unit of production and hence families 
are no longer so concerned about whether their son-in-law or daughter-in- 
law will be a productive member of the household. However, the nature of 
family relations also has a major bearing on the advantages of arranged 
marriage for the older generation. In Sri Lanka the old seem always to
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have gained comparatively little in m aterial term s from the m arriages of 
their children. In the Sri Lankan family, or a t least the Sinhalese family, 
nowadays the emphasis is on the individual, whereas in India the emphasis 
is more on the individual being a part of a larger whole, the joint family. 
Apart from the greater acceptance of love m arriage, family members 
generally seem to have more autonomy in Sri Lanka than  in India. Field 
work in South India indicated th a t most families expected unm arried sons 
and especially daughters to give all their earnings to their parents, who had 
responsibility for the family budget. This was even true of m arried children 
while they were still living in the same household. When the children 
wished to buy something, or ra ther when the children needed something, 
the family would buy it. From the viewpoint of the family it was not the 
children's money to keep. The family provided all and in retu rn  the children 
were expected to provide all they had to the family. In a sense it was not 
theirs to dispose of, as w hat they had was due to their family's efforts. The 
family provided for them  as its wards and they in tu rn  served to advance its 
interests. From the parents' viewpoint it is not unreasonable to say th a t the 
child does owe the family everything as an individual's position in an Indian 
village is largely a consequence of family property and family status. 
Furtherm ore, to allow children to keep their earnings would not only allow 
frivolous expenditure - any expenditure which did not advance family 
in terests - but was positively dangerous in th a t it m ight allow loose living: 
any behaviour which did not strictly conform to family morality.
In contrast, among the Sinhalese, families generally expect children 
to keep part or all of their income. W hat the children contribute to the 
family budget is left largely to them. Not surprisingly, this is to some 
extent affected by circumstance and income but not wholly. For example, if 
a family is having economic difficulties, an older child might assume 
responsibility for feeding and educating some of his or her younger siblings
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ra ther than  directly contributing to the family budget. Furtherm ore, the 
testimony of the old suggests th a t this is not a recent change.
While the outcome m ight seem the same there are different 
implications. F irst, there is a recognition involved in Sri Lanka of individual 
autonomy. The children assist the family not because it is their duty but 
because they wish to. Secondly, the expenditure of the older sibling is 
directed towards assisting the younger siblings ra ther than  the family. It is 
the individuals who are being assisted, not the family. Thirdly, there is a 
difference in term s of who owes whom what. In South India, the family 
provides for all and the individual members owe all they have to the family. 
In Sri Lanka, it is, in a sense, the family which m ust be grateful for having 
been relieved of some its burden. Furtherm ore, the younger siblings who 
are the beneficiaries of their older siblings' largesse are in debt to them  and 
not to their families.
U nfortunately the economic independence of individuals was not a 
point th a t the in-depth interviews concentrated on, although it was a m atter 
I explored by participant observation and discussion. It was, however, a 
point examined by Yalman (1971: 97) who rem arked of the Kandyan 
Sinhalese th a t
A notable feature of the Kandyan family arrangements is that each married 
individual has a private income. This private income, usually in the form of 
grain, is stored in private granaries to which only the spouse has access.
He adds (1971: 103) th a t
the unit of food consumption in the Kandyan village consists of a wife, 
unmarried children, and a husband. It always has separate granaries and 
it has a separate cooking place. Every married woman has her own pots 
and separate cooking place. The cooking area is private and other women 
may use it only with express permission. All else may be shared, but 
granaries and cooking may never be shared. Thus the nuclear family, the 
basic commensal group, is the most clearly drawn cell in the village. It is 
referred to as the ge in Sinhalese.
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These descriptions are in striking contrast to the Hindu joint family where 
property is held in common.
There are two implications in this for the arrangem ent of marriage. 
The first is th a t the acceptance of the right of the individual to his or her 
own income implies some acceptance of the right to choose one's own 
partner, and, secondly, th a t there were few direct gains from the control of 
children's m arriages. W hat was gained was very much according to 
children's own volition. If the children strongly desired a love match, then it 
was not in the parents' in terests to resist it. An arranged m arriage was 
more costly still for them  once they could no longer ensure th a t the children 
supported them. It was more in their in terests to m aintain a good 
relationship with their children so th a t the la tte r would assist their parents 
out of a sense of obligation.
This helps to explain some of the differences between the estates and 
the low country in term s of attitudes to arranged m arriage. In the estates 
arranged m arriage was of much greater benefit to the parents not simply 
because of the value of female labour but also because, as an Indian 
im m igrant community, the earnings of all family members were retained by 
the family as a whole.
5.11 Who is the family?
The issue of the responsibilities, rights and in terests of the family in 
regard to the young raises the question whom or w hat is m eant when 
referring to the family. In th is thesis the in terests of the individual have 
been contrasted with those of the family, yet the family itself consists of a 
num ber of individuals, each with their own interests. C ertain of the family 
members, particularly the parents, have much greater responsibilities and 
in terests in family concerns, such as m arriage, than  others. They also have 
much more say in family decisions including arranging a m arriage. Many of
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the questions directed to respondents regarding arranged m arriage were for 
this reason pu t in term s of the advantages and disadvantages for the 
parents and the young couple. Nevertheless, it would be oversimplifying 
m atters to identify the family purely with the parents because all family 
members have an interest, and even some input, in the decisions of the 
family.
However, who has an input into m arriage decisions clearly is 
im portant in term s of how the family's in terests are perceived and 
implemented. Differences in how the m arriage decision is made may 
influence the family's involvement in m arriage and even age a t m arriage. 
Arguably there are im portant differences in this regard between Sri Lankan 
families and the Indian families, and possibly between Sri Lankan families 
now and formerly.
In Section 5.10 it was noted th a t the Sinhalese lack an extended joint 
family of the type th a t is an ideal in India. Individual family members have 
considerable autonomy particularly in financial affairs, and for the income 
they provide the family, the family is in m any ways indebted to them. This 
autonomy of action is associated with the lack of a strongly centralized 
patriarchal authority. While the parents, particularly the father, ultim ately 
bear responsibility for the decisions made, the views of, a t least, the 
imm ediate family members are taken into account, as they all have an 
in terest in the decision. The seriousness with which their views are 
considered will reflect their seniority within the family; sibilings older than  
the individual m arrying will be more carefully consulted, especially if  they 
are educated and regarded as having something useful to contribute. This 
is particularly so if they are contributing economically to the family. The 
input of the males is perhaps taken most seriously but the views of the 
females of the family, particularly the m other bu t also daughters, are 
considered as they are regarded as being better judges than  the males of
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w hat a daughter needs or w hat is desirable in a daughter-in-law. The 
situation is probably somewhat different where family property is involved, 
but this is less im portant than  it was. The grandparents and more d istant 
relations are not normally involved in the initial m arriage negotiations but 
it is polite to invite them  to the formal meeting where the intended groom 
and his family or the family of the intended bride come to the family house. 
This is when the final decision on w hether to go ahead with the m arriage is 
made. The relatives are, however, expected to be on their best behaviour 
and not to interfere.
The difference between this situation and w hat in my experience 
prevails more generally in South Asia is the g reater say given to the more 
junior members of the family, and the relatively little attention given to 
grandparents and more d istan t kin. These are two sides of the same 
principle; a family system where each nuclear un it is essentially 
autonomous. Parents and children reta in  various responsibilities toward 
each other after m arriage and all have an in terest in family property but 
they do recognize the essential separateness of the conjugal un it including 
decisions concerning the m arriage of grandchildren. The relative autonomy 
seems in p art to be related to lack of lineage system but it is possible th a t 
when landed property and family sta tus were more im portant and the local 
community stronger the grandparents and more d istan t kin had more 
reason to be concerned and were more involved.
Where grandparents and especially more d istan t kin are involved in 
m arriage they will inevitably place more emphssis on family concerns than  
on individual ones. They will be much more concerned with issues of 
property and sta tus than  with the individual per se. The imm ediate family 
is also concerned with family issues but they have a more direct concern 
with the in terests of the individual too. I t is the imm ediate family who will 
have to bear the direct costs of any assistance the young couple require, and
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it is therefore in their in terests to ensure th a t the young couple are 
compatible.
Because the immediate family bears most of the cost, they may be 
more willing to accept a love m arriage, than  the grandparents and more 
d istan t kin, who may get many of the family's benefits from arranging a 
m arriage while having to contribute little to their costs. Thus the 
involvement of grandparents and more d istan t kin may favour arranged 
m arriage. Their greater stress on family-level a ttribu tes over individual- 
level a ttributes also increases the advantages of early m arriage.
5.12 D ow ry and parents' resp on sib ilities to th e ir  daughters
There are strong parallels between the responsibilities expected of 
family members in Sri Lanka and India and their respective dowry systems. 
According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary a dowry is 'property or money 
brought by a bride to her husband’. Goody regards it not so much property 
or money brought by a woman to her husband as something given by the 
woman's family to her on her m arriage. He writes (1973: 1-2):
Dowry can be seen as a type of pre-mortem inheritance to the bride, 
bridewealth as a transaction between the kin of the groom and the kin of 
the bride.
Goody identifies the essential characterizing tra it of dowry not as the fact 
th a t it goes from the bride's family to the groom's family but the fact th a t it 
goes from her family to her. Dowry was arguably the bride's protection if 
the m arriage went wrong.
In practice, though, dowry does not always work this way. As 
discussed earlier, in an area in the South Indian state of K arnataka where I 
have worked, dowry was unknown until a few years ago and is now paid to 
the groom's family because it is difficult otherwise to obtain a suitable 
partner. While the bride may get some gifts from her family and from the
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groom's, there is little  pretence th a t the major dowry payment, which 
consists nowadays largely of cash, is for the bride, ra ther it goes directly to 
the groom and his family. It is a sort of groom price, the incentive needed to 
get him and his family to agree to the m arriage.
Of course, all of India is not necessarily in the same situation as 
K arnataka: dowry in Kerala, as w ith m any other institutions, seems to 
approach the Sri Lankan situation, and it is possible th a t among the higher 
castes of North India, where dowry has long existed, dowry is different. 
Dowry in Sri Lanka can have some Indian characteristics but it generally 
seems closer to the situation described by Goody with the dowry more likely 
to go to the bride herself. Dowries are more moderate and approximate 
more closely the likely share of the family's inheritance. In K arnataka, 
dowries vary greatly according to w hat is required to achieve a particular 
match. If the girl is too m ature, ugly or handicapped much more m ay have 
to be paid than otherwise. If a particular m atch is to the family's advantage 
they may be happy to pay even if it is a t the expense of other family 
members. The am ounts paid may frequently have little relevance to the 
family's overall wealth or capacity to pay. Some daughters may receive far 
more in dowry than  others who will have to accept w hat are for them  
undesirable m arriages while the sons may be impoverished. In Sri Lanka 
there is a much closer awareness of w hat an equitable dowry is, with 
families giving a reasonable bu t not exorbitant amount, in comparison to 
the am ounts given in K arnataka.
One sign th a t Sri Lankan dowry is regarded in m any ways as 
equivalent to a pre-mortem inheritance is th a t although dowry is more 
likely to be paid for an arranged m arriage than  for a love m arriage, since a 
love m arriage involves an implicit declaration of independence from the 
family, nevertheless m any parents do pay it even in the case of love 
m arriages, sometimes after the m arriage has taken place; though in this
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case it is more a mark of affection than of duty. According to Leach (1971: 
135-136) Sri Lankans see a direct equivalence between dowry and 
inheritance:
The theory behind dowry-giving is that a daughter rates with her brothers 
as an heir to the parental estates but, if a diga - married daughter can be 
given her potential share of the inheritance in the form of cash or jewellery 
or other moveables, then she will have no further claim on the parental 
land. Ideally, land should be transmitted to male heirs only. Dowry-giving, 
as an important institution, tends therefore to be confined to those social 
classes which are sufficiently affluent to be able to hold a part of their 
assets in ready cash and other moveables.
The different nature of the dowry system in Karnataka and Sri 
Lanka is inseparable from the other differences in the nature of family 
responsibility and family structure. The very concept of female inheritance 
implies the breakup or absence of a continuing lineage, or, at least, of a joint 
family. Each couple's position is based not on their membership of a 
particular family but on what each as an individual inherits from a 
particular family. Yalman's comment can be noted that the Kandyan 
Sinhalese family is based on the ge, the unit of husband and wife, in 
contrast to the more hierarchical and patriarchal joint family of India.
The structure of the family helps determine who benefits from dowry. 
Only where the young couple have their own property separate from the 
family is it meaningful to talk of dowry as being what the bride's family 
gives to help set up the new family. Only where the new bride herself can 
retain her own property can one speak of pre-mortem inheritance. Where 
there is a joint family it is very questionable whether the bride would have 
any significant say as to its disposal. While in theory it might be expected 
that dowry would be returned on divorce, in practice, in Karnataka, there 
was little suggestion that this would happen as few families would admit to 
being at fault.
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The difference is not a m atter of delineating who really benefits from 
the dowry, it is also a question of the individual's relationship to the family. 
Patriarchal corporate families, such as joint families, regard individual 
family members, especially females, as wards of the family. The dowry is 
paid not to the daughter directly but to the family into which she is 
marrying; in re tu rn  th a t family will take responsibility for her. In the 
circumstances it would be illogical if the dowry were to be paid directly to 
the bride. In contrast, where individuals are prim arily responsible for 
themselves it would be illogical if the dowry were paid to the family and not 
to the individual.
There are other more practical reasons too why the groom-price type 
of dowry is not paid in Sri Lanka since many of the reasons for it simply do 
not operate in the Sri Lankan circumstances. There is much less concern 
about the age of the bride, in part because it is a less status-based society 
and m atters such as female virginity are seen less as signifying the 
exclusiveness of certain social groups. Besides, m arriage is simply less 
essential, not least to the family. As has been discussed, the family now has 
fewer advantages to gain from a good m arriage and less direct in terest in 
such a m atch because of the diminution in family production and the decline 
of the local community. In th is situation dowry is much more a m atter of 
w hat the family owes their daughter.
5.13 Are the stru ctu ra l d ifferences b etw een  the Sri Lankan fam ily  
and the Indian  fam ily  n ew  or are they  ancient?
Many of the differences between the situation in Sri Lanka and in 
India are not merely responses to different circumstances, but involve basic 
structural differences in the societies and the families within them. The 
question rem ains, though, w hether these structural differences th a t 
distinguish India, where arranged m arriage still prevails, from Sri Lanka, 
where it has largely broken down, are recent or are age old. The answer to
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this question must be that both are true. Sri Lankan society has always 
been different but it has also changed a great deal.
The changes in Sri Lankan marriage as compared to India would not 
have been so radical had Sri Lankan society not been so inclined in this 
direction in the first place. Sri Lanka society in general and Sinhalese 
society in particular never had a corporate family of the type constituted by 
the joint family. This is apparent from the description of the 
anthropologists, particularly Yalman and Leach writing in the 1950s of 
especially remote and presumably traditional villages; Yalman suggests 
that the low-country Sinhalese might be more patriarchally inclined but this 
is evidently only a tendency. Yalman makes the interesting point in this 
regard that the Sinhalese family has never, unlike the Hindu family, been a 
unit of worship:
The Kandyan pattern of undivided tenure, then, may be said to resemble, in 
its general features, the Dayabhaga type of joint estate. But the particulars 
are quite different. The Hindu joint family is normally joint in worship as 
well. The Kandyan case is merely a matter of undivided property: there are 
no family idols, and those who have undivided property do not worship in 
common. Furthermore, the Kandyans allow their daughters much more 
extensive claims to inheritance than is the case in Dayabhaga law (Yalman,
1971: 102) .
Hence the ideological basis for the joint family was essentially missing.
While historical writings indicate that Sri Lankan marriages were 
arranged in the past, they also indicate, as was discussed in Chapter 2, that 
the tight patriarchal family was never a feature of Sri Lanka, and, in 
particular, that the young, including young women, had much more 
independence. Knox (1981), for example, writing in the seventeenth 
century, frequently referred to the freedom of Kandyan women, which he 
saw as licentiousness. While their original marriages may have been 
arranged, Knox indicated they had considerable freedom in their behaviour.
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Furthermore marriage was unstable in a way untypical of joint family 
societies.
Significantly, Knox's (1981: 248) description of dowry among the 
Kandyans approximates Goody’s definition of dowry as pre-mortem 
inheritance:
They do give according to their Ability a Portion of Cattle, Slaves and 
Money with their Daughters; but if they chance to mislike one another and 
part asunder, this portion must be returned again, and then she is fit for 
another Man, being as they account never the worse for wearing.
The writings of other early authors also indicate the lack of a joint 
family. Percival in 1803 commented that
The natives of Ceylon are more continent with respect to women, than the 
other Asiatic nations; and their women are treated with much more 
attention. A Ceylonese woman almost never experiences the treatment of a 
slave, but is looked upon by her husband, more after the European manner, 
as a wife and companion (Percival, 1803: 176).
While not all writings suggest that the position of women was as high 
as portrayed here, it was clearly better than in most of South Asia. 
Percival's comment strongly supports Yalman's point that the basic 
constituent of the Sinhalese family was the conjugal bond rather than the 
corporate family.
While it is evident that the Sri Lankan family and, in particular, the 
Sinhalese family, has long been quite different from the Indian family, the 
evidence indicates that there have also been important structural changes 
within the Sri Lankan family. While the Sri Lankan family has long been 
more based on the conjugal unit than the Indian family, it is clear that it too 
has become more individualized with increasing acceptance of the rights of 
the children to decide for themselves. In a sense the Sri Lankan family has 
moved further in a direction in which it was, in comparison to the Indian 
family, already more inclined.
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5.14 Why w as Sri Lanka different?
A num ber of questions rem ain to be answered including why families 
were organized as they were in Sri Lanka, and why family structures 
differed so greatly between Sri Lanka and neighbouring areas of South Asia, 
questions which could be rephrased as w hat determ ines family structure in 
a given society, and why have family structures been changing in Sri 
Lanka?
These are impossible questions to answer. It is impossible to say 
definitely w hat the situation was in the far d istan t past, nor can one 
ultim ately say w hat preceded what. While differences in the economics of 
m arriage between Sri Lanka and India may be due to differences in family 
structure, family structure itself is influenced by economics. While it is 
difficult enough to try  and identify w hat might underlie very particular 
differences in society, it is much harder to try  and explain w hat lies behind 
whole social systems, and there is a danger of resorting to vague and 
hypothetical generalizations; so I am restricting speculation in this regard 
to citing one suggestion by Goody.
Goody (1973) distinguishes between societies which are characterized 
by w hat he calls diverging devolution, m arked by individual private 
property, typically the case in Asia and Europe, from societies where 
productive assets are communally owned, as is largely true of sub-Saharan 
Africa. In the latter, societies are m arked by large lineages which own 
virtually all property, and through which access to land is gained. Because 
access to land is through the lineage, women in patriarchal societies can be 
left, when their partners die, w ithout access to resources, except through 
their children, and may have to re tu rn  to their own lineages to be able to 
support themselves. This is not a major problem except as far as it involves 
uprooting, as such societies tend economically and socially to be fairly 
egalitarian.
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Goody sees an association between these societies and an economic 
context where almost all inputs involve human labour, and economic 
surpluses are small. Very often their agricultural systems are based on root 
crops which are not suited for cultivation employing animal power. 
Provided a person has access to land, which is generally fairly plentiful in 
these societies, what he or she produces is not greatly different from what 
smother does. There is, thus, only a small differential in material living 
standards between individuals and more importantly there is only a small 
surplus which can be appropriated by a ruling princely or bureaucratic 
class.
In contrast, societies marked by diverging devolution generally have 
agrarian systems that are based on grain, which is easily storable and 
therefore appropriab le , use animal power extensively, have large potential 
surpluses, and are generally land-hungry. Consequently, families and 
individuals are marked by striking differences in social and economic 
status. In these circumstances there is greater pressure towards 
exclusiveness in status and control of resources, especially land. Perhaps as 
a consequence of this and of the need to retain the fruits of one's 
investments such as in irrigation, there was a move to private ownership, 
since communally owned lands could be redistributed to individuals who 
had not previously farmed the land. Whereas the lineages or clans which 
controlled land in communal societies were all-encompassing in that all 
members bom into the lineage had rights to all the land owned by lineage, 
private property divided. Lineages tended to dissolve into corporate 
families. Property was owned by an individual or his family, and on his 
death or earlier was divided among members of his family.
Goody sees the result as placing greater responsibilitlies on the 
family to ensure the economic and social well-being of children. For sons 
this was usually done through inheritance on the death of the household
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head; for daughters it was often done by dowry or w hat Goody calls pre- 
mortem inheritance.
By providing for all the children, the family risked, however, 
dissipating its property, the basis of the family's prosperity. One solution 
was to exclude land from dowry as in North India, though this means th a t 
there is a very considerable problem of finding enough other resources to 
pay for dowry. Goody (1973: 21) suggests th a t where land was included in 
dowry, as in Sri Lanka, then  one would expect to find close connubium as in 
Sri Lanka's cross-cousin marriage.
Goody’s argum ent is plausible but unprovable. If correct, it suggests 
th a t there is a relationship between the economic base and the family 
structure, a point which few people would challenge, but th a t such a 
relationship m ust be very general with the constraints set by the economic 
context allowing for a considerable variety in family structures. 
Furtherm ore, the relationship posited m ust be highly speculative.
The specific in terest of Goody’s thesis for us is its relevance for Sri 
Lanka; nevertheless, the Sri Lankan case may be evidence of a weakness in 
his argum ent. Goody, in his search for information from which to 
generalize, is often forced to rely on very weak or localized data. In writing 
about dowry in India, especially South India, Goody has relied very heavily 
on N ur Yalman's Under the Bo Tree (1971) which is essentially about Sri 
Lanka and the extension of which to South India is itself ra ther speculative. 
This may account for his reference to South India as long having a system of 
dowry including land (Goody, 1973: 21), when, according to my own 
experience and others' evidence, dowry is a new phenomenon in South 
India, has few of the characteristics of a pre-mortem inheritance, and never 
includes land. To th is extent, Goody's characterization of dowry as simply 
being pre-mortem inheritance is grossly oversimplified. Indeed, much of the
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seamless universality of Goody's characterization comes from referring to 
isolated examples in often far different places when few places have all the 
characteristics which he attributes to his two systems, one marked by 
diverging devolution, and the other by communal land ownership.
It is not possible to say precisely why Sri Lankan and Indian social 
and family structures were as they were but it is fair to say that they 
existed within a number of economic and environmental constraints. As 
noted by Goody, the existence of a grain-based agrarian system, no doubt, 
did set certain limitations on their societies. It encouraged a stable social 
system with tightly controlled families. The differences were also 
important. The relatively greater availability of land in Sri Lanka, 
especially for chena cultivation, may give greater economic independence to 
the young and almost certainly reduces the pressure on the family 
regarding inheritance and protecting the interests of the young. In this 
sense it may make for a looser family structure.
It is also possible that environmental factors influence family 
structure indirectly. One factor making for a tightly controlled family is 
pressure from the local community. If, for example, the behaviour of the 
young, especially of daughters, can affect the reputation of the family as is 
the case in India and was the case in Sri Lanka, then the strength of the 
local community is of critical importance. In addition, a strong local 
community is likely to increase the need for family alliances so that the 
family will be able to exert greater pressure when needed. This, in turn, 
will increase pressure for greater control over family members and 
particularly over marriage. The weakness of the local community in Sri 
Lanka was probably in part due to the dispersion of villages there in 
contrast to the nucleated villages common in India. The contrast may relate 
to the different ecology: in Sri Lanka's wet zone water is freely available for 
irrigation and other purposes, and villages can be dispersed with houses
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being located ju s t above the fields which the householders farm, while in 
India villages were much more likely to be dependent upon tanks (earthen 
dams for irrigation) and were generally compactly located adjacent to the 
tanks and the irrigated area. Furtherm ore, the relatively open landscape of 
India may have made warfare a greater problem and therefore encouraged 
nucleation for easier defence.
A part from any overtly economic factors, the other im portant 
determ inants of the nature  of family structure in Sri Lanka and India are 
ideology and history. Im portant ideological influences include religion, 
caste and the concept of the ideal joint family.
As was discussed in Chapter 2, in comparison to Hinduism, 
Buddhism, a t least as now interpreted, places more emphasis on the 
individual than  on the household. In Buddhism it is the individual's 
relationship to the tru th  which is im portant. While this concept is an 
element of Hinduism , there is more emphasis in Hinduism  on institutional 
relationships. Buddhism 's greater emphasis on the individual reflects the 
concept th a t everyday reality is an illusion, a concept which Buddhism 
shares with Hinduism  but on which it places more stress; thus the social 
institutions which are very im portant in our everyday world are ultim ately 
not im portant. Caste, for example, in Sri Lanka is accepted as p art of the 
everyday world but not, as in India, as integral to the very essence of the 
individual. While in theory in orthodox Hinduism  individuals of even the 
lowest caste could hope to obtain enlightenm ent, in practice they would be 
unlikely to as in their very nature they would lack the necessary 
spirituality. In Sri Lanka m embership of the m ain Buddhist order of monks 
is restricted to the Govigama caste, but this is never justified in spiritual 
term s bu t solely by the argum ent th a t society would not, in the past, have 
given the proper respect owing to monks, to members of the lower castes, 
even though as monks they are in theory free of caste. While this is no
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doubt a rationalization, it is a rationalization th a t in India would not have 
been needed; in Sri Lanka, unlike India, caste is essentially a secular ra ther 
than  a religious concept.
Similarly, Buddhism places less emphasis than  Hinduism  on the 
family. For Hindus, as Yalman (1971: 102) notes, the family is a unit of 
worship, with a god's room and specified gods to whom the family as a whole 
owes allegiance; in Sri Lanka worship is essentially an individual concern. 
The major family rites in Sri Lanka, apart from funerals, do not involve 
religion; most im portantly, m arriage is a purely secular affair, unlike in 
India where it involves a religious rite. Buddhism's emphasis on the 
individual helps to explain the acceptance in Sri Lanka of love marriage.
Ideological concepts are not restricted to religious beliefs. Caste, for 
example, involves a notion of pollution which, though related to religious 
beliefs, cannot be reduced to religion. Similarly, though the joint family is 
in India a religious ideal, it is also associated with secular success in th a t 
only a prosperous community such as well-off landowners could fully 
implement the model.
So far the differences between Sri Lanka and India have been 
emphasized yet it is the sim ilarities on which the comparison is based. To a 
large extent there is a shared common culture between Sri Lanka and the 
rest of South Asia, especially India: the m ain ethnic groups, the Sinhalese 
and the Tamils, originally em igrated from India; Buddhism and Hinduism 
originated there. Both Sri Lanka and India have caste, a concept which is 
found in its true  sense only in South Asia. The kinship systems of Sri 
Lanka and South India both use Dravidian kinship terminology. Finally, 
Sri Lanka has borrowed m any of its ideal concepts from India, reflecting the 
high prestige of the civilization there as the home of Buddha and the Hindu 
gods.
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The points being suggested here have been pu t very succinctly by 
Tambiah (1973: 137-139), who argues th a t India and Sri Lanka represent a 
dom inant and a varian t w ithin one family. He notes th a t the Sinhalese and 
other peoples of Sri Lanka are ethnically Indian in origin, and speak 
languages th a t are derived from the major Indian Indo-Aryan and 
Dravidian languages. Tam biah regards the major contrast between the 
Sinhalese and India as being the former's espousal of Buddhism:
it has been suggested that it is their very espousal of Theravada Buddhism 
that in large part explains various aspects of their social structure and 
organization, including such matters as family and kinship structure, 
inheritance customs, the secular nature of marriage, the degree of equality 
between the sexes, the permissibility of divorce etc. Indeed it could 
seriously be suggested that the liberalization of Sinhalese and Burmese 
society as for instance evidenced by greater property rights given woman, 
the loosening of social forms such as unilineality and joint family towards 
bilineality and conjugal family is directly related to two features of 
Buddhism. Firstly, unlike Hinduism and its prime officiants, the 
Brahmins, there is little religious legislation by Buddhism and its monks 
on, and ritual concern with family and kinship practices and norms; 
secondly since the destination of the Buddhist search is said to be 
individual salvation, the religion is alleged to encourage a weakening of 
social groupings like the joint family, to emphasize the distribution of 
property to all children of both sexes alike, to devalue ancester worship and 
preoccupation with male heirs. It would take us too far afield if we 
investigated in detail the relation between Hinduism and Buddhism to their 
respective social structures, but what can be conceded here (without 
suggesting a causal link) is that there certainly is a fit between the 
structure of Theravada Buddhism and the social organization of the 
societies in which it prevails, especially when we keep in view the 
contrasting relation between Hindu religion and the society which it
informs (1973: 138-139).
Regarding inheritance, Tam biah notes th a t
All these societies fall within a belt of double transmission of property to 
males and females, but the Sinhalese and Burmese go to a step further from 
India in general and give females equal rights with males in regard to 
inheritance of patrimonial property, including land (1973: 139).
The moderate degree of scepticism implicit in Tam biah's rem arks 
concerning the causal role of Buddhism relates to the fact th a t some of the 
tra its  distinguishing the Sinhalese from the Indian model are also found 
among Sri Lanka's Tamil community, implying th a t this is simply p a rt of 
the shift from the dom inant to a deviant model.
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This section commenced with a discussion on w hether the greater 
changes in Sri Lankan m arriage patterns compared to the Indian situation 
are essentially responses to new circumstances or w hether they reflected 
deeper structural differences in the Sri Lankan families themselves. In the 
long run  such a distinction is slightly artificial as family structure will 
inevitably respond to new circumstances. The Sri Lankan family, 
particularly the Sinhalese family, has long been structurally  different from 
the Indian family. This section examined the factors th a t have influenced 
family structure in both countries.
The distinction between family structure and responses to new 
circumstances makes greater sense when discussing change. A num ber of 
reasons have been discussed in this chapter as to why the family's 
behaviour concerning m arriage has changed. Economic changes have 
reduced the parents' control over their children, and more im portantly 
reduced the parents' advantages when achieving control over their children. 
The economic changes, along with the political changes initiated  by 
colonialism, have helped to create a new social hierarchy in which tight 
family control is less advantageous and necessary than  formerly. These 
changes involve responses to new circumstances ra ther than  changes in 
family structure, though the responses themselves m ust affect the nature of 
the family.
O ther factors, most im portantly new ideologies, have possibly had a 
more direct effect on the structure of the family. The new political and 
economic context provided conditions conducive to new ideologies, which in 
turn , probably assisted political and economic change. For the family, the 
most im portant of the new ideologies was the concept of the individual. 
Newly imported ideologies from the W est emphasizing the individual 
challenged group-level concepts such as the family and caste. The best 
example of this change is probably the concept of the family itself.
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The idea of a romantic marriage is a powerful one, implying as it does 
the overriding commitment of two individuals to each other. The concept of 
romance was not entirely missing in the past - there are stories of generally 
unrequited love - but it was rarely felt to have anything to do with 
marriage which involved more practical concerns. Marriage was for having 
children and extending the family, not for the shallow egotistical desires of 
two individuals, hence the distinction between marriage and elopement. In 
practice, love marriages are generally very practical themselves and have 
more the nature of self-selection (within limitations) than of romance. 
Significantly, Sri Lankans, even those who have love matches, seem to 
regard the purpose of marriage as essentially to have a family rather than 
to form a long partnership between two individuals. Nevertheless, the 
concept of the romantic love marriage is a powerful force legitimating their 
own marriages.
Here ideology seems to have affected the very nature of family 
relationships rather than simply the way the family chooses to operate. 
Nevertheless these ideologies did not operate in a vacuum. They could not 
have had the effect that they did if the political and economic conditions had 
not been conducive to such changes. Ideology, however, has had an 
important facilitating role for the changes that have taken place.
The acceptance of these new ideologies was made easier by their 
harmonizing with already existing beliefs. Buddhism itself implicitly 
emphasized the individual, but this has been greatly reinforced by the 
developments of the last century-and-a-half starting with the Buddhist 
Revival Movement of the nineteenth century and the Western emphasis on 
the individual.
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5.15 Sum m ary: w hy arranged m arriage is lo sin g  its in flu en ce
This chapter has discussed the possible reasons for the decline in 
arranged m arriage in  Sri Lanka. It has compared Sri Lanka's situation 
with neighbouring India where a sim ilar decline has not so far occurred. A 
num ber of reasons were highlighted including a reduction in the control of 
parents over children, and especially the in terest and advantages of the 
parents in doing the choosing. It was argued th a t w hat had really changed 
was w hat society and families were willing to accept as m arriage. In the 
past, individual-initiated m arriages would not have been accepted as 
m arriages bu t would have been regarded as elopements. It was stressed in 
this regard th a t even now only those self-initiated m arriages acceptable to 
the parents are fully recognized by the parents, though some m arriages 
which occur against the parents' wishes are la ter grudgingly accepted by 
them, but rarely receive full support, and may falter as a consequence.
To phrase the changes in term s of how the respondents understood 
w hat had happened it would probably be best to say th a t children had 
changed. Paren ts still have a responsibility to ensure the future of their 
children but how they do so has become less direct, mainly because what is 
required cannot be directly achieved and because the families' own interests 
are not directly involved. In the past the parents were responsible for 
ensuring th a t their children, especially sons, had a livelihood and, especially 
daughters were suitably m arried. They fulfilled these duties by providing 
employment, usually on the farm, access to land, inheritance, arranging 
m arriages, dowry if required and support in times of need. In return , the 
children were obliged to obey their parents and offer them  w hat assistance 
they could. It was logical th a t this should be the case as children's position 
in society was simply a reflection of the larger institu tions including the 
family to which they belonged, thus the family had to have responsibility for 
them. Furtherm ore, the family’s own interests were a t stake, for the
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members of the family were among its prime assets. This was especially the 
case where the family was the unit of production.
Nowadays, however, a child is not simply an extension of the family 
and the other institu tions of society, such as caste into which he or she is 
born, but depends increasingly on an achieved status. This is itself 
dependent on such m arkers as education. Admittedly, in the past there was 
some role for achievement bu t it was generally closely associated with 
ascribed status. For example, a young woman from a high family was 
expected to have a good moral reputation, it being up to her family to ensure 
th a t it stayed th a t way to protect the family's own status. Furtherm ore, the 
family now has less economic in terest in the child, and the la tte r in the 
family, than  formerly was the situation, as most people now work outside 
the family unit.
The consequence of these changes is tha t families now take a less 
direct in terest in m arriage, and indeed in determ ining the future of their 
younger members in general. The family itself has much less a t stake in 
their future and less to offer and hence is more willing and able to accept 
th a t children are capable of m aking the appropriate decisions themselves. 
The appropriate decision itself, however, is no longer the same as it would 
have been previously. Now, it is much more im portant th a t the couple are 
compatible and capable individuals than  the extent to which their union is 
in the in terest of their families.
Changes in m arriage are p art of a general change from a localized 
society based on the family and other sta tus based on the family and other 
status-orientated institu tions such as caste, to a town-based more 
individualistic society. The chapter examined why the changes th a t had 
taken place were so much greater in Sri Lanka than  in Sri Lanka's nearest 
neighbour and the country with which Sri Lanka has most in common,
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India. It was suggested that this reflected partly the extent of economic 
changes in Sri Lanka: significantly even comparatively poor people depend 
for a large proportion of their income on the cash economy whereas similar 
families in India are likely economically at least to be much more isolated.
Even more basic than such differences in the economy were pre­
existing structural differences. Although these too might have some 
economic basis it was argued that differences in ideology were important: in 
particular, a greater stress in Hinduism than in Buddhism on the unity of 
the family. Also the seemingly greater emphasis in Buddhism on the 
individual was reinforced by Western ideologies stressing individualism 
which found a readier acceptance in Sri Lanka because they were more 
compatible with the pre-existing social ideology. Hence in Sri Lanka less 
emphasis was always placed on the family than in India, a tendency which 
was reinforced by Sri Lankans' more rapid acceptance of imported 
ideologies.
The reasons for the change in how marriages were organized were 
complex. No simple explanations are offered here for what happened but 
rather indications as to what seemed to be the most important factors. The 
emphasis here has been on the continuities, that what has happened owes 
much to the past, and indeed that many features that applied in the past 
still apply in the present even though superficially the situation has totally 
changed. For example, while arranged marriage is being replaced by love 
marriage, close parental supervision is still expected.
Nevertheless, while the continuities are important they should not 
blind us to the very real changes that have taken place. The initiative in 
marriage has shifted from the older generation to the younger generation, a 
shift Sri Lankans regard very seriously. In particular, they regard love 
marriage as being qualitatively different from arranged marriage, and as
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indicating a very different relationship between parents and children. It is 
qualitatively different in th a t love m arriages are regarded as being 
emotionally closer than  those between couples with arranged m arriages, 
though, as has been emphasized, this should not be exaggerated: m arriage 
is not yet prim arily for love, and of course there are exceptions to this 
dichotomy on both sides with some couples with arranged m arriage being 
particularly close, and others with love m arriages being more distant. It 
implies a different relationship between parents and children because it 
means th a t parents and children are to a considerable extent independent of 
each other and cannot autom atically rely on each other for support. 
Nevertheless, comparatively it would seem individuals always had a greater 
degree of independence than  was the case in India.
Having examined the changes in the process of m arriage, whether 
m arriage is arranged or not, and, if it is, how, w hat the families and others 
are expected to contribute including dowry, and, most im portantly, w hat is 
required in the bride and the groom, I wish now to examine the relationship 
between the process of m arriage and age a t m arriage. As was noted a t the 
end of the C hapter 4 there are good reasons to expect th a t the processes 
should influence age a t m arriage, and, as commented on a t the beginning of 
this chapter, there does seem to be some empirical relationship, though it is 
not a hard  and fast one since, while age a t m arriage has increased overall, it 
has a t tim es declined while love m arriage has continued to increase. This 
point is discussed in C hapter 6.
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C hapter 6
C onclusion: m arriage p atterns, an asp ect o f
m arriage
6.1 In trod uction
The previous chapters have examined various aspects of marriage in 
Sri Lanka, concentrating, in particular, on age at marriage and the process 
of marriage. The chapters examined the factors and forces involved in 
decisions concerning marriage, and how and why these have changed. This 
chapter ties together some of the loose strands before discussing what we 
have learnt overall about marriage in Sri Lanka, South Asia, and more 
generally.
6.2 Age at m arriage and the p rocess o f m arriage.
The two preceding chapters have dealt first with why age at marriage 
has risen and secondly with why arranged marriage has declined. This 
section discusses how the two aspects of marriage are related.
There is not a simple direct relationship between age at marriage and 
type of marriage: changes in age at marriage do not simply reflect changes 
in marriage type, nor can changes in marriage type be said just to reflect 
changes in marriage age. While changes in marriage type have been 
dramatic with a continuous increase in the proportion of love marriages, 
changes in age at marriage have moved in a comparatively halting way with 
a general rise being countered occasionally by downward fluctuations. 
Furthermore, the project data shows little direct relationship between age 
at marriage and type of marriage: those females currently entering 
arranged marriages marry in fact slightly older than females currently
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having love marriages, and males entering arranged marriages are 
considerably older than males entering love marriages.
Nevertheless, there is a link between changes in marriage patterns 
and changes in the processes of marriage. When marriage type is controlled 
by current age the project's data indicate that in the past arranged 
marriages were somewhat earlier among women, but not men, than love 
marriages; whereas now among the Sinhalese the opposite seems to be the 
case.
The relationship between marriage age and marriage type has 
changed because the nature and purpose of Sri Lankan marriage has 
changed as a consequence of fundamental changes in Sri Lanka's society 
and economy. Formerly, an individual's position was largely synonymous 
with that of his or her family; position within society and well-being 
depended upon family ties. Membership of the family determined an 
individual’s status including caste status as well as access to family- 
controlled resources. A person had little option but to observe the feelings of 
the family members, particularly of the elders. It was also in his or her 
interests to do so for, with the social system as it was, the interests of the 
individual were normally felt to be virtually identical with those of the 
family. The aims of marriage reflected this. A successful marriage was not 
with a person to whom the individual was attracted; this was a mere 
infatuation, at best a youthful folly, and at worst a disaster. A successful 
marriage was one which would benefit the long-term interests of the family 
and of the individual within it. This required that the marriage was with 
an individual who would fit into the family, would work hard but often more 
importantly would strengthen the family's links with other families, a link 
as vital to the individuals concerned as to the families, in societies where 
one required support from others for protection and to advance one's 
interests.
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In the circumstances it was logical that the family should control 
marriage, to protect its interests and that of all the family members. This 
was especially the case as the family was much better placed than the 
individual to choose the person with the attributes it desired. It could use 
the knowledge of all its members as well as what it could learn about the 
other family and the potential marriage partner through its contacts. The 
older members also had the experience and the managerial responsibility to 
be better able to assess just what additions the family needed. Finally, only 
the family could provide what was necessary for a marriage to be a 
marriage: recognition, marriage payments, access to land and family 
support. To paraphrase Yalman, a marriage without active family 
involvement and recognition was not regarded as a genuine marriage 
because it did not bring all the benefits of marriage.
It was also logical in the circumstances that marriage especially for 
females should be early. As noted in Chapter 4, it was primarily family 
attributes which mattered for marriage, especially in the case of females. 
There was little need to wait until the individual had acquired a particular 
attribute before marriage. There was also little need for a period of 
socialization and education in how a married woman and to a lesser extent a 
married man should behave. These could be directly learnt from the 
parents or parents-in-law and besides, less acquired knowledge was 
required than is now the case. This point comes out very clearly in attitudes 
to childcare and assisting children with their education. There is now a 
much stronger belief that a mother has an important role in these two 
matters and that only an educated woman can fill these roles, whereas 
earlier these matters would have been left to those who knew better 
(especially the old who were deemed to have acquired much experience), or 
would simply have been regarded as unnecessary.
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Conversely there were advantages for the family in the marriage 
being early. One of these was the early establishment of a useful family 
alliance. Secondly, where a woman's primary duty was regarded as being 
reproduction and where many children were seen to be advantageous, as 
was apparently the case in Sri Lanka (see Ryan: 1952), and mortality was 
much higher than it is currently, many families preferred early marriage. 
Even though it may not directly have been in the interests of a woman's own 
family, if early marriage were preferred by the families of eligible males, 
then the failure of a woman's family not to accept an early marriage would 
have meant running the risk of having to accept a less advantageous 
marriage for both the young woman and her family.
In addition to these direct operational advantages of early marriage 
to the family and to the individual, equally important or even more 
important in South Asia, though perhaps to a lesser extent in Sri Lanka, 
was an ideology of early marriage. By such an ideology is meant a whole 
complex of ideas concerning latent female sexuality, the need to prevent a 
young woman exercising too much self-will, the need to submerge her 
identity into the family before she can express too much independence, the 
need to prevent undesirable liaisons especially those which might result in 
the mixing of incompatible blood (cross-caste marriage), as well as the need 
to avoid malicious gossip that would affect her reputation as well as that of 
her family. All these concepts meant that a prudent family would want to 
marry her off before any such risks arose.
Thus, there existed in South Asia, though to a more limited extent in 
Sri Lanka, a social and economic environment in which it was in the 
interests of the families and to a considerable extent of the individuals 
concerned for the families to control marriages and for those marriages to be 
early. Of course, this explanation refers more to why marriage in the past 
was arranged and early rather than to why arranged marriage specifically
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was early. Clearly, though, a specific reason for both arranged and early 
marriage was to ensure appropriate marriages. Arranged marriages helped 
ensure early marriage before any question of morality could arise, though 
this was less important in Sri Lanka than elsewhere in South Asia. 
Conversely, where marriage was to be early and when even slight 
familiarity between the sexes was frowned upon, the consequent 
underdevelopment of courtship meant that love marriage was effectively 
meaningless. Young men and women were not in a position to know enough 
about each other for a suitable match, though, even if they did acquire this 
knowledge, they would undoubtedly have received short shrift.
There is apparently also a link between age at marriage and type of 
marriage in that love marriage is associated with a smaller spousal age gap, 
though the cause of the link is arguable. One reason is that suggested by 
William Goode (1963: 236, 336), that love marriage involves a desire for a 
stronger conjugal relationship which can only be met by a smaller age gap. 
A second reason is that in love marriage, in contrast to arranged marriage, 
individuals have to choose partners from among those whom they meet. 
According to the situation, these may well be of a similar age, as, for 
example, if people meet at work or in an educational institution which they 
are entering at the same time. Thirdly, when arranged marriage is used as 
a marriage of last resort parents are likely to step in earlier for females, for 
example in their late twenties, than for males, perhaps in their late thirties. 
All three factors probably exist in Sri Lanka but they imply quite different 
relationships between the age gap and type of marriage. The conjugal 
relationship explanation implies that the nature of the marriage determines 
the age gap, the context within which marriage partners are selected 
explanation that a particular type of marriage selection determines the age 
gap, and the last chance explanation that the age (rather than the age gap) 
determines the marriage type. Assuming that male age at marriage is fixed
275
by the prior need for employment, then the first two explanations suggest 
th a t m arriage type determ ines female age a t m arriage as a consequence of 
the age gap (though for very different reasons) and the last reason suggests 
th a t it is the individual's age which is associated with a particular age gap 
which determ ines m arriage type. The relative importance of these reasons 
has probably changed. In the past the conjugal factor may have been more 
im portant, not because those having love m atches feel any less strongly 
today but simply because parents may see m arriage as less of an unequal 
relationship and therefore no longer simply assume th a t a large age gap is 
correct; though m arriage in Sri Lanka has probably long been less 
hierarchical than  in India. Secondly, the use of arranged m arriage as a 
final act of desperation has undoubtedly increased as parents no longer take 
quick action when the daughter is young. Hence, there may well have been 
a reversal in causation from m arriage type influencing m arriage age to 
m arriage age influencing m arriage type. The implication of this is th a t the 
continuing large age gap in arranged m arriages does not indicate th a t the 
nature  and purpose of arranged m arriage rem ains unchanged. In contrast 
to the time when m arriage was arranged and early, there now exists in Sri 
Lanka an environm ent where there is diminishing advantage in arranged 
m arriage for the individual and even for the family, and in which there is 
very little  advantage in early marriage.
The breakdown of a localized society and its replacem ent by a wider 
society, where success is dependent much more on achieved status, and in 
whose institutions kinship has a much sm aller role, has m eant th a t there 
are few advantages to arranged m arriage for either the younger generation 
or their parents. Equally these changes have m eant th a t there are few 
advantages and very considerable disadvantages in early m arriage. The 
ideology of early m arriage, which was always much weaker in Sri Lanka 
than  in the region generally, has been rendered virtually irrelevant by the
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social changes which have taken place: particularly the weakening of the 
local community which has meant that families are now less likely to be 
socially excluded for transgressing local morality or the interests of the 
community.
The weakening of the local community does not mean that any sense 
of community has ceased to exist, but merely that the community has 
become much less intrusive. This is partly because it much less constitutes 
the whole of an individual's life, for much more of an individual's life is 
spent outside the local environment and even when located in the local 
environment the individual is much more dependent on outside institutions. 
The weakening of the local community is also, in part, because the 
community is no longer as politically organized as it was, though again it 
was always less so than elsewhere in South Asia. In South India, village 
life is largely built around the local politics led by the powerful men of the 
village. This is not the case in Sri Lanka. The equivalent landowning class 
is much weaker, for most families own some land, and more importantly the 
interests of all reside increasingly outside the village. Neither the 
organizational structure for concerted action nor the motivation any longer 
exist, as the actions of individuals do not by and large threaten the interests 
of the community as a whole.
Apart from reducing the enforcement of the ideology of early 
marriage, the weakening of the local community has also meant that family 
alliances have lost much of their former value. This, plus the fact that 
family production is much less important than formerly, means that there is 
much less advantage for both the older and the younger generations in the 
family in retaining its control over marriage. The consequent lessened 
importance of family status in marriage and the increasing importance of 
acquired attributes has meant that early marriage is no longer as 
advantageous as it was. The reduced importance of family and local
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considerations has also meant that families are in a much weaker position 
to arrange marriages. They no longer have the requisite knowledge nor the 
ability to swing the deal either through influence or through what they 
themselves can provide to the match.
On one level these changes mean that both arranged and early female 
marriage are less advantageous. On another level it means that the close 
relationship between age at marriage and type of marriage has broken 
down. In the past, when families controlled marriage, female marriage was 
early. Now, even when families control marriage, female marriage is not 
early because it is not in the family interests that it be so. The direction of 
causation between type and age at marriage has changed. In the past when 
marriage was to be to a person specified by the family this ensured that it 
was early, while now it is increasingly because the young have failed to 
arrange their own marriage by the expected age that the family has to 
become involved in marriage at all.
The ease with which Sri Lanka, in contrast to the rest of South Asia, 
has moved from one model of marriage, where marriage was family- 
arranged and for females early, to one where self-selection and late 
marriages prevail, is related to the comparative weakness of the constraints, 
particularly ideological ones, on late marriage in Sri Lanka. Female 
marriage was never as early as elsewhere in South Asia, because both the 
non-ideological factors such as family alliance, and the ideological factors 
such as the fear of sexual transgressions, always were less in Sri Lanka. 
The non-ideological factors were less because Sri Lanka had long had a less 
localized society and because the kinship system emphasized intra-family 
rather than extra-family linkages. The ideological factors were also less, 
partly because the lesser importance of the local community meant that 
they had never been enforced with the vigour prevailing in India, for 
instance. But the main reason is probably that Buddhism did not
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emphasize the dangers of female independence, accepting a fairly 
independent status for women and not being overly worried about any likely 
consequences such as cross-caste miscegenation.
The non-ideological factors may have been the primary immediate 
influence making for less arranged marriage and a later female marriage 
age but it was the weakness of the ideological constraints which allowed 
this to happen. In India and the rest of South Asia the non-ideological 
factors have been changing too in the same direction though not generally 
as far as in Sri Lanka, but changes in type of marriage and age at marriage 
have been held back by the greater resistance of ideological impediments 
concerning fears of uncontrolled female sexuality. The greater emphasis 
there on caste purity seems to be an important factor in this.
6.3 Why has m arriage ch an ged  in  Sri Lanka?
Marriage patterns are indivisible from the larger processes of 
marriage and marriage change which are themselves aspects of the larger 
social processes in the society. Age at marriage has changed because society 
itself has changed and accordingly the nature of marriage within it. 
Because social processes are so complex, generally multidimensional, and 
often ambiguous, it is very hard to tie down the exact relationships involved, 
and equally it is very hard to make predictions about the future.
It has been argued here that Sri Lanka has shifted from a position 
where society was much more family and community based to one where it 
is based on the individual. This is the shift that Maine (1863) was 
discussing in the move from status to contract and Tönnies (1955) described 
as the shift from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft. A consequence of the shift 
has been that the aims of marriage and what is wanted in a marriage 
partner have changed. In a society based on the family, family interests 
and family authority were predominant. A marriage had to contribute to
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the family's in terests or a t least not underm ine them. Hence, a m arriage 
partner had to be someone who would accept the primacy of family 
interests, and the structures of prevailing authority  within the family and 
the community, and whose family had the right sta tus and could provide 
m aterial and other benefits. It was also im portant th a t a bride could assist 
the family in terests by having children who would contribute to the family's 
labour force and security; it should be noted th a t the family as a whole, 
including the parents who made the decision, received the benefits of any 
grandchildren but it was the couple themselves who had to bear any direct 
burden.
In the new society based on the individual, increasing emphasis is 
being placed naturally  on w hat is im portant for the individual ra ther than  
w hat is im portant for the family. W hat the individual brings to the 
m arriage partnership  is much more im portant than  w hat he or she brings to 
the family as a whole. The young m ust be able to manage on their own, a 
cicumstance th a t requires an element of m aturity  and preferably skills, 
education and a job. The previously im portant requirem ents of family level 
a ttribu tes is much less im portant. Family status as distinct from individual 
sta tus is much less im portant than  it was. Family alliances similarly count 
for less in the much larger, less localized world th a t now prevails. Most 
im portantly, the individual has less to contribute to the family than  
previously. Family property, particuarly land, is of much less significance 
than  it was, and outside income, which individuals earn through their own 
jobs, much more im portant. Thus, the shift from a family-based society to 
an individual-based society, or in Maine's (1863) term s from a society based 
on sta tus to one based on contract, appears to have been the driving force in 
the transform ation of m arriage in Sri Lanka.
Nevertheless, an  understanding of the natu re  of m arriage requires 
more than  a simple "status-contract" dichotomy. No society completely fits
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either of the two stereotypes. India was in Chapter 5 characterized as an 
example of a family-based society (it also served as Maine's classic example 
of a status-based society), while Western societies may be regarded as 
particularly individualistic societies (Maine's contract-based societies), but 
it would be grossly misleading to suggest that the individual is or was 
absent in India or the family was absent in the West. In all societies both 
status and contract are important, what is being discussed here is where the 
emphasis lies. If India and the West do not and never have fitted the 
stereotypes, Sri Lanka certainly does not.
Sri Lanka has moved from a position where family was more 
important to one where the individual is but again this is a comparative 
point. The family was never as dominant in Sri Lanka as in India while it 
remains more important than it is in the West. It is precisely because the 
family was willing to concede a larger role to the individual that marriage in 
Sri Lanka has changed as much as it has.
Apart from the fact that no society fits the simple stereotype of being 
totally family-oriented or totally individualistic, too simple a dichotomy 
understates the complexity of human society. Most importantly though, it 
tells us very little about why society was as it was and why it is changing. 
What is of interest is not that there has been a shift towards a more 
individualistic society but why this is happening, and what underlay the 
previously more family-oriented society and the new more individualistic 
society. In this sense the dichotomy of family and individual-oriented 
societies is less important than the underlying processes involved. The 
thesis has examined a number of these processes with regard to Sri Lanka.
The thesis has identified as being crucial to an understanding of the 
transition in Sri Lankan marriage, the nature of kinship and family 
structure in Sri Lanka and how this has interacted with changing economic
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structures and new ideologies. M arriage is no longer early or arranged 
because the factors which underlay early and arranged m arriage no longer 
exist. The family has less to gain from controlling m arriage or from 
pursuing early m arriage, and those m arrying have less to gain from their 
families being involved in the m arriage. Social and economic success is 
much less dependent on the family, its prosperity and reputation and on the 
ties it has with other families. Success now depends much more on 
individual achievement and qualifications such as education. Consequently 
w hat m atters for m arriage is not w hat individuals can contribute to the 
wider family but w hat they can contribute to the m arriage partnership.
Under the new conditions, early female m arriage is not an advantage. 
While a younger bride m ight be an advantage for the husband's family she 
would not be able to contribute as much to the partnership  as a somewhat 
older bride. For the family, a younger bride was more likely to have an 
unblemished reputation, accept family precedence and authority, and 
ultim ately bear more children. For the partnership  an older, more m ature 
and probably more educated woman can provide guidance when the family 
is no longer interested, and can do things th a t were not thought to be 
im portant in the past such as looking after the family's health  and assisting 
children with their schoolwork.
Furtherm ore, having as m any children as possible is less in the 
couple's in terest, especially nowadays. The larger family, especially the 
parents, gained m any of the benefits of children while leaving most of the 
burden to the couple. Nowadays children are much less of a benefit to the 
family as well as the couple, while their costs have risen. They are less of 
am advantage for m any of the reasons th a t early and arranged m arriages 
are no longer an advantage. Since family property is less im portant there is 
less need for the labour children can provide on the farm. The lessened 
importance of family property means th a t the family cannot easily
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appropriate the labour of the young, for the off-farm earnings they get are 
more visible, being in the form of money and almost always paid directly to 
those who provide the labour. Furtherm ore, the new urban economy 
requires education for economic and social advancement, thus greatly 
raising the costs of children while sim ultaneously reducing the time they 
have available for family use.
However, it is not simply a m atter of recent changes. The advantages 
of children were always less in Sri Lanka than  elsewhere in South Asia 
because family obligations were different. In Sri Lanka, each m arried 
couple was regarded as a separate economic unit and even children were 
usually allowed to reta in  any cash income they earned. In the past this did 
not m atter so much because the costs of children were less and because on 
the family farm the input of their labour could be easily appropriated, but, 
as a consequence of the changes mentioned above, it does m atter now.
Ju s t as early female m arriage is not an advantage, arranged 
m arriage is not either. The families now receive little benefit from 
controlling m arriage while the costs of the assistance provided in arranged 
m arriages are very considerable. Similarly, for the younger generation the 
advantages of arranged m arriage are now much more limited. The family 
links accompanying arranged m arriage are often more onerous than  useful 
while the families are not in a particularly useful situation to select the 
m arriage partners the young themselves want.
The kinship and family structure is closely connected to the 
advantages and disadvantages of m arriage and hence the degree of family 
involvement in m arriage. The thesis has identified, as being crucial to an 
understanding of the transition  in Sri Lankan m arriage, the nature  of 
kinship and family structure in Sri Lanka and how this has interacted with 
changing economic structures and new ideologies. As discussed in Chapter
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5, in a traditional society the kinship system determ ines most social 
relationships, who are kin, affines or strangers, as well as the inheritance of 
property and offices, and how the old and the young will be provided for. 
The way kinship did this has profound implications for marriage. In Sri 
Lanka the kinship system emphasized m arriage very much as a family 
concern bu t otherwise gave the children a comparatively high degree of 
personal autonomy. The kinship system emphasized m arriage w ithin a 
restricted group of relatives, often cross-cousins. The kinship structure is 
built round the balancing concepts of kin and affines. There are two types 
of people with whom an individual has links in the same generation, those 
who are their brothers and sisters ^  whom they cannot marry, and those who 
are their cross-cousins: father's sister's child and m other's brother’s child. If 
a person m arries a non-relative the new spouse will be classified as a cross­
cousin bu t the preference is certainly for m arriage to true cross-cousins. 
Cross-cousin m arriage helped to prevent the dispersion of family property 
and protect family status. Land could be inherited by daughters as well as 
sons so concerns about the breakup of family property were very real. Thus 
m arriage was a family concern but there was no suggestion of a patriarchal 
joint family, and the individual family members including women had a 
high degree of independence. As family property could be inherited 
bilaterally there was no real corporate property and hence little basis for a 
patriarchal jo int family or lineage. The patriarchal family was further 
underm ined by cross-cousin m arriage, which was probably an a ttem pt to 
prevent family property from being dispersed. It m eant th a t daughters 
were brought back into the family or a t least retained their links with their 
nata l families through one or more of their children m arrying back into 
their families. By doing so it underm ined the basis of the patriarchal family 
as it exists in the northern  parts of South Asia, sustained by the rigorous 
exclusion of the daughters of the family and the breaking as much as
1. Including parallel cousins - father’s brother's child and mother's sister's child.
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possible of all links to the women's nata l families. Only then  could the men 
legitim ately claim to be the perm anent nucleus of the family, the women 
being outsiders except as wives or m others. Where women could claim a 
stake in the family by b irth  the men's claims for sole supremacy were 
unsupportable.
Consequently, a fair degree of independence was left to individual 
units; this is presum ably why the young were allowed to retain  their own 
earnings. Hence, the potential for greater individualism  was built into the 
kinship system. The lack of a joint family m eant th a t there was much less 
pressure for a daughter-in-law to know her place, and hence one less reason 
favouring very early m arriage. When concerns about preserving the 
family's property and sta tus became less im portant as a result of economic 
changes and the decline of the local community, there was little advantage 
to the family in rem aining directly involved in m arriage. The family 
retained its veto over the m arriage to the extent of ensuring th a t the chosen 
m arriage partner was a suitable m atch who would enhance the standing of 
the family, but otherwise they were happy to leave the choice to the 
individual.
The increasing individualism  of recent times is reflected in the 
kinship terminology. As S tirra t (1977) has noted for the village of 
Wellagoda, but which is more generally true of the kinship terminology of 
the low-country Sinhalese, kinship terminology is changing so th a t instead 
of cross-cousins being identified as potential affines they are increasingly 
being referred to by the term s for brother and sister which, by implication, 
excludes them  from m arriage. Hence m arriage is coming to be perceived in 
kinship terminology not as a union which brings two families or the 
members of one family together but as a union of unrelated individuals. 
This change in kinship terminology is presum ably a sign th a t the old term s 
were no longer in agreem ent with modern realities; the economic and social
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basis of the old kinship system no longer existed. The principal requirem ent 
underlying the old system, the need to prevent the dissipation of family 
property, is less im portant than  the need to m arry a person with the right 
characteristics.
In summary, changes in m arriage patterns in Sri Lanka are an 
aspect of a shift from a localized family-based society to a wider more 
individualistic society. This change itself reflects the in terests of the 
m embers of the community, who now have little to gain through localized 
institu tions including the family, and more to gain by concentrating on their 
own in terests w ithin the newer and much larger community centred on the 
towns. The changes in Sri Lanka have been more radical than  elsewhere in 
South Asia because the supports of the older family-based society were 
always weaker in Sri Lanka. Fewer people had an in terest in m aintaining 
family control largely because of pre-existing differences in family and 
kinship structure.
6.4 Why is  Sri L ankan m arriage la te  even  by the standards o f the  
West?
So far I have discussed why m arriage patterns have changed in Sri 
Lanka and particularly why female age a t m arriage has been rising all this 
century and perhaps longer. W hat I have not dealt w ith properly is why age 
at m arriage is as late as it is, to the degree th a t it  is now later than  in many 
W estern countries.
The economic problems of poverty and high unemployment coupled 
with rising expectations, and a new environm ent in which m arriage is no 
longer an  essential p a rt of social life, provide the essential context for very 
late m arriage. In these circumstances m arriage is less feasible in Dixon's 
term s th an  it was in the past when aspirations were less, or than  it is in the 
contemporary West where the means are greater. In C hapter 4 it was
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argued, however, th a t financial problems were less im portant in delaying 
m arriage than  were increasing advantages to the individuals and to their 
families in delaying m arriage. P art of the explanation here is th a t achieved 
individual a ttributes increasingly count for more than  ascribed family 
attributes. Since achieved attributes depend on the family there is little 
reason to delay m arriage. In contrast, achieved characteristics have to be 
acquired and often dem onstrated. It is not enough to acquire an education, 
it is also im portant to show th a t it can be put to good use in the aquisition of 
a suitable job with the appropriate income and status. Where the economy 
is depressed and unemployment is high but education and especially a 
modern job is seen as the passport to the modern world, for both men and 
women m arriage can in  such circumstances be delayed a very long time 
indeed. The situation has changed from one where there is little  reason for 
m arriage to be delayed to one where there is very little reason for it not to 
be delayed, often alm ost indefinitely, except for the risk of not m arrying at 
all. Even the danger of rem aining perm anently celibate is reduced by the 
fact th a t a m arriage can usually be arranged if need be, especially as there 
is now very little opprobrium regarding older brides.
A good example of the acceptance of delayed m arriage is the num ber 
of couples who often court for years before finally having a love m arriage, 
usually after the husband, a t least, has got a job. Their reasons for delaying 
so long are partly  financial: they need a sufficient income; but even more 
im portantly in the Sri Lankan context where family approval is still 
necessary, the bride would not get permission to m arry a groom who did not 
have a suitable job. M any m odem  couples also like to delay their m arriages 
until they have had more experience of the world, th a t is until they are 
ready to m arry. There is surprisingly little  worry about the risks of 
delaying m arriage for there  are much stronger pressures in Sri Lanka, than  
in the West, on engaged couples to m arry, no m atter how long the period of
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engagem ent is. It is felt to be a responsibility which if broken not only is 
unfair to the other party  but also shows a lack of moral fibre. A long 
delayed m arriage is also possible because if the worse does happen and an 
engagem ent is broken, arranged m arriage rem ains as a final possibility.
6.5 W hat do the ch an ges in  Sri Lankan m arriage in d ica te  about 
m arriage and p articu larly  m arriage change generally?
This study commenced with an exam ination of the literature 
concerning m arriage patterns in the W est and in Asia. It noted the 
difficulty of comparing W estern and Asian m arriage patterns, for W estern 
m arriage in comparison to Asian m arriage tended to be much later 
particularly  for women, with a higher proportion never m arrying a t all. The 
explanations given for variations in m arriage patterns w ithin the West and 
within Asia tended to be quite different. Variations in W estern m arriage 
patterns were generally explained in term s of the couple's ability to 
economically support a household, whereas in early-m arrying Asia, 
variations in m arriage were explained more in cultural term s, when the 
young should m arry. Dixon (1970: 79) noted th a t there was a stronger 
correlation between female age at m arriage and differences in indicators of 
the feasibility of m arriage in the W est than  in Asia whereas there was a 
stronger correlation between female m arriage age and indicators of 
desirability of m arriage in Asia than  in the West; a complicating factor was 
th a t the direction of the correlations differed between Asia and the West. 
Indicators of economic development were associated w ith early m arriage in 
the W est and late  m arriage in the E ast bu t this was probably more a sign of 
the inadequacies of Dixon's indices than  anything else.
One reason for the greater importance of feasibility as a reason for 
delaying m arriage in the W est was the need to establish an independent 
household. To establish a household of the required standing took a great 
deal of resources especially when the young were expected to do this on
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their own. Laslett (1977) has described how the young of both sexes spent 
considerable periods before m arriage working to save up for marriage. 
Hajnal (1965: 132) has even suggested th a t the very considerable capital 
accumulation th a t m ust have been involved is one reason for the W estern 
economic revolution of the last few centuries. The absence of available work 
m eant th a t m any couples had to put off m arriage or even never m arry a t all.
In contrast, it  has been claimed tha t, in Asia, couples were not 
obliged to establish a new household from their own resources and hence 
the lack of resources was not a major factor delaying m arriage. Specific 
reference (e.g. Davis, 1955: 33-39) has been made to the existence of the 
joint family, where the couple lived with the husband's or much more rarely 
the wife's family, following marriage; and to arranged m arriage, where the 
family paid the costs associated with m arriage. The point relates prim arily 
to the cost of establishing a household bu t the problem of sustaining a 
household is also im portant. However, the difficulty here, too, was less in 
Asia than  in the West. The young often worked on their family's land, or 
land to which the ir families had access, and would normally inherit p art of 
any land their families had, partible inheritance being the norm in Asia. 
The Asian em phasis on the family as against W estern individualism  m eant 
th a t a person could not be denied access to property which was his right as a 
member of the family, provided he observed his family obligations.
There is much validity in these points but certain reservations should 
be made. As Dixon (1971: 228) points out, parts of Asia never had the joint 
family and yet they too fitted Hajnal's non-European model of early and 
universal m arriage, though m arriage was probably not as early as where 
the joint family did exist. Furtherm ore, as Reddy (1991) has pointed out for 
India, there is little  evidence th a t joint families are associated with early 
m arriage. Reddy notes (1991: 253) th a t the
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available evidence shows that age at marriage is lower in nuclear than in 
joint families and that wives and children far from being a liability are an 
asset and the need for female labour is more acute in nuclear than in joint 
households.
F ar from m arriage being a burden to the groom and his family, it was 
actually a net benefit. Reddy rem arks (1990:264):
The assumption that age at marriage is low in joint families because the 
husband does not have to support a wife and family does not appear to be 
true. In the agrarian societies that Davis talks about, a wife works hard 
both in the household and in the field, and earns not only for her own needs 
but also for others in the family. Westermarck knew about this double 
burden of the farm wife when he wrote: 'Indeed far from being a burden to a 
man, wife and children are frequently a source of prosperity (1921). ... 
Similarly, children in agrarian societies work long and hard, and do not 
become a liability to their father’.
Reddy, admittedly, is referring to the family structure of the parents 
ra th e r than  to w hether or not the young couple will establish a new 
independent household. Nevertheless, his basic point holds, th a t marriage 
m ay bring m any economic advantages. In K arnataka, families complained 
about the costs of m arrying, particularly the difficulties of paying for dowry 
and expensive weddings, which were usually associated with large dowries 
(see Bradford, 1985). But they did not regard being m arried itself as 
involving major costs since both husband and wife worked if necessary, 
though they did accept th a t young children are no longer the economic 
benefit th a t they were.
In Sri Lanka the expenses of the m arriage itself are less, in tha t 
dowries tend to be smaller and weddings less expensive, bu t the cost of 
being m arried m ay be somewhat greater. Nevertheless, the cost of 
m arrying and being m arried does not seem to be the basic factor delaying 
m arriage. Even where all possible family assistance is provided, age at 
m arriage is rising. The clearest, though atypical example of this, is on the 
estates. Here, women were the m ain breadwinners and, from the male 
point of view, and th a t of their families, early m arriage was beneficial. 
Indeed, the point comes up in several of the interviews th a t a son had
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m arried because a woman was needed to help support the family. In this 
case it was the families of the girls th a t were reluctant for them  to m arry 
early.
While the specific economic circumstances of the estates were 
unusual, even elsewhere the cost of m arriage was not the prim ary factor 
delaying m arriage. Early m arriage for females or males is no longer seen to 
be in the in terests of either the two individuals concerned or their families, 
for the reasons outlined earlier, most im portantly th a t they have not yet 
acquired the characteristics th a t are now preferred in m arriage partners.
This raises the question why early m arriage was preferred in Asian 
countries in the past. The most commonly cited reason in the litera tu re  is 
ra ther ambiguously term ed socio-cultural factors (e.g. P.Sm ith, 1980). The 
most im portant single factor cited is the desire to protect the purity  of 
daughters and thereby the reputation of the family. While this does seem to 
be an im portant factor, it is by no m eans sufficient. Even in societies where 
concerns about female reputation are not so strongly felt, m arriage was 
nevertheless reasonably early, though perhaps not quite as early as in 
societies where it was felt strongly.
A second factor which could be considered as coming under socio­
cultural factors is the preference felt in  many Asian societies, for a young 
bride who would be more easily 'moulded' into the family. This also is an 
im portant factor bu t even where this was not so in Asia, m arriage was still 
earlier than  the W estern norm.
A part from suggesting th a t m arriage is more feasible in Asia than  in 
the West, Dixon has also argued th a t it  was more desirable. Desirability as 
a concept has much in common with socio-cultural factors, in th a t the la tte r 
help determ ine w hether m arriage is desirable. Dixon, though, has
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som ething more concrete in mind and w rites more from the individual's 
point of view about w hether it is worth m arrying early, or m arrying a t all.
Dixon (1971: 229) refers to m arriage as being particularly desirable in 
Asia for three basic reasons:
(a) the need to have children, who, unlike in the West, provide 
income not expenses, in  societies where mortality, 
particularly  in fan t mortality, is high;
(b) the social isolation of the celibate where few others are 
celibate;
(c) the lack of alternatives for women, especially where women 
lack access to high-prestige wage labour.
It is less th a t the unm arried are socially isolated, for, in comparison 
to W estern society, they have extensive networks of family and more d istan t 
kin to in teract with, th an  th a t there is no accepted role for the unm arried 
adult. Similarly, even where acceptable work was available, m arriage was 
nevertheless expected and was often early.
The most basic factor to which Dixon's points relate is th a t the whole 
organization of society was based on the family and only by being m arried 
could one effectively participate in it. In this circumstance, m arriage was to 
the advantage of both the individual and the family. Sri Lanka shows this 
very clearly. Only when the family orientation of society broke down could 
the individual or the ir families consider late  m arriage or even non­
m arriage. This is the essential difference between W estern and Asian 
m arriage. In Asia the family was central and hence m arriage was early and 
universal, while in the W est it was not and hence other factors came into 
play. A choice betw een w hether to m arry or not was possible. In Asia such 
a choice would have been impractical.
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This raises the question if Asia is moving towards the European 
model of w hether to m arry or not and w hether the same factors are 
involved. There are some signs th a t m arriage is becoming more of an 
individual choice; after all arranged m arriage is on the decline, and even 
celibacy is becoming a possibility. In Sri Lanka, for instance, it will be 
in teresting to see w hether the higher proportions not m arrying in their 
twenties and th irties will transla te  into higher num bers not m arrying a t 
la ter ages or ever.
Nevertheless, Asia has not yet arrived a t the W estern situation. In 
Sri Lanka, for example, the family has w ithdraw n from direct involvement 
in m arriage but indirectly its presence is still there, and the family will 
intervene if it feels its in terests are being infringed, for instance if an 
unsuitable m arriage partner is chosen. If the child of the family is unable 
on his or her own account to find or a ttrac t a suitable partner, the family 
will also intervene to organize a m arriage. Furtherm ore, the Sri Lankan 
family is still much more involved in m arriage and in the life of the 
individual than  is the case in the West. Especially when the m arriage is 
arranged by the family but even when it  is not, the family provides 
considerable support to the individual in tim es of need. Family members 
assist each other and depend on each other to a much greater extent th an  in 
the West. To this extent m arriage is still not a completely independent 
decision. Most people are still expected to m arry, but to obtain the most 
desirable m arriage partner m arriage delay is now acceptable.
If the reason why m arriage was earlier and more universal in Asia 
than  in the W est was because society was more family-oriented, the 
question is why has Asian society changed? It is not so much th a t Asia has 
acquired the individualistic society of the W est, though this may happen 
eventually, bu t th a t the individual ra ther th an  the family is now a t the 
centre of society. This is an  apparent contradiction but there is an
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im portant difference in emphasis involved. W hat has changed is not th a t 
family and kinship structures have broken down leaving individuals on 
their own but th a t changes in the external economic and social context have 
reduced the sphere over which the family has sway. This has consequently 
led to changes in how individuals and families make decisions.
Changes in the economic and social context have m eant th a t a much 
greater role has had to be conceded to individual attribu tes than  was the 
case in the past. It has also m eant th a t w hat the family can bring to the 
m arriage is much less im portant than  was the case in the past, and it has 
m eant th a t the family is in a much weaker position vis a vis the individual 
th an  formerly to choose a m arriage partner or to negotiate an advantageous 
m arriage.
This helps to explain why age a t m arriage has risen alm ost uniformly 
in Asia even though family structure in Asia varied from the joint to the 
nuclear family, and even though there is little  evidence th a t family 
structure has changed greatly. There has not been a sudden shift from the 
jo int family to the nuclear family. Many parts of Asia, including Sri Lanka, 
or a t least the majority community, the Sinhalese, never had a fully 
developed joint family, yet age a t m arriage was much earlier than  it now is. 
There is little evidence in Sri Lanka th a t family structures differed greatly 
in the past, and considerable evidence that, while there seem to be some 
signs of change in kinship, as indicated by shifts in kinship terminology, 
these so far are minor.
Nevertheless, to say th a t m arriage patterns have changed across Asia 
irrespective of family structure, and to say th a t changes in family structure 
have not greatly contributed to changes in m arriage patterns is not to say 
th a t family structure is irrelevant to the subject. The structure of the 
family and of the kinship system has had an im portant role in influencing
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m arriage change not because they themselves have altered, though 
ultim ately this m ust happen, but because they are im portant mediating 
factors in determining the influence of external changes on m arriage 
decisions.
Age a t marriage, particularly for females, increased for joint, stem 
and nuclear households because external circumstances m eant th a t such an 
increase was in the in terests of family and individual irrespective of family 
type. Nevertheless, particular family types m eant th a t the advantages of 
early or la ter m arriage were greater in some societies than  in others. In Sri 
Lanka, for example, the comparatively loose Sinhalese family, where 
children were allowed to keep separate budgets and did not have to 
contribute to the household, m eant th a t there were fewer advantages for the 
family in being directly involved in m arriage. I t also m eant th a t many of 
the features th a t made early m arriage advantageous were relatively weak. 
Children contributed less and therefore the desire to have m any children 
was less of a reason for m arrying early. To some extent the family always 
was less dom inant than  in much of Asia, and therefore family attributes did 
not m atter quite so much and individual a ttribu tes m attered more.
In contrast to the Sinhalese families, Tamil parents in Sri Lanka still 
re ta in  greater control over their children, and the children are still expected 
to contribute to their families. Hence the parents reta in  strong incentives to 
control their children's m arriages. In the particu lar context of the estates, 
however, th is has not led to the families favouring early m arriage but on the 
contrary late m arriage. While external factors may be ultim ately 
responsible for w hether the family is a t the centre of the social system, and 
hence w hat the role of the family in m arriage is, some family structures 
encourage greater family involvement in m arriage than  others. In general 
in such societies early m arriage will be advantageous, though the last 
example was an exception because of the unusual economic context. In
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particular, tight joint families will generally result in more family 
involvement in m arriage and earlier m arriage than  looser family structures.
W hat does the comparison between Asia and European m arriage tell 
us? It suggests th a t the prim ary factor distinguishing W estern m arriage 
from Asian m arriage is not th a t m arriage is less feasible in the W est th an  it 
is in Asia but simply th a t it is less necessary for the individual and for his or 
her family. Hence, there is little reason for the family to be involved and 
hence also financial considerations can become a factor. Another reason why 
financial considerations have been of relatively little  importance in delaying 
m arriage in Asia is simply because m arriage was in the past financially 
advantageous for all concerned. The lack of assistance provided by parents 
to children in W estern m arriage is itself a sign of how little there is to be 
gained by close family involvement in  m arriage, and how long this has been 
the case.
This raises the question to w hat extent family and kinship structure 
cam be treated  as autonomous variables from the surrounding economic and 
social order. Ultimately, there m ust be interaction between the two and the 
W estern family and m arriage systems seem to be am example of this. The 
fact th a t parents did not need mamy family members to protect family 
property and the fact th a t children were not needed for old age support 
probably did dem onstrate the underlying im pact of a secure political and 
social order and a comparatively developed capitalist economy where 
investm ents could be made in property and not simply in children in 
contrast to the situation in less secure areas. Also the W estern economic 
and social system was to some degree an outcome of its family structure, as 
is suggested in Hajnal's comment th a t one reason for the West's economic 
development may have been the capital build-up due to both future 
m arriage partners saving up over several years for m arriage.
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Asia, however, has not yet arrived a t this stage. Family and kinship 
structure, and the economic and social order, are still largely autonomous 
variables. It is still possible, therefore, to speak of how the family and the 
individual approach decisions regarding m arriage given the prevailing 
economic and social conditions. The economic and social conditions have 
changed m arkedly in Asia and hence how the family and the individual 
approach such decisions has changed.
Asia, however, has not yet reached the position where the individual 
is entirely autonomous. M arriage is being delayed because it is to the 
advantage of both the family and the individual th a t this should be so. In 
the long run, Asia may move to the W estern position where m arriage is 
increasingly unim portant, a t least to the spouses' families of origin. This is 
why, up until now, m arriage in Asia has been delayed but proportions never 
m arrying have not yet risen to W estern levels. Ultimately, with the 
declining family in terests in m arriage and the collapse of arranged 
m arriage, Asian m arriage may move towards the W estern pattern  in this 
aspect of m arriage as well.
6.6 A theory o f  m arriage
To conclude it  is appropriate to consider w hat contribution this thesis 
has made to a theory of m arriage. Chapter 2 referred to P.Sm ith's (1980: 
60, 91) argum ent th a t the weakness of most analysis of m arriage transition 
is the lack of a theory of m arriage transition; he dismisses Becker's theory of 
m arriage as ignoring sociological reality. He suggests th a t a useful theory 
of m arriage transition  would have to s ta rt with the family. Sm ith (1980: 
91-92) suggests th a t the theory would involve individuals or their parents 
choosing the most advantageous options given the natu re  of family ties, the 
overall social structure, and intergenerational resource transfers. He 
argues th a t the empirical support for this theory building requires a
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microlevel approach to quantify intra-fam ily resource transfers over the 
family life cycle, and how these transfers are modified by the m arriages of 
the children.
The elem ents th a t Sm ith has identified in his approach seem 
sensible. M arriage is, after all, for creating family links, either in a new 
family, or as an extension of an existing family. Thus it is of vital concern to 
the natal families of the m arriage partners, though the direct involvement 
of these families will depend upon the extent to which their immediate 
in terests are a t stake. The degree of family involvement in marriage, who 
makes the decisions, and w hat is expected of individual members of the 
family are vital issues in the explanation of changes in m arriage patterns. 
The age a t which people m arry or w hether they m arry a t all is directly 
related to w hat is expected of an individual or w hat he or she can expect of 
others, most im portantly in the family.
In  this study there has not been a specific a ttem pt to quantify 
intergenerational resource transfers over parents' and children's life cycle 
and how the m arriages of children modify these transfers as Smith 
recommends, bu t the general issues concerned have been examined. It 
would be extrem ely difficult to quantify resource transfers in the way th a t 
Sm ith desires. Nevertheless, it is clear from this study th a t what 
individuals in various family roles can expect from other members of the 
family, during the course of the family life cycle, is of profound importance 
in term s of the family's involvement in m arriage. Given the pre-existing 
family structure  and kinship system, and the associated rights, obligations 
and expectations, with the desire of each individual to optimize the 
advantages, including resource flows, open to him  or her and to the family 
as a whole, the changes which have occurred in Sri Lanka's m arriage 
patterns have been a rational response to the external changes th a t have 
taken place. Fem ale age a t m arriage has risen, in part, because it is no
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longer in the in terests of the families to be involved in m arriage, nor is it in 
the children's in terest for them  to be so involved.
Nevertheless, while th is thesis has looked a t some of the issues raised 
by Smith as being essential to a theory of m arriage, I do not claim to have 
produced a model of the m arriage transition. The definition of m arriage 
varies greatly between societies and it is consequently difficult to fit 
m arriage easily into a theoretical framework. Much of the change in 
m arriage patterns is a resu lt of changes in precisely w hat m arriage is; 
where it was once prim arily an aspect of inter-fam ily and intra-fam ily ties it 
is now essentially a relationship between two individuals.
The aims of th is thesis are to explain m arriage in one country, Sri 
Lanka, in a way th a t takes into account the fact th a t m arriage is not simply 
a m atter of demographic statistics, but m ust be understood in term s of its 
overall social and economic circumstances; and to in terpret the implications 
of those findings in the wider regional and global context. I believe the 
major value of this study lies not in w hat it contributes to a theory of 
m arriage transition bu t in showing specifically how m arriage patterns in Sri 
Lanka have changed as the perceived in terests and families have changed 
in response to the impact of external circumstances on pre-existing family 
and kinship systems.
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